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Craig R Kleinman (# 8451)
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3434
Facsimile: (801)521-3484

Attorneys for Appellant/Respondent
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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THIS
STATUTORY DISCONNECTION PROCEEDING
1.

The initial Judicial Petition for Disconnection (the "Petition") listed Bluffdale

Mountain Homes, L.G and South Farm, L.L.C. as petitioners and Bluffdale City
("Bluffdale") as respondent. R. 1-2
2.

Since the Petition was not brought by those required under Utah Code Ann. §

10-2-502-5(a), the lower court, without jurisdiction, authorized an amended Petition (R 16380) with the following additional parties: Laguna Investments; Malibu Investment
Company, LP; JLC Investments, LLC; Hidden Valley Associates; T & M Holdings, LLQ
Bluffdale Enterprises, LLQ James E. & Shirley C Butterfield (as trustees); Scott B. Barclay
(as trustee); Don E. Petersen, Jr.; Don W. & Elaine W. Bennion (as trustees); Daro E.
Hamilton; Myrtle's Seven, LTD; Fredrick K Osterloh; Rodney W. Butterfield; Weston
Butterfield (as trustee); Danell C Bills; Jay G. & Arda D. Bennett; Vauna Parr; Roger L. &
Susan Gailey (as trustees); Gary K. & Linda Kessimakis; The Patricia J. Rasmusson Family
Limited Partnership; Lucille G Bearden (as trustee); Dale W. & Sharen L. Hamilton (as
trustees); Robert & Deanna Phillips; Van Dee Bearden; Randall E. & Sheila E. Bloomdale;
Billy L. & Donna J. Mangum (as trustees); Dianne B. Mangum (as trustee); Jean T. &Kim S.
Mangum (as trustees); Michael L. & Deborah K. Mangum; Marilyn L. Russo (as trustee); and
Dave Shelby Realtor, Inc.
3.

At trial, South Hills Development, L.L.G claimed to be the successor in

interest to Bluffdale Mountain Home, L.G R 1283 at 4:.
4.

There are no prior or related appeals by any ol the parties to this action.
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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THIS
STATUTORY DISCONNECTION PROCEEDING
1.

The initial Judicial Petition for Disconnection (the "Petition") listed Bluffdale

Mountain Homes, L.C and South Farm, L.L.C as petitioners and Bluffdale City
("Bluffdale") as respondent. R 1-2
2.

Since the Petition was not brought by those required under Utah Code Ann. §

10-2-502-5(a), the lower court, without jurisdiction, authorized an amended Petition (K 16380) with the following additional parties: Laguna Investments; Malibu Investment
Company, LP; JLC Investments, LLC; Hidden Valley Associates; T & M Holdings, LLC;
Bluffdale Enterprises, LLC; James E. & Shirley C Butterfield (as trustees); Scott B. Barclay
(as trustee); Don E. Petersen, Jr.; Don W. & Elaine W. Bennion (as trustees); Daro E.
Hamilton; Myrtle's Seven, LTD; Fredrick R Osterloh; Rodney W. Butterfield; Weston
Butterfield (as trustee); Danell C Bills; Jay G. & Arda D. Bennett; Vauna Parr; Roger L. &
Susan Gailey (as trustees); Gary K. & Linda Kessimakis; The Patricia J. Rasmusson Family
Limited Partnership; Lucille G Bearden (as trustee); Dale W. & Sharen L. Hamilton (as
trustees); Robert & Deanna Phillips; Van Dee Bearden; Randall E. & Sheila E. Bloomdale;
Billy L. & Donna J. Mangum (as trustees); Dianne B. Mangum (as trustee); Jean T. & Kim S.
Mangum (as trustees); Michael L. & Deborah K. Mangum; Marilyn L. Russo (as trustee); and
Dave Shelby Realtor, Inc.
3.

At trial, South Hills Development, L.L.C. claimed to be the successor in

interest to Bluffdale Mountain Home, L.C R. 1283 at 4:.
4.

There are no prior or related appeals by any of the parties to this action.
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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0. However, because the Petition commencing this lawsuit was not filed by
those required by statute (Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5)(a)), the lower court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and this Court's appellate jurisdiction is limited to reversing the Decree of
Disconnection and dismissing the statutory proceeding. Hawxniv ToimcfNorth Salt Lake, 3
Utah 2d 189,281 P.2d 216 (1955).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that it had jurisdiction to enter a

disconnection decision. R. 198; 1003; & 1283 at 14. The appellate court reviews a trial
court's determination regarding subject matter jurisdiction in a disconnection case under a
correction of error standard, according the trial court no deference. SeeHouard, 281 P.2d
216; Skokos v Corradni, 900 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
II.

Whether the trial court erroneously interpreted the determinative statutes to allow

disconnection of the territory in question. The appellate court reviews a trial court's
statutory interpretation for correctness, according the trial court no deference. SeeHowzrd,
281 P.2d 216; Manmvnt Corp. v White City Water IrrpmimentDisL, 958 P.2d 222 (Utah 1998).
A.

Whether the trial court erred in adjusting the common municipal boundary

between Bluffdale and Herriman City ("Herriman") to facilitate the annexation of territory
into Herriman, in contravention of Utah Code § 10-2-510, which provides that Utah Code
Ann. § 10-2-419 is the exclusive mechanism for adjacent cities' common boundaryadjustments. R. 200; 1002-03; 1283 at 13-14 & 1297 at 103-04 & 104.

1

B.

Whether the trial court erred in holding the proposed disconnection did not

leave or create a peninsula or island of unincorporated territory prohibited by Utah Code
Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii). & 198; 1003,1008-10, & 1283 at 12-13.
C

Whether the trial court erred in allowing a Developer to circumvent a lawful

municipal land use decision by using the statutory disconnection process, not following the
statutory remedy of appealing that decision to the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-91001 (2003) (which was subsequently appealed in 2005 and supplanted by § 10-9a-801).
III.

Whether the trial court erroneously determined that "justice and equity" required

disconnection in this matter. An appellate court reviews a trial court's application of a legal
standard to the facts of the case for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's
determination. SeeJensen v Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, \ 127,130 P.3d 325.
A.

Whether the trial court erred in finding that the citizens' challenge of a zoning

ordinance by referendum is a factor in determining that justice and equity require
disconnection pursuant to Utah Code § 10-2-502.7. & 1004 & 1297 at 104 & 109.
B.

Whether the trial court erred in holding that "justice and equity7' required

disconnection, based on the City's planning and zoning process for one developer. & 199*
C

Whether the lower court erred in holding that raw ground requires

disconnection where it will be immediately developed and require municipal services. & 200
& 1011-12.
IV.

Whether the lower court made erroneous findings, including (1) whether the

disconnection is viable, K 1297; and (2) whether the lower court erred in holding that the
disconnection would not leave Bluffdale City with an area within its boarders for which the

2

cost of providing municipal services would materially increase. K 1003; 1008; & 1297. An
appellate court reviews the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury under a
clearly erroneous standard. RHN Corp. v VeM, 2004 UT 60, 96 P.3d 935.
DETERMINATIVE CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are determinative constitutional provisions (U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 and
Utah Const, art. I, § 7) and statutes (Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-501(1) & -502.5(5)(a))
showing the lower court lacked jurisdiction. In addition, Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-419 &510 preclude a court from using a disconnection to "abrogate, modify or replace" a common
boundary between two municipalities absent a voluntary boundary adjustment agreement.
The Utah Legislature set forth the elements developers must prove to justify a disconnection
in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3). The requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)
and the former § 10-9-1001 (2003) set forth the standard of judicial review in this matter.
The provisions relevant to a citizens' referendum petition of a zoning ordinance are
set forth in Utah Constitution Article VI, § 2(b)(ii) and Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-7-102(3) and
-601 etseq.
The Court should apply the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-1-104(6) and 10-2502.7(3) (c)(iii) to determine whether the disconnection decree should be reversed because it
creates an island or peninsula of unincorporated territory.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is a statutory proceeding where a developer of property in Herriman, South

3

Farm L.L.C ("South Farm") and its property owner allies1 seek to disconnect nearly 40% of
Bluffdale G t / s land area. The property owners could have received municipal serves by
remaining in Bluffdale, but are seeking to disconnect because they believe they will get more
development concessions in the adjacent city of Herriman. Bluffdale favors large lots
consisting of one to 1.75 units or residential density per acre. Herriman has indicated it will
allow South Farm to develop at a density in excess of three dwelling residential units per
gross acre. At trial, the parties stipulated that any disconnected land will be annexed and
developed in Herriman. & 1283 at 102-03; 1295 at 38 &Ex. 130.
B.

Course of Proceedings
When Bluffdale rejected South Farm's application to amend its general plan and

zoning ordinance, South Farm along with one other developer, Bluffdale Mountain Homes,
L.C (the "Two Developers") filed the underlying Petition. South Farm chose to not appeal
Bluffdale's land use decision, although it was entitled to due so at the time pursuant to Ltah
Code Ann. § 10-9-1001. Bluffdale moved to dismiss for a failure to exhaust available
remedies and for lack of jurisdiction. The lower court allowed the Two Developers to
amend their petition by adding additional petitioners. The Utah Court of Appeals declined
to grant permission to file an interlocutory appeal of that jurisdictional decision.
Thereafter, the parties entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to resolve their
differences. Accordingly Bluffdale enacted a zoning ordinance that, if applied to the
property in dispute, would allow for the mixed developments proposed by the Two
Developers. After the city enacted the new ordinance, a group of citizens filed a referendum
1

South Farm and South Hill Development, L.C. have paid all of the attorney's fees and
costs incurred by all of the petitioners seeking disconnection. & 1295 at 195-196.
4

petition referring the zoning ordinance to the voters. The parties subsequently entered into
a consent decree agreement resolving all their issues. They presented the proposed decree to
the lower court, but it was not accepted.
C

Disposition in the Lower Court
After a four-day bench trial, the lower court entered a Decree of Disconnection.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

Lack of Lower Court Juris diction
1.

This action is a statutory municipal disconnection proceeding pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5)(a). R. 1-28.
2.

The affected municipality is Bluffdale Gty, Salt Lake County, Utah. & 2.

3.

On July 5, 2002, South Farm filed a complete application to amend Bluffdale's

general plan and to change the zoning for its 1,124 acres. & 1295 at 69, See Trial Exhibit
(hereinafter "Ex.") 50 (Tab A). See also K 1295 at 67.
4.

The City Council eventually rejected the application on December 9,2003

because it did not conform to its master plan and land use principles. Exs. 169, T & U.
5.

South Farm did not seek judicial review of the denial pursuant after

determining it would be futile to appeal the land use decision. R. 1296 at 69-70.
6.

In an attempt to reach an accommodation with South Farm, the Bluffdale Gty

Council eventually voted to reconsider the denial. Exs. 170-71.
7.

The Two Developers responded in February of 2003 by filing 52 requests to

disconnect almost 40% of the Gt^s land so that it could be annexed into lieniman. Exs.

5

90-92. The proposed disconnection area comprises 3,971 acres and is illustrated on a map
(Ex. 90) included in the Addendum. K 1283 at 223-24 & 1295 at 12.
8.

South Farm requested Bluffdale and Hertiman to voluntarily adjust their

common municipal boundary to include the subject real property. South Farm also
petitioned Bluffdale to disconnect the property and asked Herriman to annex it. Id
9.

Bluffdale Gty timely denied the disconnection. K 1-28; Exs. 179-81.

10.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.5(5)(a) allows "petitioners" to challenge a city's

denial of a disconnection. "Petitioners" is a term of art defined by Utah Code Ann. § 10-2501(1) as persons who own "real property within the area proposed for disconnection" and
"have signed a request for disconnection". Id
11.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-2- 501 (2) (b) provides that "each request for

disconnection shall... contain the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more
than 50% of the real property in the area proposed for disconnection."
12.

The Petition giving rise to this litigation was filed by only the Two

Developers, and not by any of the other affected property owners. K 1-28; Exs. 90-92.
13.

South Farm owned 1,124 acres and Bluffdale Mountain Homes owned 106.67

acres in the disconnection area. K 20 & Exs. AD & CD. Combined, the Two Developers
owed a total of 1,230.67 acres, comprising only 31% of the disconnection area. Id.
14.

Bluff dale moved to dismiss the Petition on the basis that the lower court

lacked jurisdiction to hear the disconnection proceeding. & 45-50; 56-59.
15.

Bluffdale also pled lack of jurisdiction as an affirmative defense. & 41; 198.

6

16.

The lower court recognized the Petition did not comply with section 10-2-

502.5, but allowed the Two Developers to amend the Petition. Order on Motion to Dismiss, R
160-162. A partial transcript of the July 30,2004 hearing (R 1278) provides as follows:
THE COURT: It is my initial impression to grant the motion
to dismiss, and that is based upon the fact that the petition in
this case is brought in the names of fewer than all the persons
who signed requests for disconnection with the Gty.***
"Petitioners" in the statute is a defined term. Petitioners means
persons who (a) own title to real property within the area
proposed for disconnection and (b) have signed a request for
disconnection proposing to disconnect that area from the
municipality. So when the statute says... that the petition
against the municipality may be brought by the petitioners, I
think that it is using petitioners in the defined sense in the
statute, which is all the people who have signed the request for
disconnection. So this particular petition would be defective in
that it is not signed by all the persons who signed requests for
disconnection in the Gty. I don't think this is a problem
resolved by Rule 19. *** They intended the statute to preserve
the requirement that the petition or request for disconnection
be brought by persons representing a majority of the land
affected by the disconnection.
R 1278 at 4-5. Bluff dale's counsel informed the lower court
M R GARDINER [T]he Court does not have jurisdiction - it
clearly does not, because the petition is facially defective—you
can't go ahead and say, alright, tiy to amend your petition so
that we do. All you can do is dismiss the petition without
prejudice.
R 1278 at 12-13. Instead, the lower court ruled as follows:
THE COURT: Alright, I'm going to rule, and consistent with
my tentative ruling in the case, I'm going to allow the
petitioners 30 days to amend the petition
R1278atl9.

7

17.

Bluffdale requested permission to file an interlocutory appeal the lower court's

ruling, but permission was denied by the Utah Court of Appeals.2 & 181-84 & 203-06.
18.

The Two Developers filed an Amended Petition with an additional 33 of the

original 52 requested property owners listed as petitioners. & 163-80 &Exs. 90-92.
19.

Bluffdale answered the Amended Petition by again pleading lack of subject

matter jurisdiction as an affirmative defense. R 185-98.
20.

The lower court concluded that it had jurisdiction because the 52 Requests for

Disconnection filed with the Qty contained the names and signatures of the owners of more
than 50% of the property within the disconnection area. R. 1165-1166. Those "facts" are
not disputed by Bluffdale in this matter. Id
21.

Bluffdale never admitted that more than 50% of the real property owners filed

the Petition in the district court. Instead, Bluffdale only acknowledged that some of the
administrative procedural requirements had been met. Bluffdale has never admitted that the
property owners met the jurisdictional requirements in district court. & 172,178 & 255-56.
B.

The Lower Court Incorrectly Interpreted the Common Boundary
22.

Bluffdale Qty is bounded on the west by Herriman Qty. & 1295 at 61; Exs.

BJ, BK, 91-92, 210, 212 & 220. South Farm views its proposed developments in Herriman
and Bluffdale as coordinated projects planned together. R. 1295 at 38.
23.

From its beginning as a city, Fferriman committed to approve the South

Farm's plans for development. Prior to incorporation, Herriman's community council sent a

2

When the appellate court declines to address subject matter jurisdiction in an interlocutory
appeal, the parties may appeal subject matter jurisdiction once a final judgment is entered.
Houghton v Department <fHealth, 2005 UT 63,116,125 P.3d 860, 866.
8

letter to the Salt Lake County Commission dated April 6,1998 supporting South Farm's
entire 2,081 acre project (half of which was located within Bluffdale's boundaries). & 1283 at
248-49 & Ex. CFL The letter was signed by J. Lynn Crane, who is now the mayor of
Herriman. Id && 1283 at 249.
24.

Two weeks later, the developer of South Farm's property3 provided a letter

supporting FJerriman's efforts to incorporate as a city. The commitment included using inhouse and consultant services, attending County meetings, and financing a loan for an
amount up to $97,000. K 1283 at 250-51 & Ex. CH.
25.

After Bluffdale rejected South Farm's application to amend the general plan

and rezone, South Farm sought to obtain a voluntary boundary adjustment between
Fferriman and Bluffdale. South Farm's alternative plan was to disconnect its property from
Bluffdale so that it could annex into Herriman. K 1295 at 124.
26.

Consequently, the property owners filed simultaneous requests with Bluffdale

and Herriman to either (1) adjust common boundaries, or (2) to disconnect and then annex.
K 1283 at 215-16,224 &Exs. 90-92.
27.

Herriman never acted on South Farm's request for a voluntary boundary

adjustment. & 1283 at 225.
28.

The Two Developers and other property owners plan to immediately annex

into Herriman. & 1178-79 & 1283 at 226, 254. The parties to this action stipulated at trial
that Herriman cannot decline a proper application for annexation. Id

South Farm, L.L.C. and SF Development L.L.C., the predecessor to Rose Crest, Inc.,
are companies controlled by James Lee Sorenson. R. 1283 at 102, 104 & 116.
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29.

The map attached to the Requests for Disconnection shows the property

owners who did not sign a Request for disconnection. They include but are not limited to
parcels 1, 5, 3, 6, 59, 60, 70,72, 73, 84, 89,103,105,106,124,125, and 127. R. 1283 at 217219.
30.

Those parcels along the boundary line of Bluffdale that did not sign Requests

for Disconnection, could annex back into Bluffdale and take some of the parcels, whose
owners signed Requests for disconnection. R. 1283 at 121,222-223.
C

The Lower Court Created an Unincorporated Island or Penninsula
31.

It is undisputed the proposed disconnection area consists of 3,971 acres, K

1295 at 12, and is identical to Bluffdale's Planning District 4. R. 1296 at 12 & Exs. M-N.
Bluffdale is comprised of a total of approximately 10,000 acres. & 1296 at 12.
32.

It is undisputed the area at issue is bounded by Heniman on the west,

Bluffdale on the east, Riverton City on the north and Camp Williams, a federal military
installation, on the south. & 1295 at 61, 81 &Exs. 210,212-16.
33.

Camp Williams provides its own (self-contained) municipal services. K 1296

at 179. Unincorporated areas receive municipal services from the County, while
incorporated areas receive services from cities. If the lower court views Camp Williams as
"incorporated territory*' in its disconnection analysis, then there is no dispute that the
disconnected area would be unincorporated land surrounded by incorporated lands.
34.

The Utah Code defines peninsula in an unincorporated area to mean "an area

surrounded on more than 1/2 of its boundary distance, but not completely, by incorporated
territory and situated so that the length of a line drawn across the unincorporated area from
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an incorporated area to an incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of
the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area." Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6).
35.

Blaine Gehring, Bluffdale city planner, testified that the perimeter of the

disconnection area is 90,399.91 feet. R 1296 at 170 &Ex. A. Mr. Gehring applied the
mathematical formula found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6) and concluded that the area
was a peninsula. Id He was the only person who testified about the exact length of the
circumference of the disconnection area. Id
36.

Shane Jones, former city engineer, testified that the disconnected area is a

peninsula. R 1296 at 132.
37.

Mike Bradshaw, South Farm's engineer, admitted in his testimony that the

definition of peninsula does not state where a line from the length of the unincorporated
area to an incorporated area on the opposite side should be drawn. R 1295 at 62. He
further admitted that he could draw several lines in several locations in the disconnection
area that would meet the statutory definition of a peninsula. & 1295 at 65, 78-80.
38.

The property owners' assertion that the disconnection area is not a peninsula

is based on the notion that the unincorporated territory in Utah County should be included
in applying the statutory definition of a peninsula. R 1295 at 74 & Ex. 209.
D.

The Developer Circumvented The Municipal Land Use Development and
Management Act
39.

The majority of the land in Bluffdale consists of rural, country-type residential

developments. R 1296 at 165. Roughly 30% of Bluffdale's developed land area consists of
lots smaller than one acre and 60% are one acre or larger. R 1295 at 116.
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40.

Bluffdale encouraged South Farm to develop with one acre lots. R. 1295 at

41.

At the time South Farm filed its application, it knew that the disconnection

32.

area was master planned for one acre lots. & 1283 at 182-83.
42.

South Farm submitted an application to Bluffdale that was patterned after

another application it has submitted to Salt Lake County (and later Herriman) for a mixed
use development. K 1295 at 113.
43.

The applicant hopes to construct 3,183 residential dwelling units on 674 acres

for a density of 4.72 units per residential acre. Ex. 50 at Tab K. The proposed development
also includes acres for streets, church sites, commercial space and parks. The residential
density per gross acre is 2.83 (calculated by dividing 3,183 units by 1,124.6 acres). Id
44.

Only 10% of South Farm's proposed development will be allocated to the

residential development of one-acre lots. R. 1283 at 187.
45.

The application bears little if any resemblance to Bluffdale's mater plan. Id

46.

South Farm's application triggered this disconnection action. K 1283 at 182.

47.

The crux of the instant dispute is Bluffdale's master-planning of one-acre

residential lots versus South Farm's plan for mixed use development. & 1295 at 120.
48.

If South Farm had known that Bluffdale would stick to its plan for one-acre

lots, it would have filed for disconnection back in 1993 or 1997. & 1283 at 240.
49.

All of South Farm's proposals to Bluffdale contained a residential density of

2.8 units per gross acre (except for the parties' Consent Decree). Ex. 123. In the Consent
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Decree, South Farm and the other property owners agreed to residential density of 2.6 units
per gross acre. & 1295 at 114.
50.

South Farm's position at trial was that since the property in the disconnection

area is adjacent to Herriman or Riverton, Bluffdale should have considered the property for
uses with higher densities. & 1283 at 205-06.
51.

On December 9, 2003, Bluffdale denied South Farm's application because the

Gty Council determined it did not conform to the master plan's land use principles. Ex.
169.
52.

After the denial, the Two Developers immediately decided to seek a

disconnection proceeding instead of South Farm filing an appeal of the land use decision to
the district court. & 1295 at 143-44.
53.

At trial, the Two Developers stipulated that they did not appeal Bluffdale's

lawful land use decision because an appeal would have been futile. R 1296 at 69-70.
E.

The Citizens' Petition for Referendum Does Not Justify The Disconnection
54.

In June 2005, Bluffdale entered into a Memorandum of Understanding

("MOU") with the property owners. & 1295 at 163. The property owners testified
Bluffdale behaved reasonably after entering into that agreement. & 1295 at 164. Pursuant
to the MOU, Bluffdale enacted the zoning ordinance that the property owners needed for
approval of their application. R 1295 at 144. Absent the citizen's referendum, the
disconnection lawsuit would not have continued. See R 1295 at 93.
55.

Instead of waiting for the June 2006 referendum election, the property owners

decided to pursue this disconnection action. R 1295 at 146-47.
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F,

Bluffdale's Planning and Zoning Process Did Not Create The Justice and
Equity Requirement for Disconnection
56.

The lower court concluded that justice and equity required disconnection

because Bluffdale's planning and zoning process was characterized by unreasonable delays
and changing standards. & 1185-86.
57.

The lower court's criticism focused on Bluffdale's processing of one single

application: South Farm. South Hills did not file a land use application until after Bluffdale
had entered into the MOU and adopted the mixed use zoning classification. 1295 at 165.
58.

It is undisputed that South Farm initiated its application of May 2002,

completed it in July 2002, and was turned down in December 2003. Exs. 50,169, T & U.
From the beginning of the process, South Farm knew that Bluffdale consisted mostly oneacre lots. K 1295 at 30-31. South Farm's engineer testified in his deposition that Bluffdale
had treated South Farm fairly up to May 2002, when South Farm filed its application, but he
changed his mind at trial. & 1295 at 133-34. Although the property owners' Requests for
Disconnection (Ex. 90) claimed they had spent ten years planning with Bluffdale, only South
Farm presented testimony supporting that claim. The other testifying property owners had
to admit that they had no experience with Bluffdale's planning process. & 1283 at 5 & 1295
at 215,218.
59.

The 10-years claimed by South Farm included all of its proceedings before Salt

Lake County beginning in 1993, and all of the additional proceedings with Herriman before
and after it incorporated. K 1283 at 5 & 230. South Farm did not seriously concentrate on
developing in Bluffdale until May 2001. K 1295 at 29. The 16 months Bluffdale spent
before ultimately rejecting South Farm's application is comparable to the waiting periods of
14

other municipalities. South Farm waited 12 months for disposition by Salt Lake County, and
an additional 10 months for Herriman to negotiate a development agreement for South
Farm's twin development outside of Bluffdale. & 1283 at 40-42. During the same time
period, Bluffdale has processed several other third-party applications for residential lots or
mixed use developments. R. 1296 at 23.
60.

The Two Developers believe the City acted responsibly between June 2005

and November 2005 when the lower court rejected the Consent Decree. Bluffdale made
several changes to its development standards, enacted a new zoning classification, and
executed a Consent Decree in an attempt to accommodate the Two Developers proposals
for a mixed-use development. R. 1295 at 90. Bluffdale cannot be blamed for the lower
court's rejection of the Consent Decree. & 675-79 & 1296 at 131.
61.

Bluffdale invested a considerable amount of time and effort in creating plans

for development of the disconnection area. K 1296 at 122. Bluffdale had completed a
Transportation Master Plan, a Revised Land Use Plan, a Revised Storm Drainage Plan and a
Revised Master Plan before the instant action was initiated. K 1296 at 105. Bluffdale
completed a culinary water system plan shortly after litigation was commenced in this matter,
but the lower court refused to consider it. & 1296 at 113.
62.

Regardless of the amount of time it might have taken for Bluffdale to process

the application, South Farm would have still sought disconnection because it was unwilling
to develop the property in accordance with the Bluffdale's master plan. R 1295 at 120.
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63.

Bluffdale enacted Resolution 2005-05, which provided that South Farm would

provide Bluffdale a waterline easement and the Qty declared an intent to allow South Farm
to develop in a way comparable to its development in Herriman. Ex. 38.
64.

South Farm told Bluffdale that it did not considered Resolution 2002-05

neither binding nor enforceable. & 1283 at 242-44. After it was enacted, South Farm felt
that it still did not have a deal acceptable to the Qty. & 1283 at 253-54. The Consent
Decree complied with the resolution's requirements. R. 1296 at 200.
G.

Undeveloped Land That Will Be Immediately Developed In An Adjacent City
Does Not Create The Justice and Equity Requiring A Disconnection
65.

The real property at issue is largely undeveloped; there is only one home and a

large water treatment plant located therein. R. 1295 at 14 &C Ex. 210.
66.

The land will remain mostly vacant in the period of time between its

disconnection from Bluffdale and its annexation into Herriman; the Two Developers have
already filed a petition for annexation. R. 1283 at 254,1295 at 66 & Ex. 90.
67.

South Farm plans to develop in Herriman in the same manner as it proposed

in Bluffdale. R 1295 at 324. South Hills plans to develop its 640 acres residentially with a
density of at least 2.8 units per gross acre. K 1295 at 152-53 &Ex. 130.
68.

If the disconnection is granted, Bluffdale will lose the benefits of the proposed

developments. & 1295 at 94. Bluffdale will lose the system improvements and amenities
the Two Developers would have helped to finance. R. 1295 at 196.
69.

The property owners prepared some materials opposing the referendum. See

Ex. CK. The materials list the benefits that Bluffdale stands to lose in the disconnection: an
increased and improved road system; trails and open space allowing for access to foothills
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for equestrian pedestrian users; regional park with amphitheatre for everyone's use;
recreation center for youth and adult programs; a commercial center; preservation of the
Mountain View corridor; land for a future fire station; culinary and secondary water storage
capacity increased storm water runoff capacity protecting Bluffdale; and design control
guidelines which will raise neighboring property values.
70.

There is little or no evidence in the record to suggest that Bluffdale will not

lose these benefits in a disconnection.
H.

Marshaling of the Evidence on the Issue of Whether the Disconnection is
Viable
71.

The property owners must prove the viability of a disconnection by the

preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(a).
72.

South Farm's in-house engineer testified the disconnection was viable because

the land was vacant land and, once disconnected, would remain vacant. & 1295 at 66.
73.

South Hills' CEO testified it was viable because the raw land with minimal

services would remain in the same state the day after it was disconnected. & 1295 at 176.
74.

The Two Developers' consulting engineer testified the disconnection was

viable because there would be no existing infrastructure before and immediately after the
disconnection. & 1295 at 229.
75.

The Two Developers' financial expert testified that the disconnection would

be viable because there was very limited tax revenue produced by the property and very
limited services provided to the property. K 1295 at 324-25. She opined it is viable because
the property is undeveloped and produces only about $1,750 in tax revenues. Id
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76.

The lower court found the disconnection was viable as undeveloped land. &

77.

The lower court also found that the property would be viable if it was annexed

1184.

into Herriman and developed in the manner proposed by the Two Developers because
Karen Wikstrom of Wikstrom Planning Consultants testified
credibly that because of the increase in'critical mass'of
population brought by the planned development, together with
planned and existing commercial and retail elements, the
planned community will provide more than offsetting revenues
though sales taxes.
R a t 1184.
78.

The evidence suggesting that undeveloped land makes the disconnection

viable is insufficient. The Two Developers have petitioned Herriman for annexation;
Herriman has no choice but to accept the annexation; Herriman is committed to approving
South Farm's development; and South Hills will develop its 640 acres as a residential
development with density of at least 2.8 per gross acre. R 1179.
79.

When asked whether the taxes generated would pay for the two police calls

and eight fire calls per year that the property annually requires, Petitioners' financial expert
answered: "I don't know that, I can't state that as a fact". R 1296 at 11 & Ex. 130.
80.

Karen Wikstrom opined that the disconnection would remain viable in

Herriman because the residential development creates commercial development. R 1296 at
43-45. That testimony is insufficient to support a finding that the disconnection is viable in
Herriman because Ms. Wikstrom's sweeping proposition does not comport with the specific
findings contained in her report. Ex. 130.
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81.

Wikstrom concluded that the disconnection will cost Herriman almost $^5

million more to serve the disconnection then it will generate from all forms of revenue
available to the general fund. Ex. 130 at 51. Her analysis included all commercial
development. Id at 43. All of South Hills' development will all be residential, K 1296 at 43,
which may contribute to municipal deficits. R 1296 at 45. Ms. Wikstrom was unable to
identify any additional commercial development that would be created by the Two
Developers' proposal. K 1296 at 43-44 & Ex. 130.
82.

Ms. Wikstrom also admitted that according to Herriman's budget documents,

Exs. D & E, Herriman does not generate sufficient taxes or other lawful sources of funds to
pay for Herriman Gty's general fund expenditures.
Question: [Herriman] is not funding its general city obligations
through taxes, it is using development fees to do that, isn't it?
Answer: Uh uhh (affirmative).
K 1296 at 39.
Question: They are [Herriman] using the development fees
contrary to the state statute to fund general services.
Answer. Uh uhh (affirmative).
IdztAO.
83.

Herriman's general fund shortfalls include the following: $2,132,629 (2002-

2003); $2,920,328.00 (estimated for 2003-2004); $5,706,180.00 (2004-2005); and $6,165,240
(2005-2006). E x s . D & E .
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I.

Marshalling of the Evidence on Whether the Disconnection will Leave an Area
Within its Boundaries for Which the Cost's Requirements or Other Burdens of
Providing Municipal Services Would Materially Increase Over Previous Years
84.

On the theory that vacant land will remain vacant immediately after it is

disconnected, South Farm's engineer testified it would not materially increase municipal
costs to Bluffdale City. & 1295 at 67-69. South Farm's CEO, David Millheim, testified
there would be no impact on Bluffdale's roads. & 1295 at 168. He also testified, however,
that Bluffdale would lose the improvements and amenities financed by the Two Developers.
R 1295 at 196.
85.

As stated earlier, Ex. CK represents the document the Two Developers put

together that lists the things that Bluffdale will lose as a result of the disconnection. R. 1295
at 207-208. Again, the Two Developers' consulting engineer said there would be no negative
impact upon Bluffdale because there is no infrastructure in the area. & 1295 at 231. But he
admitted that his analysis does not take into account roads and transportation and is not sure
whether the disconnection would have a negative impact on Bluffdale's water system. R
1295 at 243-244. He admitted that it is possible that Bluffdale will lose preferred sites for its
water system. & 1295 at 246. He also could not say with certainty that there would be no
negative impact from surface runoff from the disconnected area through Bluffdale. & 1295
at 256. The Two Developers' road expert testified there would not be a negative impact on
Bluffdale's roads because traffic increases would only be 2-5% if the Mountain View
Corridor goes in, but he admitted that no one knows whether it will go in or not. & 1295 at
284. The road expert also admitted the disconnection would have an impact on 3600 West
and 14400 South in Bluffdale. R. 1295 at 273-274. The Two Developers' financial expert
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testified it would not have a negative impact on Bluffdale because it only provides $1,750.00
in tax revenue to Bluffdale and she could not identify any municipal service costs. & 1295 at
333.
86.

It is undisputed there is a 12-inch waterline owned by Bluffdale Qty in the

disconnection area, and that it can serve 600 residential units. But if a secondary water
system is used, it can serve 1600 residential units. & 1296 at 49-50.
87.

The waterline was constructed primarily to serve the area between the Welby-

Jacob canal, the eastern area of the property proposed for disconnection and the proposed
Mountain View Corridor alignment. & 1296 at 76. The 12-inch waterline is sized for future
waterlines to loop though the disconnected area. & 1296 at 86. Roads and waterlines must
be looped and be interconnected for proper circulation throughout Bluffdale Qty. & 1296 at
140.
88.

South Farm's application to Salt Lake Q)unty for the Rosecrest development,

Ex. 252, acknowledges that every drainage pattern runs though Bluffdale. Id Ex. 252 (Tab
G at 5). And that the Two Developers will use natural drainages. Id at 1. In addition, the
master road plan contained in the application shows that 14400 South inside Bluffdale would
be extended from 3600 West to South Farm's development.
89.

South Farm's land use application to Bluffdale, Ex. 50, shows the same thing.

Tab I shows that South Farm's development alone will generate 51,184 external daily road
trips and assumes again the extension of 14400 South from 3600 South to the development.
Ex. 50 (Tab G).
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90.

The parties jointly determined what the specific costs would be for the

development impacts on Bluff dale when they submitted the proposed settlement documents
and consent decree to the court. Exhibit 123 (Tab 6D) shows the roads that would need to
be improved in Bluffdale, i.e. 15000 South, 14400 South, 13400 South and 3600 West. The
water plan map and storm drain plan map also show infrastructure that should be
constructed in Bluffdale. Exhibit F divides the costs into two types i.e. project costs (those
costs to be funded and paid by the Two Developers) and systems costs (those costs that
would be incurred to serve the development and the Qty at large. See&nerally, Utah Code
Ann. § 11-36-102. For Phase I, the transportation and drainage costs simply to improve
3600 South from 13800 South to 14400 South will be $1,431,920.00 and offsite detention
costs will be another one million dollars. K 1283 at 165 &Ex. 123 (Tab 6F). Likewise,
Exhibit 123 (Tab 6F), shows that to do the Redwood Road connection in Bluffdale will cost
Bluffdale an additional $1.4 million. Ex.123.
91.

The budget documents submitted to the lower court show that Bluffdale

currently spends $206,319.00 for road maintenance and improvements. Exs. F & G.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case is a case of first impression. The case at bar is the first time a Utah court
has allowed a developer to circumvent a municipal land use decision by using the statutory
disconnection process, rather than by following the statutory remedy of appealing that
decision to the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-101 etseq. This is also the first
time that a Utah court has used a disconnection to effectively end a citizen referendum
process.
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There are compelling and undisputed reasons to reverse the lower court's pioneering
but unlawful disconnection. The lower court plainly lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitions
and do what it did. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-2-501(2)(b)(l) &-502.5(5)(a)(i). For over 50
years, the law in Utah has been that if the petition commencing the disconnection lawsuit is
not filed by the individuals specified in the statute, the courts are "impotent to act and no
grafting on the petition thereafter, either by physically signing it or by motion to be allowed
to intervene and become petitioners, can breathe life into the still-bom petition so as to
authorize the court to do more than dismiss the petition/5 Hcamrd, 281 P.2d at 220.
It is also undisputed that the Two Developers are seeking, through a disconnection,
to adjust the common municipal boundary between Bluff dale and Herriman. The Legislature
has, however, prohibited the disconnection statute from being used to "abrogate, modify, or
replace" the voluntary boundary adjustment procedure4. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-510.
The disconnection in this matter leaves an island of unincorporated land, a result that
is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3) (c)(iii). The island results from the
undisputed fact that the disconnection area would be surrounded by Bluffdale on the east,
Riverton on the north, Herriman on the west, and Camp Williams on the south. (Camp
Williams is a military based with self-contained municipal type services.) Even if Camp
Williams was mistakenly treated as garden-variety unincorporated land, the definition of
peninsula found in Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6) provides that the effect of the
disconnection results in an unincorporated peninsula, which is another outcome prohibited
by the disconnection statute.

4

The boundary adjustment procedures are set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-419.
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The Two Developers are using the disconnection process as an inappropriate attempt
to circumvent the statutorily-created method to obtain judicial review of a city's land use
decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (2003). Although Bluffdale had master-planned
the disconnection area for one-acre lot developments, the Two Developers have never filed
an application meeting those requirements. Instead, South Farm filed a land use application
requesting approval of a 1,124-acre, multi-use development with 2.8 dwelling units per gross
acre. The denial of this request triggered the underlying disconnection proceeding.
South Farm would have filed for disconnection in 1993 or 1997 if they had known
that Bluffdale would not change its master plan in response to their application. South Farm
and the other developer decided to seek a disconnection immediately after Bluffdale rejected
South Farm's land use application. Once that decision was reached, the Two Developers
undertook efforts to organize other property owners to support a disconnection. They
chose to pursue a disconnection rather than to challenge the Gty^s land use decision in court
because Utah law affords cities a substantial amount of legislative discretion.
The citizens' call for a referendum ultimately prompted the Two Developers to
continue this disconnection action. The Qty Council enacted a zoning ordinance pursuant
to an agreement that would have enabled the Two Developers to proceed with their plans.
The parties also mutually approved a development agreement and a stipulation to dismiss
the underlying disconnection action. The case was not dismissed, however, due to the
citizens' call for a referendum. SeeMoutyv Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 41,122 P.3d 521.
Bluffdale citizens voted on June 27, 2005 to uphold the challenged zoning ordinance.
Despite this favorable outcome, the Two Developers continue to refuse to develop their
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property in Bluffdale. The citizens' right to refer the disputed zoning ordinance to the
voters is protected by Utah Const, art. VI, § 2(b)(ii) and Title 20A, Chapter 7 the Utah Code.
The lower court mistakenly concluded that citizens' call for a referendum created justice and
equity factors that justified the disconnection.
Finally, a review of the record shows that no reasonable fact-finder could have
concluded that the Two Developers met their burden of proof for the disconnection on the
elements specified in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT LACKED JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE INITIAL PETITION
WAS NOT BROUGHT BY THOSE PERSONS REQUIRED BY THE
DISCONNECTION STATUTE
The seminal Utah case deciding that the failure to file a disconnection petition by
those specified in the disconnection statute creates a jurisdictional error is Haimndv Tofim of
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 (1955). In Howrd, the court set forth the
standard for determining whether a majority of real property owners had successfully filed a
sustainable petition for disconnection. Id After determining that the petition was not signed
by the required majority of property owners, the trial court counted the subsequent
interveners to conclude that the plaintiffs had obtained a majority. Id at 191, 281 P.2d at
217.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed, and framed the jurisdictional inquiry as follows:
Let it be conceded that if the court had been vested with
jurisdiction to order the area disconnected, then the intervening
parties, if otherwise qualified, could be considered as parties.
But, if the court had not been vested with the jurisdiction ~ in
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fact, lacked jurisdiction ~ because the petition was not signed
and filed by a majority, we opine that permitting the
intervention could not confer jurisdiction.
Id at 192,281 P.2d at 218. The court reasoned that "the changing of the territorial limits of
a city is primarily a legislative function." Id at 193, 281 P.2d at 219. "[Qourts are bound to
confine the exercise of the power conferred upon them b}f the Legislature." Id "Before the
court can pass upon the justice and equity of the matter it must first determine judicially the
existence of requisites fixed by the legislature." Id at 195, 281 P.2d at 219. The act of obtaining
a majority of property owners' signatures on the petition is a condition precedent to the right
of a court to make a disconnection. See id at 195, 281 P.2d at 219-20. Consequently, Houurd
held that if a petition was not signed by a majority of the owners, the court was "impotent to
act and no grafting on the petition thereafter could breathe life into the stillborn petition so
as to authorize the court to do more than dismiss the petition." Id at 195, 281 P.2d at 220.
For that reason, the court in Houurdreversed after concluding that "the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction to make the order of disconnection". Id
The Houurd decision is foursquare with the case at bar. The original petition was not
signed by enough property owners to satisfy the statutory threshold. Petitioners' attempt to
insert additional property owners into the equation fails as a matter of law.
In Mawrrvrt Corp. v White City Water Inpnnement DisL, 958 P.2d 222 (Utah 1998), the
Supreme Court considered a petition by a group of residents to withdraw from a water
improvement district. The applicable statute permitted withdrawal upon the filing of a
petition with the district court by "a majority of the real property owners." Id at 223 (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-2-334 &-335). This Court stated it "agree[d] with the district court
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that no amendments to the withdrawal petitions should be permitted after the date of filing,
whether by way of addition, deletion, or reinstatement of names." Id at 226.
Mariemont acknowledged the Haimrd decision as "the case most relevant to this issue."
Hauurd held that "the trial court initially had jurisdiction only to determine whether a
majority of real property owners petitioned for disconnection as cfthe time of thefilingcfthe
petition If it determined that this prerequisite had not been met, it could only dismiss the
action for lack of jurisdiction. It could do no more." Id See South Jordan City v Sandy City,
870 P.2d 273 (Utah 1994) (dismissing where disconnection was not signed by enough
voters). Due to the initial Judicial Petition's facial fatal defect, the lower court never
acquired the jurisdiction to disconnect property.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE
DISCONNECTION STATUTE
A

The Court Erred in Adjusting the Common Boundary
Utah law prohibits the Two Developers from using the disconnection procedures to

adjust boundaries between two municipalities. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-510 provides that
"[t]his part [the disconnection statute] shall not be construed to abrogate, modify, or displace
the boundary adjustment procedures in Section 10-2-419."
There are good practical reasons for not allowing the disconnection statues to be
used to modify a common municipal boundary. First, traditional municipal disconnections
have been used to separate vacant land not needing municipal services from a city. It has
never been used to allow developers to shop their developments in a competing municipal
arena. Second and more importantly, it is undisputed in the case at bar that if this
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disconnection is upheld, property owners who did not sign Requests for Disconnection can
petition to annex back in and take with them properties whose owners did sign
disconnection Requests. The constant jockeying of disconnection/annexation could
undermine the secure fixing of municipal boundaries forever.
Plainly, the lower court's order has the effect of adjusting the common boundary
between Bluffdale and Herriman to the north and the east. The lower court was informed at
trial that the Two Developers had already applied for annexation into Herriman, that
Herriman was willing to provide the municipal services, and that Herriman was willing to
allow the higher density development. R 1283 at 215-16.
The Two Developers' intent to affect a boundary adjustment was clear from the
inception of the proceedings giving rise to this action. The Two Developers filed petitions
with Bluffdale and Herriman entitled "Petition to Bluffdale Gty and Herriman For
Voluntary Boundary Adjustment, Disconnection and Annexation." Ex. 90. In the letter
transmitting the "Petitions for Voluntary Boundary Adjustment/Disconnection" to
Bluffdale Gty, counsel for the Two Developers wrote that: "This letter transmits 52
petitions requesting Bluffdale Gty to adjust the boundaries between Bluffdale Gty and the
Town of Herriman pursuant to [Utah Code Ann.] § 10-2-419." Ex. 95.
In short, the Two Developers always intended to use the disconnection statute to
circumvent the legislatively-mandated procedure for boundary adjustments. See Utah Code
Ann. § 10-2-419. But, "where a statute's plain language or its structure and purpose
demonstrate a legislative intent to preempt an area of law, the statute becomes the only
source of law in the area...." Gottlingv RR. Inc, 2002 UT 95,18, 61 P.3d 989, 992. Further,

28

a court must read the plain language of the statute "as a whole", interpreting its provisions
"in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 'with other statues under the
same and related chapters'". Grand County v Emery County, 2002 UT 57,123, 52 P.3d 1148.
A party cannot accomplish indirectly what it is prohibited to do directly.
The legislature did not view a boundary adjustment and a disconnection as being
comparable. The procedures are quite different and are much more restrictive for a
boundary adjustment. To initiate a disconnection, the owners of more than 50% of the
affected real property must sign the petition. If 50% refuse to sign it, the court lacks
jurisdiction to proceed. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-501(2)(b). A boundary adjustment, on
the other hand, will not be allowed if both cities do not agree to it or if the owners of 25%
or more of the affected property owners object. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-419(2)(b)(iv).
The disconnection statute prohibits the exact result accomplished by the lower
court's ruling: circumventing the boundary adjustment procedure of section 10-2-419 by
disconnecting property from one city and annexing into another. The Legislature's intent in
this matter is plainly expressed that no provision of the disconnection process can be used to
"abrogate, modify, or displace the boundary adjustment procedure in section 10-2-419."
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-510. The lower court erred in allowing the disconnection of a large
portion of Bluffdale for the purpose of affecting a boundary adjustment through the
annexation of that area into Herriman.
B.

By Statutory Definition This Disconnection Leaves or Creates a Prohibited
Island or Peninsula of Unincorporated Land
By allowing the disconnection of the affected area, the lower court authorized the

creation of a "peninsula" prohibited by the disconnection statue. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-
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502.7(3) (c) (iii) provides that a territory cannot be disconnected if the proposed
disconnection would "leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated
territory7'. A "peninsula" is defined as follows:
"Peninsula" when used to describe an unincorporated area,
means an area surrounded on more than one half of its
boundary distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory
and situated so that the length of a line drawn across the
unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an
incorporated area on the opposite side shall, be less than 25% of
the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area.
Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-104(b).
In applying this mandate, the lower court correctly concluded that it was a two-step
procedure requiring two separate calculations. First, to determine whether a "peninsula" will
be created by the disconnection, the court must ascertain whether the resulting
unincorporated area created by the disconnection is surrounded by incorporated territory on
more than one half of its boundary distance. Second, the court must ascertain whether a line
drawn across the unincorporated area is less than 25% of the total aggregate boundaries of
the unincorporated area.
In applying the first step, the lower court settled on a facetious, nonsensical
interpretation of boundary distance by finding the size of the "unincorporated area" as used
in the definition is infinite - thereby concluding that there could never be a peninsula. &
1192. See generallyExs. 209 &216 (Maps of "peninsula"). The lower court then determined
that the second step was so vague that it could be ignored without any attempt to ascertain
its plain meaning or the legislative intent. Id The lower court concluded that if the term
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"unincorporated area were limited to the newly disconnected area as the Qty proposes, the
statute is rendered too vague to apply". Id.
Rather than applying the definition in Utah Code, the lower court claimed to rely on
the "historical definition of peninsula". R. 1194-1195. The lower court interpreted and
applied the two-step inquiry in a manner that effectively removed the peninsula proscription
from the disconnection statute. In reaching this result, the lower court completely ignored
many of the well-settled rules of statutory construction. As to the first step, the lower court
found that the size of the unincorporated area left or created by the disconnection was
infinite:
The unincorporated area that disconnection would "leave or
create" would be bordered in part by Bluff dale and in part by
Herriman; however, the unincorporated area that is left or
created is seemingly infinite. The newly created unincorporated
area would join other bordering unincorporated areas in Salt
Lake County which in turn borders unincorporated areas in
other counties throughout the state. In the court's view, all
contiguous unincorporated areas must be considered in the
calculation. Tracing the borders of incorporated territory
reveals only islands and peninsulas of incorporated land in a
vast ocean of unincorporated territory. In reality, unless other
boundaries are utilized, the very definition which was created by
the legislature, make the existence of a peninsula impossible,
because every "peninsula" with measurable boundaries will also
be an island.5 (emphasis added)
R 1192.
This erroneous finding led to a second finding that the boundary distance around the
unincorporated area was also infinite, and therefore could not meet the requirement that

5

Ex. 209 is a map that graphically illustrates the court's mistaken reasoning.
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"one half of its boundary distance" must be bounded by incorporated territory. This faulty
logic led to the conclusion that the disconnection area would not result in a peninsula.
The lower court declared the second prong vague and interpreted it in a manner that
effectively removed that provision from the disconnection statute. In doing so, the lower
court abdicated its duty to give meaning to all of the words and terms of a statute.
Such a result clearly is not the legislature intended, nor is it what follows from a plain
reading of the language of the disconnection statute. It appears that the lower court misread
the word "or" for "and" in the "leave or create" language of the statutory restriction of
section 10-2-502.7(3) (c)(iii). Thus, the lower court interpreted the "leave or create" language
to be conjunctive when it is actually disjunctive. The disconnection process would obviously
"create" a defined area of unincorporated territory. But the process would not "create" or
"leave" unincorporated territory throughout the remainder of the county and state. In the
instant matter, the disconnection would only "create" the unincorporated area bounded by
Bluffdale, Riverton, Herriman and Camp Williams, unincorporated primarily6.
The lower court explained its absurd view of the disconnection statute by stating:
"[t]racing the borders of incorporated territory reveals only islands and peninsulas of
incorporated land in a vast ocean of unincorporated territory." R 1192. The court
continued, "the very definition which was created by the legislature makes the existence of a
peninsula impossible, because of necessity, every "peninsula" with measurable boundaries
will also be an island." K 1193.

6

Camp Williams provides its own municipal services. It does not obtain municipal services
from the County like all other unincorporated lands in Salt Lake County do.
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Rather than attempting to determine the Legislature's real intent, the lower court
interpreted the disconnection statute in a manner that would provide no legislative direction
for determining whether or not a particular disconnection would be permitted. Without any
understanding of the legislative intent - and without voiding the statute for vagueness - the
lower court granted the property owner's disconnection after finding that no peninsula, as
the term is defined in the statute, could ever be created.
The basic rules of statutory construction require a court to first consider the plain
language of the statute. If the statute's plain language invokes some ambiguity, the court is
required to look consider the legislative intent.
The lower court in this matter also violated a cardinal rule of statutory construction
by inferring substantive terms into the disconnection statute that were not already there.
Rather than basing its interpretation on the language used in the statute, the lower court
effectively rewrote the disconnection statute to conform it to an intent not expressed
therein.
In determining the legislative intent, a court must interpret the "plain" meaning of
"the language of [that] statutory provision in light of other provisions within the same statute
or act, and ... attempt to harmonize the provisions in accordance with the legislative intent
so as to give meaning to each provision." Daus County Solid Waste Management & Energy
Recovery Special Sera Dist v City cfBountiful, 2002 UT 60,110, 52 P.3d 1174. See also Grand
County v Emery County, 2002 UT 57, \ 23, 52 P.3d 1148. The rules of statutory construction
provide that the "meaning of doubtful words or phrases" must be determined in light of and
take their character from associated words or phrases.
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Although the express term "leave or create" a peninsula of unincorporated territory is
not specifically defined, the legislative enactment repeatedly refers to it as "the area proposed
for disconnection". Section 10-2-501(1)(a) refers to the signatures required of real property
owners, and limits them to those "in the area proposed for disconnection." Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-2-501(2)(b)(i). The same section requires that the petitioners include a map or plat of
the "territory proposed for disconnection". Id The area shown on the map or plat defines
the unincorporated territory that is "created" by the disconnection. It cannot be infinite, or
more or less. Instead, it is a finite amount of land bounded on three sides by incorporated
territory and on one side by an unincorporated federal installation, Camp Williams. It is at
that point were the "peninsula" ends; where the "unincorporated area created" is connected
to that infinite territory referred in the lower court's decision. Although the peninsula may
be adjacent to the infinite territory, it does not become part of it.
The unincorporated area that disconnection would "create" is not "essentially
infinite" as found by the lower court. Such a finding emasculates the entire statutory scheme
of Title 10, and renders that restriction non-existent in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7. If the
court's view of the meaning of that term was accepted, no peninsula would ever be created
by a disconnection. This is a result that could not have been intended by the Legislature.
The only logical conclusion is the lower court adopted an incorrect interpretation of the
term peninsula to include the property infinitely beyond the disconnection area.
This Court has stated that the rules of statutory construction are not artificial or
arbitrary, but "arise quite naturally from the process of reasoning as to what the statute was
intended". SeeHeathrmnu Giles, 13 Utah 2d 368, 370, 374 P.2d 839, 840 (Utah 1962). The
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process of reasoning would not result in a meaning that voids the provision. "Statutory
enactments are to be constructed so as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful,
and . . . interpretations are to be avoided which renders some parts of a provision
nonsensical or absurd". Millett v Clark Clink Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980). The
lower court's view of the meaning of "peninsula" in Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-104(6) creates a
nonsensical and/or absurd result.
Where there is doubt or uncertainty as to the interpretation of a statute, the rule of
noscitura sodis (La, it is known from its associates) requires that the meaning of doubtful
words or phrases be determined in light of and take their character from associated words or
phrases. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that all parts of the enactment should be
considered together so as to produce a harmonious whole and to give effect to the intent
and purpose to be divined from the entire act. Cf. Western A uto Transport, Inc. v Reese, 104
Utah, 393,140 P.2d 348, 349 (Utah 1943).
When the lower court's view of the broad terms Title 10 and in the specific terms of
section 10-2-401, it becomes clear that such a view of the legislative intent is absurd. Utah
law provides that a city may annex an island or peninsula of all unincorporated area within
the peninsula contiguous to the municipality even without a petition. Utah Code Ann. §102-418(l)(a)(i)(A). If the lower court's interpretation of peninsula were applied to this statute,
then it would produce the absurd result of allowing a city to annex any and all
unincorporated areas if some portion of the area was contiguous to its boundary.
Applying the lower court's interpretation of "peninsula" to the same disconnected
area yields a ludicrous result. Since part of the area is contiguous to Bluffdale, as required by
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section 10-2-402(1)(a)(i), that peninsula would be contiguous to and part of the
unincorporated area of Camp Williams and beyond. Therefore, applying the lower court's
logic, Bluffdale would be permitted to annex an "infinite" amount of unincorporated
territory. Under this absurd hypothetical, Bluffdale could have annexed all the
unincorporated area south to the Utah County boundary, north to the Davis County
boundary, and then west to the Oquirrhs and beyond. This example demonstrates how
ridiculous the lower court's definition of peninsula really is, since the definitions included in
section 10-2-104(b) apply to all provisions of Title 10.
The area of the disconnected territory clearly meet? the definition of "peninsula." As
shown in Exhibit A, and the testimony of the Bluffdale Gty Engineer, Shane Jones, the total
"boundary distance", circumference of the proposed disconnection area is 90,399.91 feet. K
1296 at 170. This boundary distance is surrounded by 51,559 feet of incorporated territory,
which is more than 50% of the total boundary distance. Further, the shortest line that can
be drawn across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to another incorporated
area on the opposite side is 3,936 feet long. Id. The longest such line that can be drawn is
17,146 feet long. Id. In either case, such line is far less than 25% of the total aggregate
boundaries of the unincorporated area (25% of 90,400 equals 22,600). Id.
Instead of accepting the calculations set forth above, the lower court incorrectly
rejected these calculations and the whole statutory scheme upon which they were based by
finding (without factual or rational support) that the boundary of the resulting
"unincorporated area" is essentially infinite.
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In applying the plain language of Section 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) and accepting that the
Legislature would not and did not intend to enact a "nonsensical or absurd" provision, the
disconnection area is a "peninsula" and therefore the disconnection is prohibited by Utah
Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii). The lower court's Decree of Disconnection must be
reversed because the disconnection territory creates a "peninsula of unincorporated
territory'' in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii).
C.

The Court Erred in Allowing the Two Developers To Use the Disconnection
Process as a Means to Circumvent the Requirements of Section 10-9-1001
It is undisputed that the disconnection lawsuit stems from a single municipal land use

decision: Bluffdale's denial of South Farm's application to amend Bluffdale's master plan and
rezone South Farm's land. & 163-180. So states the Amended Petition for Disconnection.
Id Had Bluffdale granted the application there would be no disconnection. In contrast, if
South Farm had known Bluffdale would remain true to its land use plan, calling for one-acre
lots, South Farm would have filed for disconnection well before it filed its application on the
county portion of South Farm in 1999.
It is also undisputed that if citizens had not successfully filed a lawful petition
referring the zoning ordinance designed to resolve the land use dispute, there would have
been no disconnection. Lastly, it is undisputable that if the lower court had approved the
parties' stipulation and Consent Decree to resolve this land use dispute, there would be no
disconnection.
Never before has a Utah court found that a municipal land use decision justifies a
disconnection from a municipality- nor could it. No disconnection can be ordered unless
both justice and equity require it. It is axiomatic that equity does not require anything if the
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applicant fails to avail itself of the available legal remedies. Section 10-9-1001 (later repealed)
granted South Farm the legal remedy of appealing Bluffdale's land use decision to the
District Court. It is undisputed that South Farm chose to not do so.
More importantly is the reason that South Farm chose not to appeal: it could not
meet the arbitrary and capricious standard to reverse the City's decision. Consequently,
application of the disconnection statute to circumvent the established procedures for
appealing land use decisions must be reversed for two reasons. First, equity does not require
a remedy when the applicant ignores a legal remedy. Second, to find justice and equity
requiring disconnection in a land use dispute requires grafting in the land use dispute
standard of judicial review. Otherwise, this Court will establish a precedent that future
developers will follow; a precedent that will completely undermine a century of precedent of
the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Instead of appealing an adverse land use ruling,
future developers will simply seek to disconnect and annex into a neighboring city.
POINT III
THE COURT MISAPPLIED THE JUSTICE A N D EQUITY STANDARD
A.

Introduction
Disconnecting property from a municipality by court action is an extraordinary

remedy. "This court has clearly held time and time again, that the determination of
municipal boundaries is a legislative function." Reams- Tribune Corp v Salt Lake County
Cornrrin, 2001 UT 55,121, 28 P.3d 686, 691. Also, Utah law provides substantial deference
to land use decisions by a city's legislative body. Bradley v Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 70
P.3d 47.
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A court may grant disconnection only if justice and equity require it. It is not
sufficient for the property owners to merely show that they would be better off if the
disconnection was granted. See generally, MCI Tdeoomnmmtions Corp. v Public Serrioe
CommissioncfUtah, 840 P.2d 765, 772 (Utah 1992).
In an early disconnection case, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the disconnection
of property that was "clearly unnecessary for city purposes" and that had received "no
benefit" from city services. InreChitfConsdidztedMirririg Ca, 71 Utah 430, 266 P. 1044
(1928). The court noted that in the prior cases before the court "in the light of the facts
appearing in the opinions of the court, no other or different conclusions would have been
consonant with justice." Id7
B.

The Citizens' Call for A Referendum Cannot Properly Be Used As A Factor in
Determining That Justice and Equity Require Disconnection
The case at bar is the first time a Utah Court has ever concluded that the citizens'

lawful use of the referendum process creates the justice and equity requirement necessary for
disconnecting land from a municipality
The political environment in the City is a factor that injustice
and Equity favors disconnection. The divisions have escalated
to the point that virtually any decision made by the City in favor
of development is subject to a referendum. *** The City's
administration has in effect become an agent with no authority,
who can say no, but can never say yes, and provide a reliable
7

While the substantive standard of justice and equity is a stringent one, Petitioners' burden
of proof was preponderance of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-502.7(3). That burden
does not lesson the substantive standard. For example, if the standard substantive for tort
liability was gross negligence, a preponderance of the evidence burden does not translate
into plaintiff only having to prove simple negligence. If the separation of powers is to be
preserved, "justice and equity7' must be interpreted as a stringent substantive standard. The
city council - not the court - should decide what is necessary for the citizens. Only stringent
interpretation preserves the city council's legislative capacity as well as this Court's power.
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decision not likely to be attacked by referendum. Leaving the
property in the Qty will only prolong this dysfunctional and
contentious process. The Court is not suggesting that citizen
involvement or the referendum process is anything by salutary.
It is, however, an unyielding mechanism for making zoning
decisions. This unwieldiness is a factor favoring disconnection
in this case.
& at 1188-89.
The lower court's reasoning is factually incorrect because it is undisputed the only
referendum petition successfully filed was a challenge to adoption of a multi-use zoning
classification in Bluff dale's zoning ordinance. On June 26, 2006, the Bluff dale voters upheld
the ordinance. But the Two Developers have refused to seek application of the ordinance to
develop their property in Bluffdale.
The lower court's reasoning is also legally wrong for several important reasons. First,
the legal standard of Justice and Equity requiring disconnection, has never been expanded to
include political or referendum considerations. The Utah Supreme Court's analysis from In
re Disconnection ofCertain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1983) is directly relevant to this
action:
Decisions interpreting that standard have uniformly turned on
what municipal services, improvements, or other benefits the
territory received from the Qty, the tax base the territory
provided to the Qty and the financial impact of its loss by
disconnection; the effect of disconnection on the Gty's
continued growth, financial health, and administration; and the
economic interdependency of the Qty and the territory.
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Further, lawful use of the citizens' referendum process is not an unwieldy
mechanism.8 In Citizen's A wweness v Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117,1122 (Utah 1994), the court
held that zoning decisions like the one giving rise to this action were properly referable. Utah
law provides voters with the option to control basic zoning policy decisions. Id See also
Wilsonv Manning, 657 P.2d 251,253 (Utah 1982). In Mouty v Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT
41,1f 25,122 P.2d 521, 529, this Court recently affirmed that the current referendum statute
does not limit the type of municipal actions that can be referred to the voters.
If anything, the citizens' lawful use of the referendum process suggests that justice
and equity do not require a disconnection in the case at hand. While the citizens' right to
refer a local ordinance to the voters is constitutionally protected, 56? Utah Const, art. VI, §
l(i)(b), the property owners right to disconnect from a city is not.9 The legislative power of
this State is supreme within constitutional limits. Thomas v Daughters of Utah Pioneers, 114
Utah 108,159,197 P.2d 477, 503 (1948). The legislative power of the voters via initiative
and referendum is co-equal with that of the legislature. But the voters' power to control a
basic zoning decision certainly is not supreme when a district court labels the power as
"unwieldy and dysfunctional" and determines that the voters' invocation of that power can
be considered as a factor in a disconnection.

8

If the lower court was truly concerned about the Bluffdale's "unwieldy7' or "dysfunctional
process", it could have simply approved the parties' Consent Decree.
9

Utah law requires parties to show that a city has acted arbitrary and capriciously to overturn
a land use decision. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (2003).
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C

The City's Delay in Processing One Land Use Application Does Not Justify
Disconnecting 40% of Bluffdale's Territoiy
The lower court determined that disconnection was justified because "Bluffdale Gty's

zoning and planning process was characterized by unreasonable delays and changing
standards". & at 1184. The undisputed facts tell a different story.
1.

Delay

First, regardless of when South Farm filed its land use application, it still would have
sought to disconnect because it was not willing to comply with Bluffdale's master plan for
one-acre lots.
Second, any delay that occurred was only in relation to South Farm's application. No
other party pled that they submitted an application that was delayed.10 Bluffdale has timely
processed other applications for residential lot or mixed use developments.
Third, some or all of the delay is directly attributable to South Farm's intransigence
since it was never willing to accept the density allowed by the Gty's master plan. It was
never willing to amend its plan to any residential density of less than 2.8 units per gross acre,
which happens to be the same density South Farm sought for its twin development first in
Salt Lake County and later in Herriman.
Fourth, it is undisputed Bluffdale took about 17 months to reject South Farm's
application. This is less than the time it took for Salt Lake County to amend its zoning

10

Even if delay on one land use application could create the justice and equity requirement
necessary to disconnect the territory, the only territory that could be disconnected would be
the property included in South Farms' application. A Decree of Disconnection must be
limited to the territoiy which severance from the Gty would be just and equitable. In re West
Jordan, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 127,129,369 P.2d 286,287 (1962).
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ordinance to allow for South Farms' twin development and to negotiate a development
agreement with Herriman, 22 months.
Lastly, despite the delay, Bluffdale and South Farm ultimately reached an agreement
resolving all disputes. If the lower court had simply approved the Consent Decree, it would
have prevented the additional delay that South Farm is currently experiencing.
2.

Changing Standards

At all times relevant to this action the property sought to be disconnected was zoned
A-5 and was master-planned for acre-lot residential development. Any discussion to change
those requirements was generated by South Farm. Bluffdale even went to the extraordinary
measure of adopting eight land use principles in November of 2002 so it could consider
South Farm's application. No other change in standard occurred. The only other change
discussed during the relevant time period was Bruce Parker's proposal to master plan the
disconnection area for mixed use development. This same type of plan was also proposed
by South Farm, but with a different layout. Neither plan was ever approved.
Finally, if South Farm was upset with the delays and changed in standard; South Farm
has other legal remedies available to it. It could have filed for a declaratory action, see
Patterson v A rneriamFork City, 2003 UT 7, 67 P.3d 466, or sought mandamus to require the
City to make a decision. See generallyArcherv Utah State Lard Use Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392
P.2d 622 (Utah 1964) (discussing mandamus for an oil and gas lease). South Farm could
have taken the steps to seek mandamus against Bluffdale. SeeMerrihewv Salt Lake County
Planning, 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983); Crist v Mapleton City, 28 Uah 2d 7, 497 P.2d 633 (1972).
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Rather than pursuing those legal remedies, South Farm elected to initiate the instant
disconnection action.
D.

Raw Ground Requiring Municipal Services Should Not Be Disconnected
The first reason the lower court gave for concluding that justice and equity required

disconnection is that "undeveloped land has historically been considered appropriate for
disconnection

" Although there are examples11 to justify such a statement, the lower

court failed to consider why "undeveloped land has historically been considered for
disconnection". Ordinarily, such property is "clearly unnecessary for Qty purposes." In re
QxtfConsdidzted Mining Ca, 266 P. at 1047. Undeveloped land does not ordinarily require
municipal services. Cf. Christensen, 243 P. at 376-77, Kennextt Copper Corp., 415 P.2d at 210-11,
Hoimrd, 7 Utah 2d 281-284, 323 P.2d at 263-65. Qties are typically created to supply services
to developed or developing areas ~ not to areas that will remain agricultural or undeveloped.
The case at bar, however, involves undeveloped property necessary for Bluffdale's growth
that will be intensely developed and will require comprehensive municipal services.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT
A

The Finding That The Disconnection Is Viable Is Clearly Erroneous
Two undisputed facts show the disconnection isn't viable in Herriman. First, it will

11

SeeHoimrdv ToimcfNorth Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 (1955) (referencing
unplatted low or swampy land suitable for farming and industrial plant); In re Disconnection cf
Certain Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1983) (analyzing vacant and unimproved lands
except for lights, a pond and picnic areaj; Kenneoott Copper Corp. v City cfBingham Canyon, 18
Utah 2d 60, 62, 415 P.2d 209, 211 (1966) (stating "no inhabitants and no reasonable
prospect of any... in the future"); Christensen v Toun cf Clearfield, 66 Utah 455, 243 P. 376
(1926) (discussing wholly agricultural land).
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cost almost $55 million more for Herriman to service it then the developed disconnection
area will generate in revenues. Ex.130. Second, Herriman cannot presently provide
municipal services without unlawfully using one-time development fees. Exs. D & E.
B.

The Finding That the City's Cost for Providing Municipal Services Would Not
Increase Was Clearly Erroneous
The Two Developers' witnesses offered their opinions that the disconnection would

not increase the costs of providing municipal services in Bluffdale. See eg. & 1283 at 166-67
& 173. Each of their opinions was premised on the false notion that the area will remain
vacant and undeveloped.
The Two Developers and their experts also testified that traffic will only slightly
increase. But, the issue is not how much the traffic will increase on Bluffdale's roads. The
issue is whether Bluffdale will be required to expend more to make additional improvements
and/or furnish additional services. To this specific issue, the evidence is overwhelming that
as a result of the disconnected, developable land, the costs to Bluffdale residents will
substantially increase for several reasons.
The first reason is drainage. South Farm's original 1999 general plan amendment
application acknowledges that every drainage pattern runs though Bluffdale, Ex. 252 (Tab
G), and that the projects "will use natural drainages". Id South Farm's own plans show that
its drainage will occur though Bluffdale. Id The water infrastructure, Ex. BS, and storm
drain facilities, Ex. I, would have to be constructed in Bluffdale.
The second reason is transportation. South Farm's application also shows that it will
need 14400 South to be extended within Bluffdale from 3600 West to its proposed
development. South Farm's development alone will generate 51,184 daily external road trips
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Exs. 50 & BW. Specifically the maps therein show the roads that would have needed to
have been improved within the Gty 15000 South, 14400 South, 13400 South, and 3600
West.
The parties jointly determined what the costs would be for the developments impacts
on Bluffdale when they prepared the Consent Decree. Exs. 123 &F, divides these costs into
two types, £e, project costs and system costs. The transportation and drainage plan show
that the cost simply to improve 3600 West from 13800 South to 14400 South in Phase 1 will
be $1,431,920. The construction of an offsite detention facility will cost the City an
additional $1,000,000. R 1283 at 165 &Ex. 123 (Tab 6F). The Redwood Road connection
within Bluffdale will cost the City another $1.4 million. Id The road costs alone total over
$2.8 million, but according to Bluffdale's recent budget documents (Ex. G), Bluffdale
currently expends $206,319.00 annually for road improvements. Consequently, it is beyond
reason to suggest that disconnection and development of the area will not substantially
increase the cost to Bluffdale residents for municipal services.
CONCLUSION
The lower court plainly lacked subject matter jurisdiction and the Disconnection
Decree circumvents Utah referendum constitutional provisions and statutes. It also
circumvents the Utah Municipal Land Use Development and Management Act. See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-J01 to - 803. Lastly, the disconnection case at bar is not anything like
the municipal disconnections authorized by the statute. Peninsulas and islands are created; a
common municipal boundary is changed; and the area at issue is being developed and
requires municipal services. Development in Herriman plainly is not viable. For these
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compelling reasons, the lower court's Disconnection Decree should be set aside and
reversed.
DATED this Hi

day of August, 2006.
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER

Dale F. Gardiner
Douglas J. Parry
ToddD.Weiler
Craig & Kleinman
Attorneys for Appellant Bluffdale City
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Addendum "A"
(Constitutional Provision and Statutes)

United States Constitution
Amendment XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and
judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such
state.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or
under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or
judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including
debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection
or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall
assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts,
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

Article VI, Section 1. [Power vested in Senate, House, and People.]
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in:
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the Legislature of
the State of Utah; and
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).
(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah, in the numbers, under the conditions,
in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for
adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute;
or
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a twothirds vote of the members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the
voters of the State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated to allow, limit, or
prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or method of taking wildlife shall be
adopted upon approval of two-thirds of those voting.
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under the conditions,
in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may:
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people of the
county, city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on the legislation,
as provided by statute; or
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the county, city, or
town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before the law or
ordinance may take effect.

10-1-104. Definitions.
As used in this title:
(1) "City" means a municipality that is classified by population as a city of the first class, a city of the
second class, a city of the third class, a city of the fourth class, or a city of the fifth class, under Section
10-2-301.
(2) "Contiguous" means:
(a) if used to described an area, continuous, uninterrupted, and without an island of territory not
included as part of the area; and
(b) if used to describe an area's relationship to another area, sharing a common boundary.
(3) "Governing body" means collectively the legislative body and the executive of any municipality.
Unless otherwise provided:
(a) in a city of the first or second class, the governing body is the city commission;
(b) in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class, the governing body is the city council; and
(c) in a town, the governing body is the town council.
(4) "Municipal" means of or relating to a municipality.
(5) "Municipality" means a city of the first class, city of the second class, city of the third class, city
of the fourth class, city of the fifth class, or a town, as classified in Section 10-2-301.
(6) "Peninsula," when used to describe an unincorporated area, means an area surrounded on more
than 1/2 of its boundary distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory and situated so that the
length of a line drawn across the unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an incorporated area
on the opposite side shall be less than 25% of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area.
(7) "Person" means an individual, corporation, partnership, organization, association, trust,
governmental agency, or any other legal entity.
(8) "Provisions of law" shall include other statutes of the state of Utah and ordinances, rules, and
regulations properly adopted by any municipality unless the construction is clearly contrary to the intent
of state law.
(9) "Recorder," unless clearly inapplicable, includes and applies to a town clerk.
(10) "Town" means a municipality classified by population as a town under Section 10-2-301.
(11) "Unincorporated" means not within a municipality.
Amended by Chapter 292, 2003 General Session

10-2-401. Definitions — Property owner provisions.
(1) As used in this part:
(a) "Affected entity" means:
(i) a county in whose unincorporated area the area proposed for annexation is located;
(ii) an independent special district under Title 17A, Chapter 2, Independent Special
Districts, whose boundaries include any part of an area proposed for annexation;
(iii) a school district whose boundaries include any part of an area proposed for
annexation; and
(iv) a municipality whose boundaries are within 1/2 mile of an area proposed for
annexation.
(b) "Annexation petition" means a petition under Section 10-2-403 proposing the
annexation to a municipality of a contiguous, unincorporated area that is contiguous to
the municipality.
(c) "Commission" means a boundary commission established under Section 10-2-409
for the county in which the property that is proposed for annexation is located.
(d) "Expansion area" means the unincorporated area that is identified in an annexation
policy plan under Section 10-2-401.5 as the area that the municipality anticipates
annexing in the future.
(e) "Feasibility consultant" means a person or firm with expertise in the processes and
economics of local government.
(f) "Municipal selection committee" means a committee in each county composed of
the mayor of each municipality within that county.
(g) "Private," with respect to real property, means not owned by the United States or
any agency of the federal government, the state, a county, a municipality, a school
district, a special district under Title 17A, Special Districts, or any other political
subdivision or governmental entity of the state.
(h) "Specified county" means a county of the second, third, fourth, fifth, or sixth class.
(i) "Urban development" means:
(i) a housing development with more than 15 residential units and an average density
greater than one residential unit per acre; or
(ii) a commercial or industrial development for which cost projections exceed
$750,000 for all phases.
(2) For purposes of this part:
(a) the owner of real property shall be the record title owner according to the records
of the county recorder on the date of the filing of the petition or protest; and
(b) the value of private real property shall be determined according to the last
assessment roll for county taxes before the filing of the petition or protest.
(3) For purposes of each provision of this part that requires the owners of private real
property covering a percentage or majority of the total private land area within an area to
sign a petition or protest:
(a) a parcel of real property may not be included in the calculation of the required
percentage or majority unless the petition or protest is signed by:
(i) except as provided in Subsection (3)(a)(ii), owners representing a majority
ownership interest in that parcel; or
(ii) if the parcel is owned by joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, 50% of the
number of

owners of that parcel;
(b) the signature of a person signing a petition or protest in a representative capacity
on behalf of an owner is invalid unless:
(i) the person's representative capacity and the name of the owner the person
represents are indicated on the petition or protest with the person's signature; and
(ii) the person provides documentation accompanying the petition or protest that
substantiates the person's representative capacity; and
(c) subject to Subsection (3)(b), a duly appointed personal representative may sign a
petition or protest on behalf of a deceased owner.

Amended by Chapter 206, 2001 General Session

10-2-402. Annexation — Limitations.
(1) (a) A contiguous, unincorporated area that is contiguous to a municipality may be
annexed to the municipality as provided in this part.
(b) An unincorporated area may not be annexed to a municipality unless:
(i) it is a contiguous area;
(ii) it is contiguous to the municipality;
(iii) except as provided in Subsection 10-2-418(1 )(b), annexation will not leave or
create an unincorporated island or peninsula; and
(iv) for an area located in a specified county with respect to an annexation that occurs
after December 31, 2002, the area is within the proposed annexing municipality's
expansion area.
(2) Except as provided in Section 10-2-418, a municipality may not annex an
unincorporated area unless a petition under Section 10-2-403 is filed requesting
annexation.
(3) An annexation under this part may not include part of a parcel of real property and
exclude part of that same parcel unless the owner of that parcel has signed the annexation
petition under Section 10-2-403.
(4) A municipality may not annex an unincorporated area in a specified county for the
sole purpose of acquiring municipal revenue or to retard the capacity of another
municipality to annex the same or a related area unless the municipality has the ability
and intent to benefit the annexed area by providing municipal services to the annexed
area.
(5) The legislative body of a specified county may not approve urban development
within a municipality's expansion area unless:
(a) the county notifies the municipality of the proposed development; and
(b) (i) the municipality consents in writing to the development; or
(ii) (A) within 90 days after the county's notification of the proposed development, the
municipality submits to the county a written objection to the county's approval of the
proposed development; and
(B) the county responds in writing to the municipality's objections.
(6) (a) An annexation petition may not be filed under this part proposing the
annexation of an area located in a county that is not the county in which the proposed
annexing municipality is located unless the legislative body of the county in which the
area is located has adopted a resolution approving the proposed annexation.
(b) Each county legislative body that declines to adopt a resolution approving a
proposed annexation described in Subsection (6)(a) shall provide a written explanation of
its reasons for declining to approve the proposed annexation.

Amended by Chapter 294, 2003 General Session

10-2-409. Boundary commission - Creation - Members.
(1) The legislative body of each county:
(a) may create a boundary commission on its own initiative at any time; and
(b) shall create a boundary commission within 30 days of the filing of a protest under
Section 10-2-407.
(2) Each commission shall be composed of:
(a) in a county with two or more municipalities:
(i) two members who are elected county officers, appointed by:
(A) (I) in a county of the first class operating under a form of government in which the
executive and legislative functions are separated, the county executive with the advice
and consent of the county legislative body; or
(II) in a county of the first class operating under a form of government in which the
executive and legislative functions of the governing body are not separated, the county
legislative body; or
(B) in a specified county, the county legislative body;
(ii) two members who are elected municipal officers from separate municipalities
within the county, appointed by the municipal selection committee; and
(iii) three members who are residents of the county, none of whom is a county or
municipal officer, appointed by the four other members of the boundary commission; and
(b) in a county with only one municipality:
(i) two members who are county elected officers, appointed by the county legislative
body;
(ii) one member who is a municipal officer, appointed by the governing body of the
municipality; and
(iii) two members who are residents of the county, neither of whom is a county or
municipal officer, appointed by the other three members of the boundary commission.
(3) At the expiration of the term of each member appointed under this section, the
member's successor shall be appointed by the same body that appointed the member
whose term is expiring, as provided in this section.

Amended by Chapter 206, 2001 General Session

10-2-418. Annexation of an island or peninsula without a petition — Notice —
Hearing.
(1) (a) Notwithstanding Subsection 10-2-402(2), a municipality may annex an
unincorporated area under this section without an annexation petition if:
(i) (A) the area to be annexed consists of one or more unincorporated islands within or
unincorporated peninsulas contiguous to the municipality;
(B) the majority of each island or peninsula consists of residential or commercial
development;
(C) the area proposed for annexation requires the delivery of municipal-type services;
and
(D) the municipality has provided most or all of the municipal-type services to the
area for more than one year; or
(ii) (A) the area to be annexed consists of one or more unincorporated islands within
the municipality, each of which has fewer than 500 residents; and
(B) the municipality has provided one or more municipal-type services to the area for
at least one year.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection 10-2-402(1 )(b)(iii), a municipality may annex a
portion of an island or peninsula under this section, leaving unincorporated the remainder
of the unincorporated island or peninsula, if:
(i) in adopting the resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i), the municipal legislative body
determines that not annexing the entire unincorporated island or peninsula is in the
municipality's best interest; and
(ii) for an annexation of one or more unincorporated islands under Subsection
(l)(a)(ii), the entire island of unincorporated area, of which a portion is being annexed,
complies with the requirement of Subsection (l)(a)(ii)(A) relating to the number of
residents.
(2) (a) The legislative body of each municipality intending to annex an area under this
section shall:
(i) adopt a resolution indicating the municipal legislative body's intent to annex the
area, describing the area proposed to be annexed;
(ii) (A) publish notice at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation within the municipality and the area proposed for annexation; or
(B) if there is no newspaper of general circulation in the areas described in Subsection
(2)(a)(ii)(A), post at least one notice per 1,000 population in places within those areas
that are most likely to give notice to the residents of those areas;
(iii) send written notice to the board of each special district whose boundaries contain
some or all of the area proposed for annexation and to the legislative body of the county
in which the area proposed for annexation is located; and
(iv) hold a public hearing on the proposed annexation no earlier than 60 days after the
adoption of the resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i).
(b) Each notice under Subsections (2)(a)(ii) and (iii) shall:
(i) state that the municipal legislative body has adopted a resolution indicating its
intent to annex the area proposed for annexation;
(ii) state the date, time, and place of the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(iv);
(iii) describe the area proposed for annexation; and
(iv) state in conspicuous and plain terms that the municipal legislative body will annex

the area unless, at or before the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(iv), written
protests to the annexation are filed by the owners of private real property that:
(A) is located within the area proposed for annexation;
(B) covers a majority of the total private land area within the entire area proposed for
annexation; and
(C) is equal in value to at least 1/2 the value of all private real property within the
entire area proposed for annexation.
(c) The first publication of the notice required under Subsection (2)(a)(ii)(A) shall be
within 14 days of the municipal legislative body's adoption of a resolution under
Subsection (2)(a)(i).
(3) (a) Upon conclusion of the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(iv) and subject
to Subsection (3)(b), the municipal legislative body may adopt an ordinance annexing the
area proposed for annexation under this section unless, at or before the hearing, written
protests to the annexation have been filed with the city recorder or town clerk, as the case
may be, by the owners of private real property that:
(i) is located within the area proposed for annexation;
(ii) covers:
(A) for a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(i), a majority of the total
private land area within the entire area proposed for annexation; or
(B) for a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), 10% of the total private
land area within the island of unincorporated area that is proposed for annexation; and
(iii) is equal in value to at least:
(A) for a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(i), 1/2 the value of all private
real property within the entire area proposed for annexation; or
(B) for a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(ii), 10% of the value of all
private real property within the island of unincorporated area that is proposed for
annexation.
(b) A municipal legislative body may not adopt an ordinance annexing an area
proposed for annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(ii) unless the legislative body of the
county in which the area proposed for annexation has previously adopted a resolution
approving the annexation.
(4) (a) If protests are timely filed that comply with Subsection (3), the municipal
legislative body may not adopt an ordinance annexing the area proposed for annexation,
and the annexation proceedings under this section shall be considered terminated.
(b) Subsection (4)(a) may not be construed to prohibit the municipal legislative body
from excluding from a proposed annexation under Subsection (l)(a)(ii) the property
within an unincorporated island regarding which protests have been filed and proceeding
under Subsection (l)(b) to annex some or all of the remaining portion of the
unincorporated island.

Amended by Chapter 227, 2003 General Session

10-2-419. Boundary adjustment - Notice and hearing — Protest.
(1) The legislative bodies of two or more municipalities having common boundaries may adjust their
common boundaries as provided in this section.
(2) (a) The legislative body of each municipality intending to adjust a boundary that is common with
another municipality shall:
(i) adopt a resolution indicating the intent of the municipal legislative body to adjust a common
boundary;
(ii) hold a public hearing on the proposed adjustment no less than 60 days after the adoption of the
resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i); and
(iii) (A) publish notice at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation within the municipality; or
(B) if there is no newspaper of general circulation within the municipality, post at least one notice per
1,000 population in places within the municipality that are most likely to give notice to residents of the
municipality.
(b) The notice required under Subsection (2)(a)(iii) shall:
(i) state that the municipal legislative body has adopted a resolution indicating the municipal
legislative body's intent to adjust a boundary that the municipality has in common with another
municipality;
(ii) describe the area proposed to be adjusted;
(iii) state the date, time, and place of the public hearing required under Subsection (2)(a)(ii);
(iv) state in conspicuous and plain terms that the municipal legislative body will adjust the
boundaries unless, at or before the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), written protests to the
adjustment are filed by the owners of private real property that:
(A) is located within the area proposed for adjustment;
(B) covers at least 25% of the total private land area within the area proposed for adjustment; and
(C) is equal in value to at least 15% of the value of all private real property within the area proposed
for adjustment; and
(v) state that the area that is the subject of the boundary adjustment will, because of the boundary
adjustment, be automatically annexed to a local district providing fire protection, paramedic, and
emergency services, as provided in Section 17B-2-515.5, if:
(A) the municipality to which the area is being added because of the boundary adjustment is entirely
within the boundaries of a local district:
(I) that provides fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services; and
(II) in the creation of which an election was not required because of Subsection 17B-2-214(3)(c); and
(B) the municipality from which the area is being taken because of the boundary adjustment is not
within the boundaries of the local district; and
(vi) state that the area proposed for annexation to the municipality will be automatically withdrawn
from a local district providing fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services, as provided in
Subsection 17B-2-601(2), if:
(A) the municipality to which the area is being added because of the boundary adjustment is not
within the boundaries of a local district:
(I) that provides fire protection, paramedic, and emergency services; and
(II) in the creation of which an election was not required because of Subsection 17B-2-214(3)(c); and
(B) the municipality from which the area is being taken because of the boundary adjustment is
entirely within the boundaries of the local district.
(c) The first publication of the notice required under Subsection (2)(a)(iii)(A) shall be within 14 days
of the municipal legislative body's adoption of a resolution under Subsection (2)(a)(i).
(3) Upon conclusion of the public hearing under Subsection (2)(a)(ii), the municipal legislative body
may adopt an ordinance adjusting the common boundary unless, at or before the hearing under

Subsection (2)(a)(ii), written protests to the adjustment have been filed with the city recorder or town
clerk, as the case may be, by the owners of private real property that:
(a) is located within the area proposed for adjustment;
(b) covers at least 25% of the total private land area within the area proposed for adjustment; and
(c) is equal in value to at least 15% of the value of all private real property within the area proposed
for adjustment.
(4) The municipal legislative body shall comply with the requirements of Section 10-2-425 as if the
boundary change were an annexation.
(5) An ordinance adopted under Subsection (3) becomes effective when each municipality involved
in the boundary adjustment has adopted an ordinance under Subsection (3) and as determined under
Subsection 10-2-425(5) if the boundary change were an annexation.
Amended by Chapter 233. 2005 General Session

10-2-501. Municipal disconnection — Definitions — Request for disconnection — Requirements
upon filing request.
(1) As used in this part "petitioners" means persons who:
(a) own title to real property within the area proposed for disconnection; and
(b) have signed a request for disconnection proposing to disconnect that area from the municipality.
(2) (a) Petitioners proposing to disconnect an area within and lying on the borders of a municipality
shall file with that municipality's legislative body a request for disconnection.
(b) Each request for disconnection shall:
(i) contain the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more than 50% of the real property
in the area proposed for disconnection;
(ii) give the reasons for the proposed disconnection;
(iii) include a map or plat of the territory proposed for disconnection; and
(iv) designate between one and five persons with authority to act on the petitioners' behalf in the
proceedings.
(3) Upon filing the request for disconnection, petitioners shall:
(a) cause notice of the request to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation within the municipality;
(b) cause notice of the request to be mailed to each owner of real property located within the area
proposed to be disconnected; and
(c) deliver a copy of the request to the legislative body of the county in which the area proposed for
disconnection is located.
Amended by Chapter 279. 2003 General Session

10-2-502.5. Hearing on request for disconnection - Determination by municipal legislative
body -- Petition in district court.
(1) Within 30 calendar days after the last publication of notice required under Subsection 10-2-501(3)
(a), the legislative body of the municipality in which the area proposed for disconnection is located shall
hold a public hearing.
(2) At least seven calendar days before the hearing date, the municipal legislative body shall provide
notice of the public hearing:
(a) in writing to the petitioners and to the legislative body of the county in which the area proposed
for disconnection is located; and
(b) by publishing a notice in a newspaper of general circulation within the municipality or, if there is
none, then by posting notice of the hearing in at least three public places within the municipality.
(3) In the public hearing, any person may speak and submit documents regarding the disconnection
proposal.
(4) Within 45 calendar days of the hearing, the municipal legislative body shall:
(a) determine whether to grant the request for disconnection; and
(b) if the municipality determines to grant the request, adopt an ordinance approving disconnection of
the area from the municipality.
(5) (a) A petition against the municipality challenging the municipal legislative body's determination
under Subsection (4) may be filed in district court by:
(i) petitioners; or
(ii) the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (5)(a) shall include a copy of the request for disconnection.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 279, 2003 General Session

10-2-502.7. Court action.
(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2-502.5 and a response to the petition, the court
shall, upon request of a party or upon its own motion, conduct a court hearing.
(2) At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal.
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners who must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence:
(a) the viability of the disconnection;
(b) that justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality;
(c) that the proposed disconnection will not:
(i) leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other
burdens of providing municipal services would materially increase over previous years;
(ii) make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as a
municipality; or
(iii) leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a costeffective manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of
providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the
disconnection.
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)
(c)(i) and (ii), the court shall consider all relevant factors, including the effect of the proposed
disconnection on:
(a) the municipality or community as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways;
(d) water mains and water services;
(e) sewer mains and sewer services;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning; and
(h) other municipal services.
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting disconnection shall be in writing with findings and
reasons.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 279, 2003 General Session

10-2-510. Boundary adjustment procedure not affected.
This part shall not be construed to abrogate, modify, or replace the boundary adjustment procedure
provided in Section 10-2-419.
Amended by Chapter 389, 1997 General Session
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(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the
specific constitutional taking issues that are the subject of the request
for arbitration filed with the private property ombudsman by a
property owner.
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the private property ombudsman after the time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has
expired does not affect the time to file a petition.
(3) The courts shall:
(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
History: C. 1953, 10-9-1001, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 235, § 53; 1992, ch. 30, § 13; 1999,
ch. 291, § 3; 2003, ch. 124, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1999 amend-

ment, effective May 3, 1999, added Subsection
(2)(b) and the Subsection (2)(a) designation.
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003,
added "or in violation of" in Subsection (2)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
compliance doctrine in the face of city ordinances that were expressly mandatory was
erroneous, since the city could not exercise
discretion when it had itself legislatively removed any such discretion. Springville Citizens
for a Better Community v. City of Springville,
1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332.

ANALYSIS

Attorney fees.
Burden of proof.
Construction and application.
Limits of discretion.
Prerequisites for relief.
Public comments.
Standard of review.
Attorney fees.
It was not bad faith, under § 78-27-56(1), for
town residents to seek judicial review after
having failed in their administrative challenge
to a zoning ordinance; thus, an award of attorney fees on this basis was improper. Hatch v.
Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App 55, 21 P.3d
245.
B u r d e n of proof.
Party appealing a denial of a rezoning request must show that the decision not to
change the zoning classification of the property
was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. Therefore,
plaintiff who failed to show that the existing
zoning of property for residential use could not
promote the general welfare did not prevail, in
spite of plaintiff's evidence that the proposed
rezoning was also reasonable. Harmon City,
Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, 997 P.2d
321.
Construction and application.
Subsection (3), which largely codified the
relevant case law when it was enacted, did not
alter the deferential review of a municipality's
legislative zoning classification decisions under
the arbitrary and capricious standard. Harmon
City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, 997
P.2d 321.
Limits of discretion.
The district court's use of the substantial

Prerequisites for relief.
In action alleging that a city's noncompliance
with its ordinances makes its land use decision
illegal, plaintiffs must also establish prejudice
and what relief, if any, they are entitled to as a
result of the illegal decision. Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of
Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332.
In an action arising from dissension over a
city's land use decisions, because the landowners had failed to pursue their administrative
remedies by appealing to the development commission and the city council before filing their
complaint, as required by this section, dismissal was proper. Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003
UT 7, 469 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 67 P 3 d 466.
Public c o m m e n t s .
City's consideration of public comments as a
justification for its zoning decision reflected a
reasonable judgment that properly took into
account citizens' concerns. Bradley v. Payson
City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,
70 P.3d 47.
Standard of review.
Undisputed facts demonstrating that municipality's land use decision was the result of
careful consideration and that it was supported
by substantial evidence precluded a finding
that the the city's decision was arbitrary and
capricious. Springville Citizens for a Better
Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25,
979 P.2d 332.
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MUNICIPAL LAND USE
The Legislature uses "arbitrary and capricious" to define both review of adjudicative
actions by a board of adjustments under § 109-708 and review of legislative actions of a
municipality under this section, but the Legislature has provided for judicial review under
the substantial evidence standard only for adjudicative functions under § 10-9-708. Harmon
City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT App 31, 997
?S i V
*• 1 a
11 11
,1 „ ,
The deferential reasonably debatable standard of review applies to a municipality s legislative action such as a zoning decision; there-

10-9-1002

fore, the district court was correct in using the
"reasonably debatable" standard in reviewing
the city council's refusal to rezone plaintiff's
property. Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000
UT App 31, 997 P2d 321; Bradley v. Payson
City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 12,
70 P. 3d 47.
Appellate review of a municipality's land use
d e c i s i 0 n is limited to determining whether the
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
R a l h L W a d s w o r t h Constr>) I n c v W e s t J o r .
d a n Cit
2000 ^
A
49> 9 9 9 R 2 d
m o

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h L a w Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law, 2000 U t a h L. Rev. 841 (2000).
Treatises. — Thomas and Backman, Utah
Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999), §
10.02(n).

10-9-1002.

Am. Jur. 2d. — 83 Am. Jur. 2d Zoning and
Planning § 915 et seq.
C.J.S. — 101AC.J.S. Zoning and Land Plann m g § 265 et seq.

Enforcement.

(1) (a) A municipality or any owner of real estate within the municipality in
which violations of this chapter or ordinances enacted under the authority
of this chapter occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other
remedies provided by law, institute:
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate
actions; or
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful
building, use, or act.
(b) A municipality need only establish the violation to obtain the
injunction.
(2) (a) The municipality may enforce the ordinance by withholding building
permits.
(b) It is unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, or change the
use of any building or other structure within a municipality without
approval of a building permit.
(c) The municipality may not issue a building permit unless the plans of
and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or
use fully conform to all regulations then in effect.
History: C. 1953,10-9-1002, e n a c t e d b y L.
1991, ch. 235, § 54.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Treatises. — Thomas and Backman, Utah
Real Property Law (LexisNexis 1999), §
4.02(b)(2)(ii)(B)(II); § 10.02(j).

A.L.R. — Laches as defense in suit by governmental entity to enjoin zoning violation, 73
A.L.R.4th 870.
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10-9a-801. No district court review until administrative remedies exhausted — Time for filing - Tolling of time — Standards governing court review -- Record on review — Staying of decision.
(1) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land use decision made under this
chapter, or under a regulation made under authority of this chapter, until that person has exhausted the
person's administrative remedies as provided in Part 7, Appeal Authority and Variances, if applicable.
(2) (a) Any person adversely affected by a final decision made in the exercise of or in violation of the
provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the decision with the district court within 30
days after the local land use decision is final.
(b) (i) The time under Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition is tolled from the date a property owner files
a request for arbitration of a constitutional taking issue with the property rights ombudsman under
Section 63-34-13 until 30 days after:
(A) the arbitrator issues a final award; or
(B) the property rights ombudsman issues a written statement under Subsection 63-34-13(4)(b)
declining to arbitrate or to appoint an arbitrator.
(ii) A tolling under Subsection (2)(b)(i) operates only as to the specific constitutional taking issue
that is the subject of the request for arbitration filed with the property rights ombudsman by a property
owner.
(iii) A request for arbitration filed with the properly rights ombudsman after the time under
Subsection (2)(a) to file a petition has expired does not affect the time to file a petition.
(3) (a) The courts shall:
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance, or regulation made under the authority of this chapter is valid;
and
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision, ordinance, or regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or
illegal.
(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the exercise of legislative discretion is valid if the
decision, ordinance, or regulation is reasonably debatable and not illegal.
(c) A final decision of a land use authority or an appeal authority is valid if the decision is supported
by substantial evidence in the record and is not arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the decision, ordinance, or regulation
violates a law, statute, or ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or
regulation adopted.
(4) The provisions of Subsection (2)(a) apply from the date on which the municipality takes final
action on a land use application for any adversely affected third party, if the municipality conformed
with the notice provisions of Part 2, Notice, or for any person who had actual notice of the pending
decision.
(5) If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge to the enactment of a land
use ordinance or general plan may not be filed with the district court more than 30 days after the
enactment.
(6) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the appeal authority's decision is final.
(7) (a) The land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be, shall transmit to the reviewing
court the record of its proceedings, including its minutes, findings, orders, and, if available, a true and
correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and correct
transcript for purposes of this Subsection (7).
(8) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the record provided by the land
use authority or appeal authority, as the case may be.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the record of the land use authority or
appeal authority, as the case may be, unless that evidence was offered to the land use authority or appeal
authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was improperly excluded.

(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence.
(9) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the land use authority or authority appeal
authority, as the case may be.
(b) (i) Before filing a petition under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a
constitutional taking issue under Section 63-34-13, the aggrieved party may petition the appeal authority
to stay its decision.
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the appeal authority may order its decision stayed pending
district court review if the appeal authority finds it to be in the best interest of the municipality.
(iii) After a petition is filed under this section or a request for mediation or arbitration of a
constitutional taking issue is filed under Section 63-34-13, the petitioner may seek an injunction staying
the appeal authority's decision.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 254, 2005 General Session

20A-7-102. Initiatives and referenda authorized — Restrictions.
By following the procedures and requirements of this chapter, Utah voters may, subject to the
restrictions of Article VI, Sec. 1, Utah Constitution and this chapter:
(1) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to:
(a) the Legislature or to a vote of the people for approval or rejection if it is a proposed state law; or
(b) a local legislative body or to a vote of the people if it is a local law;
(2) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the
members elected to each house of the Legislature, to be referred to the voters for their approval or
rejection before the law takes effect; and
(3) require any law or ordinance passed by a local legislative body to be referred to the voters for
their approval or rejection before the law takes effect.
Amended by Chapter 272. 1994 General Session

20A-7-601. Referenda — General signature requirements — Signature requirements for land
use laws — Time requirements.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), a person seeking to have a law passed by the local
legislative body submitted to a vote of the people shall obtain legal signatures equal to:
(a) 10% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes exceeds 25,000;
(b) 12-1/2% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 25,000 but is more
than 10,000;
(c) 15%) of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 10,000 but is more
than 2,500;
(d) 20% of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 2,500 but is more
than 500;
(e) 25%o of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 500 but is more
than 250; and
(f) 30%o of all the votes cast in the county, city, or town for all candidates for governor at the last
election at which a governor was elected if the total number of votes does not exceed 250.
(2) (a) As used in this Subsection (2), "land use law" includes a land use development code, an
annexation ordinance, and comprehensive zoning ordinances.
(b) A person seeking to have a land use law passed by the local legislative body submitted to a vote
of the people shall obtain legal signatures equal to:
(i) in a county or in a city of the first or second class, 20%o of all votes cast in the county or city for all
candidates for governor at the last election at which a governor was elected; and
(ii) in a city of the third, fourth, or fifth class or a town, 35%o of all the votes cast in the city or town
for all candidates for governor at the last election at which a governor was elected.
(3) (a) Sponsors of any referendum petition challenging, under Subsection (1) or (2), any local law
passed by a local legislative body shall file the petition within 45 days after the passage of the local law.
(b) The local law remains in effect until repealed by the voters via referendum.
(4) If the referendum passes, the local law that was challenged by the referendum is repealed as of the
date of the election.
Amended by Chapter 258, 2004 General Session

78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a court
of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its
jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court
of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States or this
state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital
felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital
felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a
charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari for
the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Chapter 302, 2001 General Session
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Addendum "B"
(Petition for Disconnection of Municipal Boundaries entered
by the Third District Court on May 13, 2004)

Bruce R. Baird, #0176
BAIRD& JONES L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
299 South Main, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 328-1400
Facsimile:
(801)328-1444
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Hollis S.Hunt, #1587
HUNT & RUDD
Attorneys for Petitioner South Farm, LLC
392 East 12300 South, Suite A
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone:
(801) 495-3500
Facsimile:
(801)495-1877

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES, LC and
SOUTH FARM, LLC
Petitioners,

PETITION FOR DISCONNECTION OF
MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES
Civil No

QLj-^oq^^o

vs.

judge

BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal
corporation,
Respondent.

ufmn *\

The Petitioners petition this Court and complain of Respondent as follows:
PARTIES
1.

Petitioner Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC, ("Bluffdale Homes")is a Utah limited

liability company.
2.

Petitioner South Farm, LLC, ("South Farm") is a Utah limited liability company.

3.

Respondent Bluffdale City (the "City") is a Utah municipal corporation.

JURISDICTION
4.

Jurisdiction of this Court over this Petition is conferred by § 10-2-502.5, Utah

Code Annotated.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
INTRODUCTION
5.

Bluffdale Mountain and South Farm (collectively, the "Petitioners") are among a

group of landowners (collectively, the "Landowners") who petitioned the City for a
disconnection of their properties (the "Disconnection Properties") from the City and were denied
that disconnection (the detailed history of which is explained below).
6.

The Disconnection Properties are presently undeveloped and uninhabited.

7.

There is no municipal infrastructure presently serving the Disconnection

Properties.
SOUTH FARM'S HISTORY WITH THE CITY
8.

South Farm acquired its property that is the subject of this Petition between 1980

and 1985.
9.

South Farm has other property that it is developing as "Rosecrest" which is

located in the City of Herriman ("Herriman") adjacent to portions of the Disconnection
Properties.
10.

After approximately seven years of internal planning South Farm began to try to

develop its Bluffdale property similarly to the development of Rosecrest in Herriman.
11.

Between 1993 and 2001 meetings regarding South Farm's proposed development

were held with former Bluffdale Mayor Wanlass (4 times) and former Mayor Nelson (12 times).
12.

Other meetings over this time were held with Salt Lake County representatives, in

?

conjunction with the incorporation of Herriman, with representatives from the City present.
13.

On or about October of 2001 the City installed a water line on South Farm's

property without obtaining a right-of-way.
14.

On January 8, 2002, as a part of the resolution of the illegal construction of the

water line, the Bluffdale City Council adopted Resolution No. 2002-05 concerning the future
development of South Farm's property and South Farm granted a right-of-way without cost to
the City for the water line.
15.

Resolution No. 2002-05 stated, in relevant part:
1. That the best use of the Rosecrest property in the City is to
develop the Rosecrest property with a mixture of uses, density,
commercial, recreational, transportation, and open space elements
compatible with the Rosecrest real property in the Town of
Herriman that is adjacent and contiguous to the Rosecrest property
in the City of Bluffdale.
* * *

3. It is the best use of the property to develop the property with a
mixture of uses including mixed residential properties, commercial
properties, recreational properties, schools, churches, trails and
open spaces consistent with a Master Development Agreement
with Rosecrest.
* * *

5. That the City will work in a speedy and timely fashion to
review the development applications of Rosecrest that are
applicable to each phase and approve or deny each application in
accordance with the relevant sections of the Bluffdale Municipal
Code and Master Development Agreement to be mutually
approved by the City and Rosecrest.
* * *

7. That the City will work with the applicable service districts to
bring the necessary infrastructure to the property to ensure timely
and orderly development of the property.

(Emphasis added.)
16.

Four members of the present City Council voted for Resolution 2002-05.

17.

On May 6, 2002 South Farm filed with Bluffdale City an Application for a

General Plan Amendment and Zone Change on 1,124 acres for 3,183 dwelling units.
18.

Six months passed with no action from the City on the Application.

19.

On November 12, 2002, over the objection of South Farm and without first acting

on South Farm's Application, the Bluffdale City Council adopted a new General Plan for
"Planning Area No. 4" (which includes almost all of the lands that are the subject of this
Petition) materially changing the rules regarding the development of South Farm's property.
20.

Six more months passed with no action from Bluffdale on South Farm's

Application.
21.

On April 22, 2003, South Farm provided $70,000.00 for the City to outsource its

planning review of South Farm's Application due to staff shortages and budgetary restraints of
the City.
22.

The City then hired consultants with South Farm's money to review South Farm's

applications.
23.

On July 15, 2003, the consultant's recommendations were received by the City.

24.

Between receiving the consultant's recommendation on July 15 and October 7,

2003, the City, ignoring both South Farm's Application and the recommendations of its own
consultant, the City created and proposed its own plan amendments to Planning Area No. 4.
25.

On December 4, 2003, the City's retained outside consultants reported to the City

that South Farm's Application met the intent of the General Plan for Planning Area No. 4.
26.

Despite that independent report, on December 9, 2003, more than 19 months after
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they were filed, the City rejected South Farm's Application.
27.

From 2001 to early 2004 South Farm participated in approximately 23 meetings

with the City's staff, 24 Planning Commission meetings and 25 City Council meetings.
28.

During this planning process South Farm submitted at least seven different

alternative proposals in an effort to address the concerns of the City Council, the Planning
Commission, City staff and citizens.
29.

During that period of time the City had three different City Planners and three

different City Attorneys.
30.

From 1997 until early 2004 South Farm spent nearly $950,000.00 trying to obtain

entitlements for the development of its property.
31.

To date, those efforts have produced no General Plan Amendment, no zone

change, no development agreement, no preliminary plat, no final plat and, to put it simply, no
development.
OPTIONS OF THE OTHER LANDOWNERS
32.

Based on the prolonged, expensive and fruitless experiences of South Farm in

dealing with the City, and their other unpleasant interfaces with the City, the other Landowners,
including Bluffdale Homes, determined that it made no sense to try to obtain reasonable
development rights for their properties from the City.
33.

During the process of the City's adoption of its General Plan effectively denying

the other Landowners any reasonable development rights, the Landowners expressed their
concerns about the unfair and improper treatment, but were ignored by the City.

S

FILING OF THE PETITIONS
34.

On February 12, 2004, the Landowners submitted petitions (the "Disconnection

Petitions") to the City to disconnect the Disconnection Properties from the City. (A copy of an
exemplar of the Disconnection Petitions is attached and incorporated as Exhibit "A".)
COMPLIANCE WITH §10-2-501, U.C.A.
35.

As required by §10-2-50 l(2)(b)(i), U.C.A., the Disconnection Petitions contained

the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more than 50% of the real property in the
area proposed for disconnection.
36.

In fact, the Disconnection Petitions (including additional petitions that were filed

later) represented 88% of the private property within the area proposed for disconnection.
37.

If property owned by an arm of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints is

excluded for the calculations (as the LDS Church does not take positions on political issues such
as this) the percentage is 91%.
38.

The other large remaining property that did not join in the Disconnection Petitions

is controlled by the out-of-Utah Trust Department of a large bank.
39.

To date, no property owner within the area proposed for disconnection has

opposed the disconnection.
40.

The Disconnection Petitions also requested the City to adjust the boundaries

between the City and Herriman pursuant to §10-2-419, so that the Disconnection Properties
would be transferred to be within the municipal boundaries of Herriman.
41.

The Disconnection Petitions also sought, pursuant to §10-2-403, to have the

Disconnection Properties (and certain other properties including two existing islands of
unincorporated property) annexed into Herriman after they were disconnected from the City.

42.

As required by §10-2-50l(2)(b)(ii), the Disconnection Petitions specified the

reasons for the proposed disconnection:
Our decision to disconnect our lands from Bluffdale did not
come lightly and is a decision of last resort. After more than tenyears of planning efforts, both formal and informal, spanning three
mayoral administrations, and costing hundreds of thousands of
dollars, Bluffdale has been unresponsive to the needs of the
landowners in Planning Area Number Four.
Bluffdale has not fulfilled its commitments to work with
the landowners to approve a reasonable master plan for their lands.
Bluffdale does not presently provide municipal services such as
roads, sewer and water to these lands and has refused to prepare
itself to provide such services to these lands. Bluffdale has not
committed the staff or resources to respond to development
applications in a competent and timely manner. Where Bluffdale
has hired outside consultants, largely paid for by the landowners
Bluffdale
has ignored the reasoned and considered
recommendations of the professionals they hired.
In the spirit of utmost good-faith, we have worked hard for
many years to react and respond to community concerns and
comments regarding the design and development of these lands.
We have encouraged Bluffdale to participate and to work together
with landowners to build a stronger community. These efforts
have reached the point of exhaustion. Bluffdale's rejection of the
development of these lands is a loud and clear message that
Bluffdale will not serve these lands. While we appreciate those at
Bluffdale who have attempted to work with us, it is time for us to
remove these lands from the municipal boundaries of Bluffdale.
43.

As required by §10-2-50 l(2)(b)(iii), the Disconnection Petitions provided a map

or plat of the territory proposed for disconnection.
44.

As required by § 10-2-501 (2)(b)(iv), the Disconnection Petitions designated three

representatives to act on behalf of the petitioners.
45.

Pursuant to §10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection

Petitions to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation within the municipality. (A copy of the Proof of Publication is attached and
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incorporated by reference as Exhibit "B".)
46.

Pursuant to §10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection

Petitions to be mailed to each owner of real property located within the area proposed to be
disconnected. (A copy of the Affidavit of Hollis S. Hunt attesting to the mailing attached and
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "C".)
47.

Pursuant to §10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection

Petitions to be delivered to the Salt Lake County Council, the legislative body of the county in
which the area proposed for disconnection is located. (A copy of the Affidavit of Hollis S. Hunt
attesting to the delivery is attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "D".)
48.

The City has acknowledged that the Landowners have complied with the

requirements of § 10-2-501.
COMPLIANCE WITH §10-2-502.7, U.C.A.
49.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(a) the Petitioners have the burden of proving the

viability of the disconnection.
50.

The disconnection is viable.

5L

The City has never disputed the viability of the disconnection.

52.

To establish this viability the Petitioners engaged the services of Wikstrom

Economic and Planning Consultants and also did other analyses of the viability of the
disconnection using resources of Bluffdale Homes and South Farm.
53.

The Petitioners provided the detailed analysis of the disconnection viability to the

54.

The City has never disputed any part of the viability analysis.

City.

55.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(b) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that

justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality.
56.

It is just and equitable that the Court should respect and honor the wishes of

virtually all of the landowners in the area proposed for disconnection when the City has treated
the area so unfairly, neither provided nor even planned for the provision of public infrastructure
or services and unreasonably prevented development of the Disconnection Properties.
57.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that

the proposed disconnection will not leave the municipality with an area within its boundaries for
which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services would materially
increase over previous years.
58.

As the Disconnection Properties are completely unserviced by the City and are

located on the periphery of the City the disconnection will not leave the municipality with an
area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing
municipal services would materially increase over previous years.
59.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(c)(ii) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that

the disconnection will not make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to
continue to function as a municipality.
60.

The Disconnection Properties provide the City each year with only approximately

$1,750.00 (not a typo) in property taxes which, out of a total General Fund budget of the City of
2,021,000.00, is less than one-tenth of one percent (0.1 %) of the budgeted revenues.
61.

The preservation of, literally, 99.9 percent of the City's budget would not work

any hardship on the City.

n

62.

Further, as the City has installed absolutely no infrastructure on the Disconnection

Properties there can be no adverse impact on such infrastructure.
63.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that

the disconnection will not leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated
territory.
64.

The disconnection would not leave or create any islands or peninsulas of

unincorporated territory.
65.

The proposed disconnection will actually cure the existence of two current islands

and one possible peninsula within the boundaries of the City.
66.

The Disconnection Properties are contiguous with an area that is presently

unincorporated.
67.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(d) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that the

county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a cost-effective
manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of
providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to
the disconnection.
68.

Salt Lake County is capable, in a cost-effective manner and without materially

increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of providing to the area the
services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the disconnection.
69.

In the present undeveloped and uninhabited condition of the Disconnection

Properties there are essentially no municipal services provided and none are required and thus no
costs are involved.
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70.

The Landowners have also petitioned Herriman to annex the Disconnection

Properties.
71.

Pursuant to §10-2-405, Herriman will have to annex the Disconnection Properties.

72.

Any costs for servicing the Disconnection Properties during the process of

development and afterwards will not fall on Salt Lake County but will, instead, be the
responsibility of Herriman.
73.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(a), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider all relevant
factors, including the effect of the proposed disconnection on the municipality or community as a
whole.
74.

The disconnection will have no adverse impacts on the City as a whole.

75.

The Disconnection Properties are physically distinct from the remaining portions

of the City and, for the most part, separated by a distinct and significant physical boundary.
76.

Disconnection would actually help preserve the characteristics of the remaining

area of the City by allowing the remaining areas to be developed with a different zoning and
density pattern than is appropriate for the Disconnection Properties.
77.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(b), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on adjoining property owners.
78.

The disconnection would have no adverse impacts on adjoining property owners.

79.

On the south of the Disconnection Properties is Camp Williams (a Federal

military base) which would not be affected at all.
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80.

To the west of Disconnection Properties, in Herriman, is a development planned

for a density and configuration similar to what has been proposed for the Disconnection
Properties.
81.

On the northeastern angular side of the Disconnection Properties the adjoining

properties are almost completely separated from the Disconnection Properties by a physical
boundary, the Welby-Jacobs Canal over which there are no bridges, roadways or pedestrian
access between the Disconnection Properties and the remainder of the City.
82.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(c), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on existing or projected streets or public ways.
83.

There are no existing or projected public streets in the Disconnection Properties

except for the proposed Mountain View Corridor (formerly known as the Legacy Highway)
which would not be negatively impacted by the proposed disconnection.
84.

Even if the City has some plans for public streets inside the Disconnection

Properties there is no reason to believe that such streets would be negatively impacted by the
proposed disconnection.
85.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(d), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on water mains and water services.
86.

There are no existing water mains or water services to the Disconnection

Properties and thus the disconnection will have no impact.
87.

Disconnection would actually facilitate delivery of water services since there are

adjacent services provided by Herriman.

1?

88.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(e), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on sewer mains and sewer services.
89.

There are no existing sewer mains in or sewer services provided to the

Disconnection Properties.
90.

Sewer services to the Disconnected Properties will be provided by the South

Valley Sewer District.
91.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(f), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on law enforcement.
92.

Law enforcement services, such as they are since the area is uninhabited and

virtually bare ground, are and will continue to be provided by the Salt Lake County Sheriff.
93.

The disconnection will have no effect on the provision of law enforcement

services.
94.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(g), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on zoning.
95.

The zoning of the Disconnection Properties currently maintained by the City is

irrationally low, discriminates against moderate income families and violates the City's
obligations regarding low income housing.
96.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(h), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on other municipal services.

n

u

97.

The proposed disconnection will have no impact on the provision of other

municipal services since the City provides no such services to the uninhabited bare ground of the
Disconnection Properties.
98.

The City has never denied, or even offered a single shred of evidence, regarding

the proof by the Landowners that the proposed disconnection meets all of the tests for
disconnection specified in §10-2-502.7.
DENIAL OF DISCONNECTION PETITIONS
99.

On May 11, 2004, the Bluffdale City Council voted to deny the Disconnection

Petitions.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Declaration of Disconnection
Petitioners incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 - 99 above.
100.

Petitioners are entitled to a judgment declaring that the Disconnection Properties

of the Landowners should be disconnected from the City.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
On the foregoing Petition the Petitioners pray for relief as follows:
1.

For a determination by the Court that disconnection of the Disconnection

Properties subject to the Disconnection Petitions is proper and required by §10-2-502.7, U.C.A.
2.

For an Order disconnecting the properties from the City.

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

izi

ap

DATED this \?

day of May, 2004.

BAIRD& JONES LC
Attorneys for Petitioners

BAfce R. Baird

HUNT & RUDD
Attorneys for Petitioner South Farms

Hollis S. Hunt

Petitioners' Addresses:
South Farm, LLC
2511 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC
5635 South Waterbury Court, C-100
Holladay,UT 84121

i^

EXHIBIT "A

PETITION TO BLUFFDALE CITY AND HERRIMAN FOR VOLUNTARY BOUNDARY
ADJUSTMENT, DISCONNECTION AND ANNEXATION
I/we, Bluffdale Mountain Homes, are the owners of the following property(ies):
Tax ED #

Approximate Property Address

33-17-400-004

Number on attached Map

Bluffdale, Utah
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Pursuant to §10-2-419, U.C.A., I/we hereby petition Bluffdale City and Herriman City to
voluntarily adjust the municipal boundaries between Bluffdale City and Herriman City to transfer the
above-referenced property(ies) and the other properties shown on Map # lthat is attached hereto and
incorporated herein from Bluffdale City to Herriman. Further, pursuant to §10-2-501 I/we also petition
Bluffdale City to disconnect the above-referenced property(ies) as shown on Map # 1 from Bluffdale.
Pursuant to § 10-2-403 I/we also hereby petition Herriman to annex the property(ies) shown on the Map # 2
into Herriman City.
I/we hereby designate Donald Wallace, Robert Jones and Loretta Wilcox as the persons with
authority to act on my/our behalf in the proceedings regarding these petitions.
Reasons for Disconnection from Bluffdale
Our decision to disconnect our lands from Bluffdale did not come lightly and is a decision of last
resort. After more than ten-years of planning efforts, both formal and informal, spanning three mayoral
administrations, and costing hundreds of thousands of dollars, Bluffdale has been unresponsive to the needs
of the landowners in Planning Area Number Four.
Bluffdale has not fulfilled its commitments to work with landowners to approve a reasonable
master plan for their lands. Bluffdale does not presently provide municipal services such as roads, sewer
and water to these lands and has refused to prepare itself to provide such services to these lands. Bluffdale
has not committed the staff or resources to respond to development applications in a competent and timely
manner. Where Bluffdale has hired outside consultants, largely paid for by the landowners, Bluffdale has
ignored the reasoned and considered recommendations of the professionals they hired.
In the spirit of utmost good-faith, we have worked hard for many years to react and respond to
community concerns and comments regarding the design and development of these lands. We have
encouraged Bluffdale to participate and to work together with landowners to build a stronger community.
These efforts have reached the point of exhaustion. Bluffdale's rejection of the development of these lands
is a loud and clear message that Bluffdale will not serve these lands. While we appreciate those at
Bluffdale who have attempted to work with us, it is time for us to remove these lands from the municipal
boundaries of Bluffdale.
DATED this fc^day of fc-bf^^ry
OWTNTEIp)

__—

2004
Mailing Address (optional)

EXHIBIT "B"

.1.4 3 SOUTH MAIN ST.
P.O.BOX 45838
LT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8414 5
ED.TAX I.D.# 87-0217663
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CUSTOMER'S
COPY

Morning News

PROOF OF PUBLICATION

DATE

[ACCOUNT NUMBER

CUSTOMER NAME AND ADDRESS
ROSECREST INC & SOUTHFARM, LL
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE
2 5 1 1 S WEST TEMPLE
SALT LAKE CITY
UT 8 4 1 1 5

03/05/04

R4619700L-07
I

I
NOTICE
». r f ? 1 1 . ^ *° r Municipal Disconnection
Bluffdale City (see legal description below)

I

|
Notice is hereby giveni pursuant to §10-2-501, Utah Code Annotated, that pet
'ions have been filed with Bluffdale City seeking to disconnect the property specific
infoelegal description below from Bluffdale Cry. The petitions represent the owr
ership of approximately 3100 acres percent (84 %) of the properties within the are
i proposed for disconnection. The petitions are supported by an analysis of the isst*

ACCOUNT NAME

more or less to the center of said Secti™ on.

ROSECREST INC & SOUTHFARM, LL
TELEPHONE
INVOICE NUMBJ
801-461-9700

ooum vvn'04"

East along the westlinenfVntr <&/•«» ™ lu %???!?" * 0 ; ™*
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2650.924 feet to ! w « n 2 r a l o , l g th,e wesf ,,ne °* said Section 18 f
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'

ke Bose and Mer
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1.68
'^^^^
AD CHARGES more or less to the Southeast

come? S thl M°« 0 J 2 2 ,°n E a s ! f o r J 370.072
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Quarter of said Section 2 J ' t a c ^ o ^ 8 9 ^ ^
°L«* N o r t h w e *
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weti r Quarter
of
,ess to
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» n e e t t m o r eof, o sald
**
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l w e s t 0u arter
21: thence North 88*53'56" East fo?
1
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A
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BEGINNING.
' feet more or less lo the POINT OF
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Acres more or less

AFFIDAVIT OF PUBLICATION^

••r»_i IICIII m a i n *

AS NEWSPAPER AGENCY CORPORATION LEGAL BOOKKEEPER, I CERTIFY THAT THE ATTACHED
ADVERTISEMENT OF NOTICE PETITIONS FOR M U N I C I P A L
FOR
R O S E C R E S T INC & SOUTHFARM, LL
WAS PUBLISHED BY THE NEWSPAPER AGENCY
CORPORATION, AGENT FOR THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE AND DESERET NEWS,DAILY NEWSPAPERS
PRINTED IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE WITH GENERAL CIRCULATION IN UTAH, AND PUBLISHED
IN SALT LAKE CITY, SALT LAKE COUNTY IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
PUBLISHED ON

START 02/20/04

SIGNATURE

^S^lO^^^^J

DATE

03/05/04

END 03/05/04
Notary Public

'

SJANIEBEST

I

^ West Big Mountain Drive •
raylorsville Utah 84123
|
vly Commission Expires
•
November 19,2006
I

StatepfJJtah

mm

j

THIS IS NOT A STATEMENT BUT A "PROOF OF PUBLICATION"
PLEASE PAY FROM BILLING STATEMENT.

\c/

EXHIBIT "C

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING PURSUANT TO U.CA.
§10-2-501(3)(b) TO PROPERTY OWNERS WITHIN THE
PROPERTY AREA TO BE DISCONNECTED
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

I, HOLLIS S. HUNT, Attorney at Law, on the 26th day of February, 2004, did mail,
by certified mail and regular mail, to those Property Owners of record being situated
within the area seeking disconnection as required in U.C.A. §10-2-501 (3)(b) as noted in
Exhibit "A" attached, a Notice for Petitioners for Municipal Disconnection as is set out in
Exhibit "B" attached to this Affidavit.
DATED March 25,2004

^JK^JLAJ

J^.^J«^^odr-

HOLLIS S. HUNT
Attorney at Law
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25* day of March, 2004.

QC<4.
•*!•«

NOTARY PUBLIC
KAftEN USOM5ST}
tMeWATCmUNK
*ANOV, UT. M O *
C O M * EXP. 01*114001

A.A.

(Name
Additional
JAIIdredge, Dennis K & Debra R
[Barclay, Scott B
Bearden, Lucille C
Bennett, Golden J & Arda D
Bennion, Don W & Elaine
[Bills, Danell C
IBIoomdale, Randall E & Sheila E
IBIuffdale Enterprises LLC
IB luff dale Mountain Homes, LC
[Board of Education Jordan School District
IBouldon, Douglas D & Judith A
(Buckmiller, Daniel K. & Kelly C
| Butterfield, James E & Shirley C
Butterfield, Rodney W
Butterfield, Weston M
Carlson, Michael M
[Carlson, Rose L.
I Cental Utah Water Conservancy Dist
Ichristensen, Del S
jChristensen, Marvin L ET AL
ICIive, David L Jr & Joan
I Cooper, Clarence B & Hazel F
IDave Shelby Realtor Inc
|Dee Bearden, Van
IDoxey, Evans T. & Mariene L.
1 First Security Bank
jGailey, Roger L & Susan
[Gibson, Donna D
IGroomer, Russell
Hamilton Land & Livestock LTD
Hamilton, Dale W & Sharen L
Hamilton, Daro E.
1 Harvey, J Neil & Rita M

Address

City

State Zip

8812 S Bluejay Ln
3802 S 2300 E
1759 W American Park Cir
I479W1200S
4260 S Parkview Dr
182 S 200 W
6872 S Meadow Dr
*615 South Lakeview Drive
5635 S Waterbury Way #C100
*9150 South 500 West
245 N Vine St. #803
16775S1825W
I6237 W 13100 S
I6223W 13100 S
862 E Fairway Dr
14800S1300W
1088 E9400 S
355 W University Pkwy
4524 S 785 E
Note 1:12550 S. Tithing Hill Drive
6526 S State St
4594 S Westview Dr
517 E 8 6 8 0 S
2862 W 13760 S
3690 S 5600 W
PO Box 810490
E11 CalleDiido
16575 S Camp Williams Rd
2865 W 7085 S
Note 2: 4850 W. 13400 South
330 E 1200 S
*5570 W. Rocky Pount Drive
16535 S Camp Williams Rd

Salt Lake City
Salt Lake City
Salt Lake City
Kamas
Salt Lake City
Herriman
Salt Lake City
•Bountiful
Salt Lake City
*Sandy
Salt Lake City
Riverton
Herriman
Herriman
Bountiful
Riverton
Sandy
Orem
Murray
Riverton
Murray
Salt Lake City
Sandy
Riverton
West Valley
Dallas
Guaynabo
Riverton
West Jordan
Riverton
Kamas
Riverton
Riverton

Ut
Ut
Ut

ut
ut
ut
ut
*UT
Ut
*UT

ut
ut
ut
ut
ut
ut
ut
ut

lut

UT
Ut

ut
Ut

ut
ut
Tx
PR

ut
ut

ur

ut

UT

ut

Parcel #

84121 33-18-200-020-0000
84109 33-22-100-006-0000
84119 33-16-300-009-0000
84036 33-16-300-011-0000
84124 33-08-400-003-0000
| 84065 33-18-200-008-0000
84121 33-17-100-017-0000
M8010 33-07-300-001-0000
84121 33-17-400-004-0000
84070 33-06-300-011-0000
84103 33-08-400-001-0000
84065 33-27-100-020-0000
84065 33-17-100-002-0000
84065 33-22-100-002-0000
84010 33-17-200-017-0000
84065 33-27-200-002-0000
84094 33-27-200-001-0000
84058 33-16-300-026-0000
84107 33-18-200-011-0000
84065 33-16-300-019-0000
84107 33-18-200-021-0000
84124 33-17-300-001-0000
84070 33-22-300-001-0000
84065 33-16-300-018-0000
84120 33-17-200-001-0000
75381 33-27-100-016-0000
"00969 33-21-100-016-0000
84065 33-22-400-015-0000
84084 33-17-100-018-0000
84065 33-06-400-019-0000
84036 33-16-300-010-0000
84065 33-07-200-005-0000
84065 33-22-400-014-0000 |

| Hidden Valley Associates
I Jack Lashley / Laguna Investment Company
IJLC Investments
1 Jones, Kurtis D & Terie N
Jordan Valley Water Conservancy Dist
Judd, Brian L & Deborah K
IKessimakis, Gary K & Linda
(King, Lyman & Michelle
Knouse, Paul T & Viemarie
1 Laguna Investments
ILarsen, John D. & Joyce
ILosee, Chris
Mac 8, LLC
IMalibu Investment Company
IMangum, Billy L & Donna M
IMangum, Dianne B
IMangum, Michael L. & Deborah K
JM call is ter, Sarah M
IMcDougal, Curtis
IMcMullin, Gam H & Pam £
(Michel Investments LLC
Miles, Waiter M & Pacrta G
Miller, Velina K & Killion, Sharron
Mitchell, Grant L & Judi R
(Myrtle's Seven Ltd
loisen, Jens A & Kama
lOndrak, Keven L & Joanne E
lOsterloh, Frederick R
JParr, Vauna
1 Patricia J Rasmusson Family Ltd Part
jPeel, Don
Petersen, Don E Jr
Phillips, Jack A Jr. & Jean
Phillips, Robert & Deanna
Provo Reservoir Canal Co
Rentmeister, Jay & Garva
Rubey, Paul R & Carol A

Note 2: 14 Lone Hollow
2688 E Wanda Way
1880 EDelannLn
13739S6315W
|P.O.Box70
199 E6100 S
4648 S 345 E
T1418 East Michigan Avenue
9803 Powderhouse Rd
*2688 East Wanda Way
196 E 9140 S
7696 S 2250 W
10299 S Springcrest Ln
j*2020 East 3300 South, #26
462 S100 E
6966 S Harvest View Way
3246 W 7300 S
275 E13275S
11576 S State St #303
2655 WSilverpoint Way
2956 E Cobblemoor Ln
1412 W Mango Rd
15103 S 1 8 0 0 W
1942EParkridgeDr
4059 S 5200W
2896 E Hyland Hills Rd
3864S2520W
8955 S Cobble Canyon Ln
2862 W 13760 S
P.O. Box 1037
4030 E Charlton Ave
10519 S Weeping Willow Dr
10133 S Birnam Woods Wy
2910 S Buccaneer Dr
1156 S State St #104
12872 S 1 8 3 0 W

P.O. Box 374

Sandy
Salt Lake City
Salt Lake City
Herriman
West Jordan
Murray
Murray
Salt Lake City
Cheyenne
Salt Lake City
Sandy
West Jordan
South Jordan
Salt Lake City
Ivins
I West Jordan
West Jordan
Draper
Draper
Riverton
Sandy
Taylorsville
Bluffdale
Salt Lake City
West Valley
Salt Lake City
Salt Lake City
Sandy
Riverton
Beaver
Hemet
Sandy
South Jordan
Magna
I Orem
Riverton
I Draper

[UT
Ut
Ut
Ut

f 84092 33-17-300-002-00001
84117 33-18-100-001-0000
I 84121 33-17-100-019-0000
84065 33-17-200-012-0000
84084 33-16-300-025-0000
ut
84107 33-17-100-020-0000
ut
84107 33-18-200-004-0000
ut
UT
84105 33-07-300-008-0000
Wy
82009 33-07-400-004-0000
UT
84105 33-19-100-001-0000
Ut
84070 33-18-200-003-0000
Ut
84084 133-17-200-013-0000
Ut
84095 33-22-300-006-0000
UT
64109 33-07-100-005-0000
Ut
84738 133-27-100-013-0000
84084 33-27-100-009-0000
ut
84084 33-27-100-007-0000
ut
|Ut
' 84020 33-18-200-002-0000
ut | 84020 33-16-300-020-0000
84065 33-16-200-016-0000
ut
I 84093 33-21-100-006-0000
ut
84123 33-18-200-016-0000
ut
I 84065 33-20-200-004-0000
ut
84121 33-18-200-005-0000
ut
84120 33-17-400-003-0000
ut
I 84109 33-16-300-003-0000
ut
84119 33-27-100-014-0000
ut
84093 33-08-300-007-0000
ut
84065 33-16-300-016-0000
ut
84713 33-16-300-017-0000
ut
92544 33-18-100-003-0000
Ca
Ut
84070, 33-16-300-019-0000
Ut
84095 33-18-200-022-0000
84044 33-17-200-011-0000
j Ut
Ut
84097 33-17-200-006-0000
Ut
I 84065 33-18-200-013-0000
84020 33-16-300-015-00001
yt

[Rueckert, Stephen
Russo, Marilyn L
ISart Lake County Water Concervancy Dist
Scholle, Richard E & Laksana I
Seeley, Steven L. & N Lorane
(Sharp, Norms in K & Myra C
T & M Holdings, LLC
The Corp of PB of CH of JC of LDS
Utah Board of Water Resources
Utah Power & Light Co
Wells Fargo Bank Northwest
Wilcox, Loretta
Wilson, Shane R & Katherine C
Winegar, Joel E & Lorraine
Workman, Wayne
[South Farms, LLC

PO Box 273
P.O. Box 1026
P.O. Box 70
2530 S Chesterfield St
1613 E Casper Rd
2331 W Donnarae Cir
581 N 600 E
*50 East North Temple
P.O. Box 146201
700 NE Multnomah St #700
P.O.Box 13495
12020 S 4000 W
*241 South 200 East
10314 S Springcrest Ln
16475 Camp Williams Rd
2511 South West Temple Street

Riverton
Salome
West Jordan
Salt Lake City
Sandy
Riverton
Orem
Salt Lake City
Salt Lake City
Portland
Arlington
Riverton
Lehi
South Jordan
Riverton
South Salt Lake City

Ut
Az
Ut
Ut
Ut
Ut
Ut
UT
Ut
Or
Te
Ut
UT
Ut
Ut
Ut

84065
85348
84084
84119
84092
84065
84097
84150
84114
97232
76094
84065
84043
84095
84065
84115

33-27-100-017-0000 I
33-16-300-023-0000
33-17-200-019-0000
33-16-300-014-0000
33-18-200-015-0000
33-16-300-024-4001
33-21-100-012-0000
33-06-100-019-0000
33-17-400-001-0000
33-22-300-002-0000
33-21-100-002-0000
33-17-400-006-0000
33-17-200-012-0000
33-18-200-019-0000
33-22-400-016-0000
33-18-400-006
|

NOTICE

Petitions for Municipal Disconnection
Bluffdale City (see legal description below)
Notice is hereby given pursuant to §10-2-501, Utah Code Annotated, that
petitions have been filed with Bluffdale City seeking to disconnect the property specified
in the legal description below from Bluffdale City. The petitions represent the ownership
of approximately 3100 acres percent (84 %) of the properties within the area proposed for
disconnection. The petitions are supported by an analysis of the issues specified in §102-502.7 related to the proposed disconnection. A copy of that analysis is on file with
Bluffdale City and available for public inspection. Also on file and available for public
inspection are a number of maps illustrating the properties involved, the relevant
development infrastructures and other matters necessary for the consideration of the
petitions
Pursuant to §10-2-501 the petitioners have delivered a copy of the petitions and
supporting information to the legislative body of Salt Lake County and are mailing a
copy to all property owners within the affected area. The petitioners are also causing this
Notice to be published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
a notice of the request for disconnection. Pursuant to §10-2-502.5 Bluffdale is required
to hold a public hearing on the request for disconnection no more than 30 days after the
final publication.
Pursuant to §10-2-501 the petitioners have designated Donald Wallace, Robert
Jones and Loretta Wilcox as the persons with authority to act on their behalf in
connection with the disconnection proceedings.
LEGAL DESCRIPTION:
A parcel of land lying in Sections 6, 7, 8,15,16,17,18, 19,20,21,22 and 27 of
Township 4 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more particularly
described as follows:
BEGINNING at the West Quarter corner of said Section 6; thence South 89°36'05" East
along the centerline of said Section 6 for 3763.944 feet to the west line of the Welby
Canal; thence along said canal for the following One Hundred Forty Seven (147) courses;
South 32°19'55" East for 122.651 feet; thence South 23°18'28" East for 49.828 feet;
thence South l O ^ e ^ " East for 48.555 feet; thence South 00°10'56" West for 48.412
feet; thence South 07°16'50" West for 52.937 feet; thence South 14°17'03" West for
106.982 feet; thence South 06°22'06" West for 55.045 feet; thence South 00°43'3r
West for 52.928 feet; thence South 01°35'47" East for 214.599 feet; thence South
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10°05'19" East for 57.621 feet; thence South 17 0 45'4r East for 55.569 feet; thence
South 25°32'39" East for 55.349 feet; thence South 28°09'27" East for 554.609 feet;
thence South 35 o H'01" East for 310.277 feet; thence South 37°17'31" East for 165.659
feet; thence South 44°49'05" East for 112.612 feet; thence South 51°23'01" East for
215.838 feet; thence South 42°10'48" East for 52.329 feet; thence South 31°33'56" East
for 106.838 feet; thence South 26°17'40" East for 212.555 feet; thence South 29°31'21"
East for 106.223 feet; thence South 38°02'18" East for 58.641 feet; thence South
49°41'00" East for 161.798 feet; thence South 53°28'05" East for 229.399 feet; thence
South 53°25'35" East for 44.402 feet; thence South 53°24'55" East for 174.082 feet;
thence South 55°48'08" East for 160.484 feet; thence South 70°39'18" East for 54.337
feet; thence South 86°58'33" East for 56.348 feet; thence North 84°00'14" East for
161.248 feet; thence South 87°22'44" East for 52.180 feet; thence South 80°15'14" East
for 270.231 feet; thence South 77°44'20" East for 52.132 feet; thence South 65°48'00"
East for 51.809 feet; thence South 50°22'H" East for 50.211 feet; thence South
40°18'00" East for 51.808 feet; thence South 33°26'33" East for 241.730 feet; thence
South 31°29'26" East for 154.228 feet; thence South 20°20'08" East for 106.043 feet;
thence South 13°33'51" East for 423.556 feet; thence South 21°37'17" East for 56.533
feet; thence South 27°10,54" East for 412.294 feet; thence South 28°35'34" East for
433.534 feet; thence South 31 °31 '03" East for 428.536 feet; thence South 19°55'18" East
for 50.061 feet; thence South 00°54'12" East for 47.742 feet; thence South 20°48'38"
West for 158.104 feet; thence South 13°19'41" West for 59.086 feet; thence South
35°53'23" East for 60.836 feet; thence South 74°29'38" East for 212.583 feet; thence
South 6 7 ° 3 5 ' i r East for 100.955 feet; thence South 67°18'50" East for 360.265 feet;
thence South 65°07'27" East for 210.380 feet; thence South 59°49'02" East for 372.880
feet; thence South 52°54'59" East for 105.787 feet; thence South 43°55'00" East for
163.875 feet; thence South 42°45'41" East for 277.617 feet; thence South 34°15'21" East
for 107.029 feet; thence South 27°00'54" East for 778.589 feet; thence South 22°14'40"
East for 54.148 feet; thence South 17°13'01" East for 595.287 feet; thence South
26°14'18" East for 114.291 feet; thence South 50°14'59" East for 60.701 feet; thence
South 63°28'0r East for 348.152 feet; thence South 63°28'01" East for 295.997 feet;
thence South 55°28'17" East for 52.340 feet; thence South 50°09'01" East for 105.261
feet; thence South 48°19'32" East for 360.507 feet; thence South 48°19'32" East for
380.852 feet; thence South 46°19'24" East for 108.048 feet; thence South 40 o 28'H" East
for 106.848 feet; thence South 30°42'43" East for 473.939 feet; thence South 33°57,21"
East for 54.448 feet; thence South 28°53'29" East for 139.550 feet; thence South
36°26'57" East for 106.518 feet; thence South 46°4r07" East for 166.181 feet; thence
South 51013'15M East for 168.834 feet; thence South 60°10'03" East for 53.216 feet;
thence South 72°43'17" East for 53.432 feet; thence South 81°25'55" East for 102.039
feet; thence South 73°24'31" East for 68.206 feet; thence South 64°25'17" East for
89.155 feet; thence South 58°36'14" East for 667.789 feet; thence South 60°35'49" East
for 106.336 feet; thence South 70°09'05" East for 107.406 feet; thence South 75°03'21"
East for 523.941 feet; thence South 87°19'57" East for 114.951 feet; thence North
84°42'53" East for 102.480 feet; thence South 68°ir04" East for 211.037 feet; thence
South 8r41'17" East for 161.218 feet; thence South 71°28'13" East for 50.515 feet;
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thence South 59°46>29" East for 48.571 feet; thence South 52°13,26" East for 128.083
feet to the south line of the north half of Section 16; thence South 89°19'49" East along
said south line for 1781.243 feet more or less to the West Quarter comer of Section 15;
thence South 89°28'41" East along the south line of the north half of said Section 15 for
422.224 feet more or less to the west right-of-way line of Redwood Road; thence along
said right-of-way line for the following eight (8) courses; with a non-tangent curve to the
left, having a radius of 2616.500 feet, a central angle of 09°33'16" (chord bearing and
distance of South 14°38'56" East - 435.817 feet) and for an arc distance of 436.322 feet;
thence South 19°25'34" East for 93.100 feet; thence South 13042'56n East for 301.500
feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 1400.000 feet; thence South 25°08'12" East for
301.500 feet; thence South 19025'34" East for 1000.393 feet; thence South 13°42'56"
East for 301.500 feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 7311.125 feet to the intersection
of said west right-of-way and the south line of the north half of Section 27; thence North
89035'39" West along said south line for 1401.748 feet more or less to the center of said
Section 27; thence North 89°35'39" West along the centeriine of said Section 27 for
1320.000 feet more or less to the Southwest comer of the east half of the Northwest
Quarter of said Section 27; thence North 00°42'20" West along the west line of the east
half of said Northwest Quarter for 2627.441 feet more or less to the Northwest comer of
the east half of said Northwest Quarter; thence South 89°36,50" West along the north
line of said Section 27 for 1380.651 feet more or less to the Southwest comer of said
Section 22; thence North 00°03'29" East along the west line of said Section 22 for
2598.603 feet more or less to the West Quarter comer of said Section 22; thence North
01°06'41" East along the west line of said Section 22 for 1326.035 feet more or less to
the Northeast comer of south half of the north half of said Section 21; thence South
89°59'33" West along the north line of the south half of north half of said Section 21 for
2640.000 feet more or less to the northeast comer of the south half of the Northwest
Quarter said Section 21; thence South 00°52'20" East for 1307.072 to the center of said
Section 21; thence North S9°53 '11" West along the south line of the Northwest Quarter
of said Section 21 for 2607.161 to the West Quarter comer of said Section 21; thence
South 89°58'02" West along the centeriine of said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or
less to the center of said Section 20; thence North 00°0r58" West along the centeriine of
said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the North Quarter comer of said Section
20; thence South 89°28'28" West along the north line of said Section 20 for 2617.134
feet to the Northwest comer of said Section 20; thence South 00°22,04" East along the
west line of said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the West Quarter comer of
said Section 20; thence North 89°16'28" West along the centeriine of said Section 19 for
5280.000 feet more or less to the West Quarter comer of said Section 19; thence North
00°43'32" East along the west line of said Section 19 for 2640.000 feet more or less to
the Northwest comer of said Section 19; thence North 00°15'11" East along the west line
of said Section 18 for 2650.924 feet to the West Quarter Comer of said Section 18;
thence North 00°36,54>> East along the west line of said Section 18 for 2623.328 feet to
the Northwest comer of said Section 18; thence North 00°09,22" West along the west
line of said Section 7 for 2693.831 feet to the West Quarter comer of said Section 7;
thence North 00°07,48" West along the west line of said Section 7 for 2673.457 feet to
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the Northwest comer of said Section 7; thence North 00° 11*30" West along the west line
of said Section 6 for 2677.167 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
Containing 4052 Acres Gross, more or less
LESS AND EXCEPT PARCEL 138
A parcel of land lying in Northeast Quarter of Section 19 of Township 4 South, Range 1
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Northeast comer of said Section 19; thence South 45°02,26" West
for 1844.418 feet more or less to the southwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the
Northeast Quarter of said section; thence North 00°05'40" West for 1319.955 feet more
or less to the Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said
section; thence South 89°16'09" East for 1307.406 feet more or less to the POINT OF
BEGINNING.
<•

Containing 19 acres more or less.

ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING PARCEL 144
A parcel of land being the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 21,
Township 4 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, being more particularly
described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the being the Nortliieast Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of said Section 21; thence South 00°52'20" East for 1370.072 feet more or less to
the Southeast corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section
21; thence South 89°59'33" West for 1320.000 feet more or less to the Southwest corner
of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21; thence North
01°35'55" West for 1344.924 feet more or less to the Northwest corner of the Northeast
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21; thence North 88°53'56" East for
1336.913 feet more or less to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
Containing 41 Acres more or less

Net Acreage 3991 Acres more or less

^ t

EXHIBIT "D

AFFIDAVIT OF DELIVERY PURSUANT TO U.C.A.
§10-2-501(3)(c) TO SALT LAKE COUNTY WHEREIN THE
PROPERTY AREA TO BE DISCONNECTED IS LOCATED
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
: ss.
)

I, HOLLIS S. HUNT, Attorney at Law, on the 12lh day of February, 2004, did
cause to be delivered to the Offices of Salt Lake County in Salt Lake City a Petition for
Voluntary Boundary Adjustment/Disconnection with exliibits as noted in Exhibit "A" as
required in §10-2-50 l(3)(c).
DATED March 25,2004

HOLLIS S. HUNT
Attorney at Law
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25th day of March, 2004.
/

/

KAREN LISONBEE
mTAmHMK'mntiuTJm

1586 WATERS LANE
SANOY.UT. MOM
COMM.EXP. M-11-2006

NOTARY PUBLIC

Addendum "C"
(Amended Petition for Disconnection of Municipal
Boundaries entered by the Third District Court on
August 4, 2004)

~H<^\
Bruce R. Baird, #0176
BAIRD& JONES L.C.
Attorneys for Petitioners
299 South Main, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 328-1400
Facsimile:
(801) 328-1444
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Hollis S.Hunt, #1587
HUNT & RUDD
Attorneys for Petitioner South Farm, LLC
392 East 12300 South, Suite A
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone:
(801) 495-3500
Facsimile:
(801)495-1877

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES, LC;
SOUTH FARMS, LLC; LAGUNA
INVESTMENTS; MALIBU INVESTMENT
COMPANY, LP; JLC INVESTMENTS, LLC;
HIDDEN VALLEY ASSOCIATES; T & M
HOLDINGS, LLC; BLUFFDALE
ENTERPRISES, LLC; JAMES E. &
SHIRLEY C. BUTTERFIELD (as Trustees of
the Butterfield Family Trust); SCOTT B.
BARCLAY (as Trustee of the B.G. Holbrook
Family Trust); DON E. PETERSEN, JR.; DON
W. & ELAINE W. BENNION (as Trustees of
the Don W. & Elaine Bennion Family Trust);
DARO E. HAMILTON; MYRTLE'S SEVEN,
LTD; FREDRICK R. OSTERLOH; RODNEY
W. BUTTERFIELD; WESTON
BUTTERFIELD (as Trustee to the Weston
Morris Butterfield Family Trust); DANELL C.
BILLS; JAY G. & ARDA D. BENNETT;
VAUNA PARR; ROGER L. & SUSAN
GAILEY (as Trustees for Blain S. & Opal L.
Gailey); GARY K. & LINDA KESSIMAKIS;
THE PATRICIA J. RASMUSSON FAMILY
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a Utah

AMENDED PETITION FOR
DISCONNECTION OF MUNICIPAL
BOUNDARIES

Civil No. 040909920

Judge Anthony B. Quinn
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Corporation; LUCILLE C. BEARDEN (as
Trustee of the Lucille C. Bearden Family
Trust); DALE W. & SHAREN L.
HAMILTON (as Trustees of the Dale and
Sharen Hamilton Trust); ROBERT JR. &
DEANNA PHILLIPS; VAN DEE BEARDEN;
RANDALL E. & SHEILA E. BLOOMDALE;
BILLY L. & DONNA J. MANGUM (as
Trustees of the Billy Lavoy and Donna Joyce
N. Mangum Trust); DIANNE B. MANGUM
(as Trustee of the Dianne B. Mangum Trust);
JEAN T. & KIM S. MANGUM (as Trustees of
the Jean T. Mangum Trust); MICHAEL L. &
DEBORAH K. MANGUM; MARILYN L.
RUSSO (as Trustee of the Russo Family
Trust); and DAVE SHELBY REALTOR,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Petitioners,
vs.
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal
corporation,
Respondent.

The Petitioners petition this Court and complain of Respondent as follows:
PARTIES
1.

Petitioner Bluffdale Mountain Homes, LC, ("Bluffdale Homes")is a Utah limited

liability company.
2.

Petitioner South Farms, LLC, ("South Farms") is a Utah limited liability

company.
3.

Petitioner Laguna Investments is a Utah limited partnership.

4.

Petitioner Malibu Investment Company is a Utah limited partnership.

5.

Petitioner JLC Investments is a Utah limited liability company.

6.

Petitioner Hidden Valley is a Utah partnership.

M

7.

Petitioner T & M Holdings is a Utah limited liability company.

8.

Petitioner Bluffdale Enterprises is a Utah limited liability company.

9.

Petitioner James E. & Shirley C. Butterfield are Trustees of the Butterfield Family

10.

Petitioner Scott Barclay is Trustee of the B.G. Holbrook Family Trust.

11.

Petitioner Don E. Petersen, Jr. is an individual and tenant-in-common with

Trust.

Eleanor M. Petersen, Lisa Layden, Bonnie Robbins and Scott Petersen.
12.

Petitioner Don W. & Elaine W. Bennion are Trustees of the Don W. & Elaine

Bennion Family LLC.
13.

Petitioner Daro E. Hamilton is an individual.

14.

Petitioner Myrtle's Seven is a Utah limited partnership.

15.

Petitioner Fredrick R. Osterloh is an individual and tenant-in-common with

Brenda A. Osterloh, Craig W. Osterloh, Kimiko K. Osterloh. Michael P. Osterloh, Denise E.
Osterloh.
16.

Petitioner Rodney W. Butterfield is an individual and tenant-in-common with

Viola Diane Butterfield, Kenneth R. Butterfield, Dean W. Butterfield, James T. Butterfield,
Jeremy W. Butterfield, Colleen B. Borovatz, Lucinda B. Davis, Rebecka B. Thomas, Jullian
Butterfield, and Thomas N. Butterfield.
17.

Petitioner Weston Butterfield is Trustee to the Weston Morris Butterfield Family

18.

Petitioner Danell C. Bills is an individual.

19.

Petitioner Jay G. & Arda D. Bennett are individuals.

Trust.

IV.S

20.

Petitioner Vauna Parr is an individual and tenant-in-common with Van Dee

Bearden and Joseph Bearden.
21.

Petitioner Roger L. & Susan Gailey are individuals and Trustees for Blain S. &

Opal L. Gailey.
22.

Petitioner Gary K. & Linda Kessimakis are individuals.

23.

Petitioner Patricia J. Rasmusson Family Limited Partnership, is a Utah

Corporation.
24.

Petitioner Lucille C. Bearden is Trustee of the Lucille C. Bearden Family Trust.

25.

Petitioner Dale W. & Sharen L. Hamilton are Trustees of the Dale and Sharen

Hamilton Trust.
26.

Petitioner Robert, Jr. & Deanna Phillips are individuals.

27.

Petitioner Van Dee Bearden is an individual.

28.

Petitioner Randall E. & Sheila E. Bloomdale are individuals.

29.

Petitioner Billy L. & Donna J. Mangum are Trustees of the Billy Lavoy and

Donna Joyce N. Mangum Trust.
30.

Petitioner Dianne B. Mangum is Trustee of the Dianne B. Mangum Trust.

31.

Petitioner Jean T. & Kim S. Mangum are Trustees of the Jean T. Mangum Trust.

32.

Petitioner Michael L. & Deborah K. Mangum are individuals.

33.

Petitioner Marilyn L. Russo is Trustee of the Russo Family Trust.

34.

Petitioner Dave Shelby Realtor, Inc., is a Utah corporation.

35.

Respondent Bluffdale City (the "City") is a Utah municipal corporation.

nt

JURISDICTION
36.

Jurisdiction of this Court over this Petition is conferred by §10-2-502.5, Utah

Code Annotated.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
INTRODUCTION
37.

Bluffdale Mountain, South Farm and the other named Petitioners (collectively, the

"Petitioners") are among a group of landowners (collectively, the "Landowners") who petitioned
the City for a disconnection of their properties (the "Disconnection Properties") from the City
and were denied that disconnection (the detailed history of which is explained below).
38.

Petitioners represent the ownership of approximately 75% of the real property in

the land proposed to be disconnected from the City.
39.

The Disconnection Properties are presently undeveloped and uninhabited.

40.

There is no municipal infrastructure presently serving the Disconnection

Properties.
SOUTH FARM'S HISTORY WITH THE CITY
41.

South Farm acquired its property that is the subject of this Petition between 1980

and 1985.
42.

South Farm has other property that it is developing as "Rosecrest" which is

located in the City of Herriman ("Herriman") adjacent to portions of the Disconnection
Properties.
43.

After approximately seven years of internal planning South Farm began to try to

develop its Bluffdale property similarly to the development of Rosecrest in Herriman.
44.

Between 1993 and 2001 meetings regarding South Farm's proposed development
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were held with former Bluffdale Mayor Wanlass (4 times) and former Mayor Nelson (12 times).
45.

Other meetings over this time were held with Salt Lake County representatives, in

conjunction with the incorporation of Herriman, with representatives from the City present.
46.

On or about October of 2001 the City installed a water line on South Farm's

property without obtaining a right-of-way.
47.

On January 8, 2002, as a part of the resolution of the illegal construction of the

water line, the Bluffdale City Council adopted Resolution No. 2002-05 concerning the future
development of South Farm's property and South Farm granted a right-of-way without cost to
the City for the water line.
48.

Resolution No. 2002-05 stated, in relevant part:
1. That the best use of the Rosecrest property in the City is to
develop the Rosecrest property with a mixture of uses, density,
commercial, recreational, transportation, and open space elements
compatible with the Rosecrest real property in the Town of
Herriman that is adjacent and contiguous to the Rosecrest property
in the City of Bluffdale.
* * *

3. It is the best use of the property to develop the property with a
mixture of uses including mixed residential properties, commercial
properties, recreational properties, schools, churches, trails and
open spaces consistent with a Master Development Agreement
with Rosecrest.
* * *

5. That the City will work in a speedy and timely fashion to
review the development applications of Rosecrest that are
applicable to each phase and approve or deny each application in
accordance with the relevant sections of the Bluffdale Municipal
Code and Master Development Agreement to be mutually
approved by the City and Rosecrest.
* * *

A

7. That the City will work with the applicable service districts to
bring the necessary infrastructure to the property to ensure timely
and orderly development of the property.
(Emphasis added.)
49.

Four members of the present City Council voted for Resolution 2002-05.

50.

On May 6, 2002 South Farm filed with Bluffdale City an Application for a

General Plan Amendment and Zone Change on 1,124 acres for 3,183 dwelling units.
51.

Six months passed with no action from the City on the Application.

52.

On November 12, 2002, over the objection of South Farm and without first acting

on South Farm's Application, the Bluffdale City Council adopted a new General Plan for
"Planning Area No. 4" (which includes almost all of the lands that are the subject of this
Petition) materially changing the rules regarding the development of South Farm's property.
53.

Six more months passed with no action from Bluffdale on South Farm's

Application.
54.

On April 22, 2003, South Farm provided $70,000.00 for the City to outsource its

planning review of South Farm's Application due to staff shortages and budgetary restraints of
the City.
55.

The City then hired consultants with South Farm's money to review South Farm's

applications.
56.

On July 15, 2003, the consultant's recommendations were received by the City.

57.

Between receiving the consultant's recommendation on July 15 and October 7,

2003, the City, ignoring both South Farm's Application and the recommendations of its own
consultant, the City created and proposed its own plan amendments to Planning Area No. 4.
58.

On December 4, 2003, the City's retained outside consultants reported to the City
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that South Farm's Application met the intent of the General Plan for Planning Area No. 4.
59.

Despite that independent report, on December 9,2003, more than 19 months after

they were filed, the City rejected South Farm's Application.
60.

From 2001 to early 2004 South Farm participated in approximately 23 meetings

with the City's staff, 24 Planning Commission meetings and 25 City Council meetings.
61.

During this planning process South Farm submitted at least seven different

alternative proposals in an effort to address the concerns of the City Council, the Planning
Commission, City staff and citizens.
62.

During that period of time the City had three different City Planners and three

different City Attorneys.
63.

From 1997 until early 2004 South Farm spent nearly $950,000.00 trying to obtain

entitlements for the development of its property.
64.

To date, those efforts have produced no General Plan Amendment, no zone

change, no development agreement, no preliminary plat, no final plat and, to put it simply, no
development.
OPTIONS OF THE OTHER LANDOWNERS
65.

Based on the prolonged, expensive and fruitless experiences of South Farm in

dealing with the City, and their other unpleasant interfaces with the City, the other Landowners,
including Bluffdale Homes, determined that it made no sense to try to obtain reasonable
development rights for their properties from the City.
66.

During the process of the City's adoption of its General Plan effectively denying

the other Landowners any reasonable development rights, the Landowners expressed their
concerns about the unfair and improper treatment, but were ignored by the City.

FILING OF THE PETITIONS
67.

On February 12, 2004, the Landowners submitted petitions (the "Disconnection

Petitions") to the City to disconnect the Disconnection Properties from the City. (A copy of an
exemplar of the Disconnection Petitions is attached and incorporated as Exhibit "A".)
COMPLIANCE WITH 810-2-501, U.C.A.
68.

As required by § 10-2-501 (2)(b)(i), U.C.A., the Disconnection Petitions contained

the names, addresses, and signatures of the owners of more than 50% of the real property in the
area proposed for disconnection.
69.

In fact, the Disconnection Petitions (including additional petitions that were filed

later) represented 88% of the private property within the area proposed for disconnection.
70.

If property owned by an arm of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints is

excluded for the calculations (as the LDS Church does not taike positions on political issues such
as this) the percentage is 91%.
71.

The other large remaining property that did not join in the Disconnection Petitions

is controlled by the out-of-Utah Trust Department of a large bank.
72.

To date, no property owner within the area proposed for disconnection has

opposed the disconnection.
73.

The Disconnection Petitions also requested the City to adjust the boundaries

between the City and Herriman pursuant to §10-2-419, so that the Disconnection Properties
would be transferred to be within the municipal boundaries of Herriman.
74.

The Disconnection Petitions also sought, pursuant to § 10-2-403, to have the

Disconnection Properties (and certain other properties including two existing islands of
unincorporated property) annexed into Herriman after they v/ere disconnected from the City.
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75.

As required by § 10-2-501 (2)(b)(ii), the Disconnection Petitions specified the

reasons for the proposed disconnection:
Our decision to disconnect our lands from Bluffdale did not
come lightly and is a decision of last resort. After more than tenyears of planning efforts, both formal and informal, spanning three
mayoral administrations, and costing hundreds of thousands of
dollars, Bluffdale has been unresponsive to the needs of the
landowners in Planning Area Number Four.
Bluffdale has not fulfilled its commitments to work with
the landowners to approve a reasonable master plan for their lands.
Bluffdale does not presently provide municipal services such as
roads, sewer and water to these lands and has refused to prepare
itself to provide such services to these lands. Bluffdale has not
committed the staff or resources to respond to development
applications in a competent and timely manner. Where Bluffdale
has hired outside consultants, largely paid for by the landowners
Bluffdale
has ignored the reasoned and considered
recommendations of the professionals they hired.
In the spirit of utmost good-faith, we have worked hard for
many years to react and respond to community concerns and
comments regarding the design and development of these lands.
We have encouraged Bluffdale to participate and to work together
with landowners to build a stronger community. These efforts
have reached the point of exhaustion. Bluffdale's rejection of the
development of these lands is a loud and clear message that
Bluffdale will not serve these lands. While we appreciate those at
Bluffdale who have attempted to work with us, it is time for us to
remove these lands from the municipal boundaries of Bluffdale.
76.

As required by §10-2-50 l(2)(b)(iii), the Disconnection Petitions provided a map

or plat of the territory proposed for disconnection.
77.

As required by § 10-2-501 (2)(b)(iv), the Disconnection Petitions designated three

representatives to act on behalf of the petitioners.
78.

Pursuant to §10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection

Petitions to be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation within the municipality. (A copy of the Proof of Publication is attached and
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incorporated by reference as Exhibit "B".)
79.

Pursuant to § 10-2-501 (3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection

Petitions to be mailed to each owner of real property located within the area proposed to be
disconnected. (A copy of the Affidavit of Hollis S. Hunt attesting to the mailing attached and
incorporated by reference as Exhibit "C".)
80.

Pursuant to § 10-2-50 l(3)(a), the Landowners caused notice of the Disconnection

Petitions to be delivered to the Salt Lake County Council, the legislative body of the county in
which the area proposed for disconnection is located. (A copy of the Affidavit of Hollis S. Hunt
attesting to the delivery is attached and incorporated by reference as Exhibit "D".)
81.

The City has acknowledged that the Landowners have complied with the

requirements of § 10-2-501.
COMPLIANCE WITH §10-2-502.7, ILCA.
82.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(a) the Petitioners have the burden of proving the

viability of the disconnection.
83.

The disconnection is viable.

84.

The City has never disputed the viability of the disconnection.

85.

To establish this viability the Petitioners engaged the services of Wikstrom

Economic and Planning Consultants and also did other analyses of the viability of the
disconnection using resources of Bluffdale Homes and South Farm.
86.

The Petitioners provided the detailed analysis of the disconnection viability to the

87.

The City has never disputed any part of the viability analysis.

City.
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88.

Pursuant lo <'j II) ,' *>0,! "'('i)(h> llu1 Petitioners, hnu !lie liunlm ot pros nig that

justice and equity require that the territory be disconnected from the municipality.
89.

It is just ai id equitable tl: lat the Court should respect and h o n o r UK vvisncs

virtually all o f the landowners in the area proposed for disconnection when the City has treated
the area so unfairly, neither provided nor even planned for the provision of public infrastructure
or services and unreasonably prevented development o f the Disconnection Properties.
90.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(c)(i) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that

which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal senices would materially
increase ovei previoi is yeai s
91.

'

.

.

As the Disconnection Properties are completely unserviced by the City and are

located on the pei iphei y of the Cit; ' the discoi u lection will i not lea vc the mi inicipality with an
area within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or other burdens of providing
municipal services would materially increase over previous years.
92.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(3)(c)(ii) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that

the disconnection will not make it economically or practically unfeasible for the municipality to
continue to function as a municipality.
93.

The Disconnection Properties provide the City each year with only approximately

$1,750.00 (not a typo) in property taxes which, oi it of a total Genei al I a iiid bi idget of tl :ie City of
2,021,000.00, is less than one-tenth of one percent (0.1 %) of the budgeted revenues.
94.

1 he preservation of ! literally, 99.9 percei it of tl le Cit> 's bi idget woi ilcl i lot v\ ork

any hardship on the City.
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95.

Further, as the City has installed absolutely no infrastructure on the Disconnection

Properties there can be no adverse impact on such infrastructure.
96.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(c)(iii) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that

the disconnection will not leave or create one or more islands or peninsulas of unincorporated
territory.
97.

The disconnection would not leave or create any islands or peninsulas of

unincorporated territory.
98.

The proposed disconnection will actually cure the existence of two current islands

and one possible peninsula within the boundaries of the City.
99.

The Disconnection Properties are contiguous with an area that is presently

unincorporated.
100.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(3)(d) the Petitioners have the burden of proving that the

county in which the area proposed for disconnection is located is capable, in a cost-effective
manner and without materially increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of
providing to the area the services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to
the disconnection.
101.

Salt Lake County is capable, in a cost-effective manner and without materially

increasing the county's costs of providing municipal services, of providing to the area the
services that the municipality will no longer provide to the area due to the disconnection.
102.

In the present undeveloped and uninhabited condition of the Disconnection

Properties there are essentially no municipal services provided and none are required and thus no
costs are involved.

n

103.

The Landowners have also petitioned Herriman to annex uie Discomie1 ^»

Properties.
104.

Pursiianl lo j,(jI0-?-'J<'iM> Hi'iii/nun mil lune l"«' .mnrv the I)i*oonnoction Properties.

105.

Any costs for servicing the Disconnection Properties during the process of

development uiul alleiwank \\\\\ nol I.ill oh ", 1 *111 I tike Count)- bill will, in lead, he the '
responsibility of Herriman.
106

Pursuant to ; J

• -I Va^ in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider all relevant
factors, including the effect of the proposed disconnection on the municipality or community as a
whole.
107.
• 108.

The disconnection will have no adverse impacts on the City as a whole.
The Discoi i nection I 'i opei ties are physical!;} distil ict froi i i tl ite remaining poi tioi is

of the City and, for the most part, separated by a distinct and significant physical boundary.
109.

.

lp preserve the el laracteristics of the remaining

area of the City by allowing the remaining areas to be developed with a different zoning and
dei isit)/ patter i I tl lan is appropr iate foi the Disconnection Properties.
110

'• •

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(b), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof •-. i: . aspect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on adjoining property owners.
111.

The disconnection would have no adverse impacts on adjoining property owners.

112.. ' On the south of the Disconnection Properties is Can lp Willi; ti ns (a I -ederal
military base) which would not be affected at all
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113.

To the west of Disconnection Properties, in Herriman, is a development planned

for a density and configuration similar to what has been proposed for the Disconnection
Properties.
114.

On the northeastern angular side of the Disconnection Properties the adjoining

properties are almost completely separated from the Disconnection Properties by a physical
boundary, the Welby-Jacobs Canal over which there are no bridges, roadways or pedestrian
access between the Disconnection Properties and the remainder of the City.
115.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(c), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on existing or projected streets or public ways.
116.

There are no existing or projected public streets in the Disconnection Properties

except for the proposed Mountain View Corridor (formerly known as the Legacy Highway)
which would not be negatively impacted by the proposed disconnection.
117.

Even if the City has some plans for public streets inside the Disconnection

Properties there is no reason to believe that such streets would be negatively impacted by the
proposed disconnection.
118.

Pursuant to § 10-2-502.7(4)(d), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on water mains and water services.
119.

There are no existing water mains or water services to the Disconnection

Properties and thus the disconnection will have no impact.
120.

Disconnection would actually facilitate delivery of water services since there are

adjacent services provided by Herriman.

IS

.121.

Piirsuaitl io ';, 10 .'-Sii; 7(4)(c>, in (klciitiiiuiii" whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on sewer mains and sewer services.
122.

There are no existing sewer mains in or sewer services provided to the

Disconnection Properties.
123.

Sewer services to the Discount led Properties will In pnn Jed b\ ihe Smith

Valley Sewer District.
124.

Pursi lai it to §10 2 502 7(4)(f). in de tei i i lining whetl lei petitioi lers ha;\ e i i let their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the pi oposed disc nmuTlimi <ii |,tn enfoftvinni!
125.

Law enforcement services, such as they are since the area is uninhabited and

virtual I bare ground, are and will continue to be provided by the Salt Lake County Sheriff.
126.

The disconnection will have no effect on the provision of law enforcement

services.
127.

Pursuant to §10-2-502.7(4)(g), in determining

WIKIIKT

petitioners hnvc iiul their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconi lection ot :t zoi lii ig,
128.

The zoning of the Disconnection Properties currently maintained by the City is

irrationally lou Jiscrimin.'iie.s ajjainsi moderate income families and violates the City's
obligations regarding low income housing.
129.

Pursuai it to § 10-2 502 7(4)(h), in determining whether petitioners have met their

burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3)(c)(i) and (ii), the Court must consider the effect
of the proposed disconnection on other municipal services.

130.

The proposed disconnection will have no impact on the provision of other

municipal services since the City provides no such services to the uninhabited bare ground of the
Disconnection Properties.
131.

The City has never denied, or even offered a single shred of evidence, regarding

the proof by the Landowners that the proposed disconnection meets all of the tests for
disconnection specified in §10-2-502.7.
DENIAL OF DISCONNECTION PETITIONS
132.

On May 11, 2004, the Bluffdale City Council voted to deny the Disconnection

Petitions.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Declaration of Disconnection
Petitioners incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-132 above.
133.

Petitioners are entitled to a judgment declaring that the Disconnection Properties

of the Landowners should be disconnected from the City.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
On the foregoing Petition the Petitioners pray for relief as follows:
1.

For a determination by the Court that disconnection of the Disconnection

Properties subject to the Disconnection Petitions is proper and required by §10-2-502.7, U.C.A.
2.

For an Order disconnecting the properties from the City.

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem appropriate.

h<\

is U
DATED this
U .d
BAIRD& JONES LC
Attorneys for_Petitioners

Bruce R. Baird

HUNT&RUDD
Attorneys for Petitioner South Farms

Hollis S. Hunt

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^f_ day of August, 2004,1 mailed, by First Class United
States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED PETITION
FOR DISCONNECTION OF MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES to the following:
Dale F. Gardiner, Esq.
Parry Anderson & Gardiner
60 East South Temple, #1270
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Bruce R. Baird
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Addendum "D"
(Findings <>l I ad Lind Memorandum Decision signed by
Judge Anthony B. Quinn on February ? 1 2006)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES, LC,
and SOUTH FARM, LLC,

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Petitioners,
:

CASE NO.

040909930

vs.
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal
corporation,
Respondent.

:
i

This matter came for trial pursuant to § 10-2-502.7, Utah Code Ann.,
on

January

30,

2006,

and

continuing

through

February

2,

2 006.

Petitioners were represented by Bruce R. Baird of and for Hutchings,
Baird and Jones, PLLC, and by Hollis S. Hunt of and for Hunt & Rudd.
Respondent was represented by Dale F. Gardiner and Craig Klieneman of and
for Parry, Anderson & Gardiner, as well as James K. Tracy and Patrick S.
Malone of and for Mabey, Murray, LC.
testimony

of

the

witnesses,

received

The Court, having heard the
the

stipulations

of

counsel,

reviewed the evidence and considered the legal arguments of the parties,
hereby enters the following Decision.
FINDINGS
A.

Jurisdiction
1

The petitioners have produced prima facie evidence that the

disconnection petitions filed with the City contained the names,
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a d d ] e s s e s a n d bnjn.it u L e s ot t h e own* i < o! nu u
real property in the area proposed

t h u 111

p n e n t <t t IK

for disconnection.

The City has

admitted this fact.
2

1\i(-

i1

hi

I 11 t li* i at litt i L t ed I lid I

ill i I I In

| JUI t <Ju t i I

prerequisites for filing this disconnection case exist.
B.

Description of the Disconnection Property
3

The property which is the subject of tins disconnection action

is a triangle shaped parcel of approximately 3,900 acres in the southwest
corner of Bluffdale City.

The total acreage represents approximately 38%

of the land area of Bluffdale City.
4
water

The land is almost completely undeveloped.
conservancy

disconnection

district

property.

facilities
There

is

on

also

the
one

There exists some

eastern

bordei

dwelling.

of

1 ilh

the

these

exceptions, there are no structures on the disconnection property.
5

The one dwelling that exists on the disconnection

receives only garbage pickup services from Blutidalo City.

pr0perty

The dwelling

is served by a well and a septic tank on the property.
6

The disconnection property is separated from Bluffdale City b\

substantial manmade barriers

Iht | i niui

known as the "Welby/Jacobs Canal."

The easement associated with this

canal is wider than the canal itself
border of the disconnection propoj I

harrier is a JS" wide canal

2

This canal ioi ms the western

I oi the majority ot Lis ieiujlh

Ihe

MVftk

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
V. BLUFFDALE CITY

PAGE 3

FINDINGS Sc MEMORANDUM

balance of the western border is Redwood Road.

There are no public

bridges that cross the Welby/Jacobs Canal.
7

There are no public roads on the disconnection property.

The

only City-owned facilities that exist on the disconnection property are
a 12" water pipe and associated meters and pressure reduction facilities
that runs parallel to the Welby/Jacobs Canal.
8
property.

The water line does not currently serve the disconnection
The water line was installed primarily to provide additional

water pressure and fire protection for the Gardner Estates and other new
developments

in the northern section of Bluffdale City east of the

Welby/Jacobs Canal and outside the disconnection area. Though this water
line has some additional capacity that could be directed toward the
disconnection

property,

serving

this

property

was

not

the

primary

motivation for its installation. The petitioners were not consulted with
respect to the size of the pipe.
9

The only services historically provided by Bluffdale City to

the disconnection property are minimal police and fire protection. There
was evidence that the police had made calls to the property approximately
twice a year to investigate trespass or other minor criminal conduct.
In addition, there have been seven to eight fire calls per year.
C.

History of the Dispute
10

During the 1980's, the entity now known as "South Farm" (the

lead petitioner in this case), purchased property for investment and

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
V . B L U F F D A L E CITY
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d e v e l o p m e n t that e x i s t e d one-half i n u n i n c o r p o r a t e d Salt Lake C o u n t y and
o n e - h a I f i n Bluffdale.
11

T h e one-half w h i c h w a s located in B l u f f d a l e is n o w e n t i r e l y

located within the d i s c o n n e c t i o n

Early i n its e f f o r t s t o develop thi s p r o p e r t y ,

12
sought

pr0perty.

to have its e n t i r e p r o p e r t y annexed

c o u l d b e d e v e l o p e d as a consistent: w h o l e .
annexation.
13

into Riverton,

South

Farm,

so that" it

B l u f f d a l e objected

t<» tin

Based o n B l u f f d a l e ' s objection, a n n e x a t i o n w a s denied.
A f t e r defeat of t h e a n n e x a t i o n petiti on, Soi ith Farm, b e g a n an

a p p l i c a t i o n p r o c e s s w i t h Salt Lake County t o b e g i n d e v e l o p m e n t of the
p o r t i o n of its p r o p e r t y that w a s located o u t s i d e of R l i M d a l e City, The
p r o c e s s included p u b l i c m e e t i n g s w i t h all n e i g h b o r i n g c o m m u n i t i e s .
14

T h e C o u n t y a p p r o v e d t h e General P l a n of Development: over the:

o b j e c t i o n s of B l u f f d a l e in A u g u s t of 1,9,99.
15

T h e County p o r t i o n of t h e South Farm p r o p e r t y w a s ultimately

incorporated

into

t h e City

of Herriman,

developed

T h i " development:

is known

and has since
as "Rosecrest"

been

large!y

and, currently

i n c l u d e s a p p r o x i m a t e l y 18 s u b d i v i s i o n s a n d 2,000 residential u n i t s .
16

B y all a c c o u n t s , t h e Rosecrest D e v e l o p m e n t is a successful and

a t t r a c t i v e m i x e d - u s e development, representiiig hi gii s t a n d a r d s of land u s e
planning.
17

The Bluffdale portion

of the S o u t h

p r o c e e d e d as smootl i,I:> towards developi i tent

Farm

\roperty

has not

In October of 1,9 9 7, M r D o n

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
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Wallace, a managing member of South Farm, appeared at a public meeting
to explain and answer questions regarding South Farm's plans for its land
in Bluffdale.
18

The reaction to Mr. Wallace's presentation was emotional, if

not outright hostile.

Mr. Wallace testified that he felt physically

threatened by the intensity of the opposition expressed in the meeting.
19

During

the time period beginning

in the late 1990's and

concluding in May of 2002, South Farm was dissuaded by City officials
from presenting any development plans with respect to their Bluffdale
property.

During this period, Bluffdale City was gearing up to address

the inevitable development pressure that it would face, given the growth
in the southern area of Salt Lake County.
20

Bluffdale City recognized the need for long range planning,

and commenced work on capital improvement pLans, transportation plans,
water plans, drainage plans, and similar efforts to plan for the city it
wished to be in the future.

The City wanted to have its own planning

house in order before it invested the necessary resources to consider a
project of the scale intended by South Farm.
21

Given the magnitude of the project and the limited resources

of the City, the planning process was time consuming.
perspective, the progress was excruciatingly slow.

From South Farm's

In fact, the planning

process that began during this time frame continues up through the time
of trial.

Most of the plans remain either unfinished or unadopted.

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
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Dur i ng t h i s p ro c e s s , S 01 11: h F a rm \ jra s p e :r s u ad e d b} t h e C :i t} r t: c

off on. filing

any applications

f o r an amendment

G e n e r a l Plan that would allow development oi i\
23

to the City's

Bluffdale property.

Th e p a i t: :i c i 11 a i: e 1 e m e n t s c: f :i n t *- •v *. . " -

. i n g t h a t: n e e d e ci t: :> b e

finished b e f o r e consideration of the Soutii Farm Development; as wel ] as
the time estimates for completion of those e l e m e n t s , were moving targets
that n e v e r seemed to b e w:i 1:1 id n reach
24

.The City was, in fact, in good faith working toward completion

its planning process; however, there were cleai .y elements •:, • !uthat were hostile to Rosecrest-1 ike develop* m-

•

':-u

••" * f i - : *- **y.

T h e Court accepts t h e reasonable inference that some :uot-dragging wretaking p l a c e - - w h e t h e r intentionally o r a s a result of
tendency

to defer

consideration

of issues

tnat

n^ :idt:Jial TU^I

- * l-Vf-

contentious.
25

During this same period, South Farm was encouraged by the City

to engage in the process of producing a Quality Growth plan. The process
included immerous public meetings with representatives of the City and
other stake-holders.
26

A draft of that Plan was produced in September of 2001.

The

Quality Growth PJ , u i although never formally adopted by the City, gave
South Farm hope that a Rosecrest-like development was in reach.

For

example, the Quality Growth Plan approved recommended densities as 11igh

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
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(provided 35% open

space was also

reserved).
27

The Quality

Growth

Plan was

by no means

endorsement of a Rosecrest-like approach.

an

unequivocal

It frankly acknowledged the

City's commitment to a "rural-like atmosphere" and a strong preference
for developments with minimum lot size of one acre.
28

In

the

fall

of

2001,

Shane

Jones,

the

City

Engineer,

approached Don Wallace for an easement across South Farm property for a
12' water line needed to service newly-developed portions of the City.
29

Before those discussions were complete, in October of 2001, a

contractor hired by the City trespassed on South Farm property to
commence work on the water line.
30
pressure

The City urgently needed the water line to address water
and

fire

protection

in

Gardner

Estates

and

other

new

developments in the northern section of the City east of the Welby/Jacobs
Canal.
31

In order

to

obtain

the needed

easement

and

resolve

the

trespass issue with the City, the City and South Farm discussed a trade
of the easement for adoption of planning policies allowing South Farm to
develop its property consistent with the existing Rosecrest Development.
In the context of those discussions, at a City Council meeting, the
Council was told the following by the City's attorney, Greg Curtis:

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN iluMKS
V. BLUFFDALE CITY
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Mr. Curtis advised that what this resolution does [with
reference to the South Farm property] is recognizes that this
will be a mixed residential, commercial, open space, trails,
schools, etc., in a manner that is compatible with the
Rosecrest Development in Herriman. This is a policy decision
that the City Council needs to make. The developer is saying
that the City wants an easement across the property and in an
effort to balance out those interests, the developer wants to
know what the City intends with the developer's property. Mr.
Curtis advised the Council not to vote for this if the only
thing they are going to support at this site is one acre lots.
Mr. Curtis stated ii the City doesn't provide infrastructure
for development, landowners make a very compelling argument to
disconnect.
Mr. Curtis advised the Council if they are not comfortable
with the mixed use development out in Herriman, not to vote
for this resolution.
32

At tiie .same uiee t inq, former county council member and current

mayor, Claudia Anderson, asked:
if the Council doesn't approve this resolution, would
developer take the land and go elsewhere?

I In

To which Mr. Curtis replied:
it would be fair to say that one of their options would be to
attempt disconnection.
*

*

*

*

A

If the Council is not comfortable with this and doesn't want
mixed-use there, don't vote for it.
33

Ultimately, on January 8,

2002, the Blulldale City Council

unanimously approved Resolution No. 2002-5, which resolved the easement
issue and provided the following statements of good faith:
Rosecrest has agreed to provide the requested easement without
cost to the City, but in turn has requested a declaration of
intent from the City as to the general acceptability of
Rosecrest's future development of the Rosecrest real property

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
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which lies in the City.
Rosecrest is in the process of
completing an existing master planned project, a mixed-use
real estate development in the town of Herriman which is
contiguous and immediately adjacent to the Rosecrest real
property located in the City and is desirous to continue the
development of its Bluffdale property with similar mixed uses,
density, and transportation elements as existed in its
existing master planned project in Herriman.
(b) Subject to the express continued administration of its
legislative and regulatory authority over development of the
Rosecrest real property and without waiving any of its future
regulatory authority, the City declares its intent regarding
the development of the Rosecrest property as follows:
(1) That the best use of the Rosecrest property in the City
is to develop the Rosecrest property with a mixture of uses,
density, commercial, recreational, transportation and open
space elements compatible with Rosecrest property in the town
of Herriman that is adjacent and contiguous to the Rosecrest
property in the City of Bluffdale.
34

By letter, dated December 21, 2001, Bruce Parker, City Planner

for Bluffdale City, wrote to Mr. Wallace to again dissuade him from
proposing a General Plan Amendment until the City's internal planning was
complete.

In essence, the letter provided two choices:

(1) wait until

we're ready or (2) propose a development consistent with the current
zoning, which was one dwelling per five acres.
35

South Farm waited an additional six months and observed no

significant progress towards completion of Bluffdale's internal planning.
36

On May 6, 2002, South Farm formally submitted its General Plan

Amendment, even though the City's planning process was incomplete.

The

General Plan Amendment was intended to be patterned on the principles of
the Quality Growth Plan--although clearly

beyond the letter of that

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
V. BLUFFDALE CITY

PAGE 10

FINDINGS & MEMORANDUM

plan-and consistent with the principles recognized by the City in the
adoption of Resolution 2002-05.

The City began immediate consideration

of the application through its planning staff.

Once again, because of

the sheer size of the project and the limited resources of the City, the
progress was unreasonably slow.
37
planning

On November 12, 2002, the City adopted a series of land use
principles

essentially

the

for

same

Planning

area

as

the

District
proposed

No.

4

(which

includes

disconnection) .

Those

principles included:
Planning District No. 4 should generally provide opportunities
for low density residential uses, with residential density of
one (1) dwelling unit to one (1) acre and one (1) dwelling
unit per five (5) acres being provided.
Only in those areas located immediately adjacent to an
existing and neighboring municipality , and only in order to
recognize adjacent land uses and to provide the desired land
use transitioning and compatibility, shall commercial,
professional office, public uses and residential uses with
densities greater than recommended by Policy No. 1 be
considered by the City.
(Emphasis added.)
38

The meaning of "immediately adjacent" in the second principle

referenced above became an important area of contention.
is read as narrow as

the

"narrow

strip bordering

If that phrase

on the existing

Rosecrest Development," it was significantly more restrictive than the
recommendations of the Quality Growth Plan and a complete repudiation of
Resolution 2002-05. On the other hand, if the entire South Farm property
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"immediately adjacent," a Rosecrest-like

development

could still be achieved.
39

The year following submission of the General Plan Application

was characterized by dozens if not hundreds of meetings between South
Farm and City staff, without any discernible progress towards submission
of a proposed amendment for approval.
40

Because of this apparent lack of progress, South Farm proposed

outsourcing review of the proposed General Plan Amendment.

Bluffdale

accepted the suggestion, and on April 22, 2003, hired J-U-B Engineers,
Inc., and Tischler & Associates, Inc., to act as the City's consultants
to review the plan.

The consultants were selected by the City, with

South Farm's agreement to advance the cost of their work.
41
2003.

These consultants completed their report on or about July 7,

Once again, dozens of meetings were held to address the concerns

raised in the J-U-B/Tischler report.
42

By

the

time

the

General

Plan

Amendment

was

ready

for

consideration by the City Council, South Farm had invested almost a
million dollars in the planning process and thousands of man-hours.

The

proposed General Plan Amendment was considered by the City Council on
December 9, 2003.

The Planning Commission recommended adoption of the

General Plan Amendment.

The City's consultants, J-U-B and Tischler also

recommended adoption of the General Plan Amendment.

However, the City
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Council voted to reject the Plan, based upon a narrow reading of Planning
Principal No. 2, in the Planning District No. 4 Land Use Principles.
43

Other property owners, including some of the petitioners in

this case, had closely followed the progress of the South Farm efforts
to develop their property, and were disillusioned by the results.
44

On February 12, 2004, the petitioners filed a Petition with

the City for voluntary adjustment of the boundary with Herriman to move
the

disconnection

property

alternative, to disconnect

from

the property

Petition was rejected by the City.
45

Bluffdale

to Herriman,

or

from Bluffdale City.

in

the
That

This case was filed May 31, 2004.

Throughout the year 2005, a Herculean effort was undertaken by

the City and the petitioners to resolve their differences and come up
with a land use plan that would satisfy both.
46

On May 24, 2005, the City Council approved a Memorandum of

Understanding that set a framework for development of the disconnection
property.
47

On August

23, 2005, the City Council approved a Special

Development Plan District Ordinance, that was a necessary prerequisite
to implementing the Memorandum of Understanding in the disconnection
property (and that would create an SDP Zone).
48

Bluffdale citizens opposing the development applied for a

referendum to overturn the Council's decision to create the SDP zone.

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
V. BLUFFDALE CITY

PAGE 13

FINDINGS & MEMORANDUM

Ultimately, sufficient signatures were collected, and the referendum is
set for June of 2006.
49

In order to avoid the delay that would be caused by the

referendum, the petitioners and the City worked out a development plan
agreement that would be implemented by a Consent Decree.
50

The proposed Consent Decree was approved by the City Council,

but once again Bluffdale citizens applied for a referendum to overturn
the Council's approval.
51

On November 10, 2005, the Court rejected the proposed Consent

Decree.
D.

Disconnection Impacts
52

The

property

is

currently

undeveloped

and

will

remain

undeveloped immediately after disconnection.
53
of

annual

In its raw state, the disconnection property produces $1,750
tax

revenue

for

Bluffdale

City.

If

the

property

is

disconnected, it would produce something over $4,000 of annual property
tax revenue to Salt Lake County.
54

As raw ground, the disconnection property requires minimal

services, and only limited police and fire protection.
55

The

petitioners

intend

disconnection property by Herriman.

to

apply

for

annexation

of

the
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that

annexation

of

the

disconnection property by Herriman is mandatory if a proper application
is made.
57

The Court takes judicial notice that annexation by Herriman

would not be instantaneous, but would be subject to statutory time frames
for notice and consideration of the petition by Herriman City.
58

Based upon the success of the Rosecrest Development currently

existing in Herriman City, it is more likely than not that South Farm
could obtain approval from Herriman for a Rosecrest-like development on
the disconnection property.
59

South Farm intends to propose a development modeled after

Exhibit 123, with the exception that the infrastructure enhancements and
amenities negotiated for the benefit of Bluffdale would not be built.
60

Even though residential development appears to be a net loss

for a city because the increased cost of services and infrastructure
exceed the increased property taxes, a critical mass of residential
development, coupled with commercial development, attracts sufficient
retail business to the city to provide more than offsetting revenues
through sales taxes.
61

Amounts invested by Bluffdale City in infrastructure in the

remaining portion of Bluffdale City, such as storm drainage and roads
were necessary to serve existing Bluffdale City without regard to the
status of the disconnect property.

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
V. BLUFFDALE CITY
62

PAGE 15

FINDINGS Sc MEMORANDUM

Loss of potential future benefits to Bluffdale City, such as

the loss of economies of scale and the opportunity to locate facilities
for secondary water system on the disconnect property are too remote and
speculative to be considered.
63

Based upon the evidence presented by petitioners, and in the

absence of credible evidence to the contrary, the increase in traffic
arteries leading to Bluffdale from the proposed development would only
be 2.5%.
64

The City owns the easement for the 12" water line and related

facilities that are now serving Gardner Estates and other newly-developed
areas in the northern section of the city east of the Welby/Jacobs Canal
and can continue to use that water line, regardless of the disconnection.
65

The proposed development would have no effect on the cost of

Bluffdale City's water services.
66

Bluffdale City currently plans for enhancement of its storm

drainage system due to water flowing from the disconnection property
towards Bluffdale City.
additional

storm

The proposed development will not require any

drainage

facilities, and would

likely

improve

the

control of storm drainage affecting the city.
67

If the land is developed, the drainage would be collected and

channeled, and managed more efficiently.

Petitioners would be required

by State law to ensure the development would not add to the volume of
storm drainage from the disconnection property.
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Whether the land is developed or not, there will be no effect

on sewer mains or sewer services, because both the disconnection property
and Bluffdale City would be served by the South Valley Sewer District.
69

Development of the land as proposed will not affect the cost

of law enforcement to Bluffdale City.
70

The proposed development will not affect the cost of zoning or

other municipal services.
71

Based upon credible expert testimony, the proposed development

will not affect the cost of City services.
72

No property owner affected by disconnection has objected to

the proposed disconnection.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The case before the Court is a statutory cause of action brought
by property owners against Bluffdale City to disconnect
3 8 percent of the land area of Bluffdale City.

approximately

The statute at issue

provides in its entirety:
10-2-502.7.

Court action.

(1) After the filing of a petition under Section 10-2502.5 and a response to the petition, the court shall, upon
request of a party or upon its own motion, conduct a court
hearing.
(2)
At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence
regarding the viability of the disconnection proposal.
(3) The burden of proof is on petitioners
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence:

who

must
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(a) the viability of the disconnection;
(b) that justice and equity require
territory be disconnected from the municipality;

that

the

(c) that the proposed disconnection will not:
(i) leave the municipality with an area
within its boundaries for which the cost, requirements, or
other
burdens
of
providing
municipal
services
would
materially increase over previous years;
(ii) make it economically or practically
unfeasible for the municipality to continue to function as
a municipality; or
(iii) leave or create one or more islands or
peninsulas of unincorporated territory; and
(d) that the county in which the area proposed for
disconnection is located is capable, in a cost-effective
manner and without materially increasing the county's costs
of providing municipal services, of providing to the area the
services that the municipality will no longer provide to the
area due to the disconnection.
(4) In determining whether petitioners have met their
burden of proof with respect to Subsections (3) (c) (i) and
(ii),
the court
shall consider all relevant
factors,
including the effect of the proposed disconnection on:
(a) the municipality or community as a whole;
(b) adjoining property owners;
(c) existing or projected streets or public ways;
(d) water mains and water services;
(e) sewer mains and sewer services;
(f) law enforcement;
(g) zoning; and
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(h) other municipal services.
(5) The court's order either ordering or rejecting
disconnection shall be in writing with findings and reasons.
As provided in the statute, the petitioners have the burden of proving
each element of disconnection by a preponderance of the evidence.
In addition to disputing that the petitioners have met their burden
of proof under the statute, Bluffdale City claims that disconnection in
this case is inappropriate because petitioner's sole remedy lies either
in an appeal of the zoning and planning decision which prompted this
action, or in the boundary adjustment statute.
For the reasons set forth in the foregoing Findings and in the
legal analysis to follow, the Court believes that petitioners have met
their burden of proving the statutory prerequisites to disconnection.
In addition, the Court rejects the City's arguments that petitioner's
sole remedy lies elsewhere.
The Court has received evidence of the impact of disconnection,
both as the land presently sits, and as a result of the development that
is likely to occur.

Though the Court is of the view that the primary

test should be disconnection of the property as it now exists, the Court
has also considered the effects of the proposed development to the
extent that they can reasonably be determined.

VlV^.
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(a) The disconnection is viable.
The Court

finds by a preponderance

of the evidence

that

the

disconnection is viable whether the property remains undeveloped or is
annexed into Herriman and developed into a Rosecrest-like project.
The cost of services currently being provided to the proposed
disconnect area will not change immediately following the disconnection.
On the other hand, after disconnection, when the land becomes a part of
the County, the tax revenue from the land will more than double its
current

$1,750 to $4,000.

anything,

In this senser the subject land is, if

more viable as raw land in the County than it is in Bluffdale

city.
Consideration of whether the disconnect property will remain viable
once it is developed presents a more complicated question.
agreed that annexation by Herriman City is inevitable.

The parties

The parties also

agree that considered in isolation, residential development is a net
financial loss to a city.
Consultants
"critical

testified

mass"

of

Karen Wikstrom of Wikstrom Planning and

credibly that because of the increase

population

brought

by

the planned

in the

development,

together with planned and existing commerciail and retail elements, the
planned community will provide more than offsetting revenues through
sales taxes.
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Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the disconnection
property would be viable, even if disconnected, annexed into Herriman,
and developed as proposed by the petitioners.
(b) Justice and equity favor disconnection.
Justice and equity have traditionally been the primary test for
determining whether disconnection was appropriate.
amended, effective May 1983, to its current form.

The statute was
As the statute now

reads, most

of the factors that courts historically

determining

whether

justice

specifically set forth.
current

statute

is

and

equity

favor

considered

disconnection

in
are

The justice and equity test as used in the

apparently

intended

to

give

the

discretion to consider all impacts of disconnection.

Court

broad

In that spirit,

the Court received opinions from virtually every witness that testified
as to why justice and equity either did or did not require disconnection
in this case.

Notably, no landowner who would be affected has objected

to disconnection. Having considered that evidence, the Court finds that
justice and equity require disconnection for three reasons: undeveloped
land has historically been considered appropriate for disconnection;
Bluffdale

City's

zoning and planning process

was

characterized

by

unreasonable delays and changing standards; and Bluffdale's current
political environment precludes an orderly development process.
(1)

Undeveloped

land

appropriate for disconnection.

has

historically

been

found

to

be

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES
V. BLUFFDALE CITY

PAGE 21

FINDINGS & MEMORANDUM

The proposed disconnection property in this case is completely
undeveloped.
public

There are few structures of any kind on the property, no

roads, and

little

infrastructure.

disconnection have universally

found

The

cases

such property

dealing

with

appropriate

for

disconnection.
In the case of In the Matter of the Disconnection of Territory and
Restriction of Corporate Limits of City of Draper, 646 P.2d 699 (1982),
the

court

focused

on

the

undeveloped

naiture

of

the property

in

determining that disconnection was appropriate:
These cases provide adequate guidelines in the instant case.
The territory to be disconnected is wholly agricultural in
nature. Draper does not have a municipal sewer system, nor
is it likely that it will acquire one. There is no municipal
water system within the city of Draper, and no negotiations
have occurred for the purchase of a water system. There have
been no municipal improvements within the area to be
disconnected. There is no substantial economic relationship
between Draper and the area to be disconnected. Draper City
provides minimal police and fire protection.
Id. at 702.

See also. In the Matter of the Disconnection of Territory

from Layton City,

494

P.2d

948, 949

(1972);

and Kennecott

Copper

Corporation v. City of Bingham Canyon, 415 P.2d 209, 211 (1966).

In

each of these cases the court placed great emphasis on the undeveloped
nature of the property to be disconnected.

It does not appear there has

ever been a case where disconnection of undeveloped property has been
found to be inappropriate.

In this case, the fact that the property at

issue is undeveloped is an important factor favoring disconnection.
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Bluffdale's zoning and planning process as applied to South

Farm reflects unreasonable delay and arbitrarily changing standards.
The Court has consistently ruled in this case that this is not a
planning and zoning dispute.
property

The Court cannot and would not disconnect

from Bluffdale City simply because it disagreed with a zoning

decision made by the appropriate governmental authority.

While justice

and equity do not require any specific outcome from a planning and zoning
process, they do require that the planning process be fair, expeditious
and consistent.

The Bluffdale process as applied to South Farm lacks

these elements.
South Farm was attempting

to develop

a substantial piece of

property that happened to be about 50 percent
percent in Salt Lake County.

The County portion of the property is not

only developed, but is nearly built-out.
raw land.

in Bluffdale and 50

The Bluffdale portion remains

The primary explanation for the difference between the two

parcels is the delay imposed by the Bluffdale planning process.

For

approximately four years, South Farm was not even permitted to submit
a development plan because Bluffdale was not sufficiently far along in
its own planning process to consider such a plan.

This

internal

planning process never seemed to achieve critical mass and remains
largely unfinished to this day.
city to bend
response.

Justice and equity do not require a

to a developer's will, but they do require a timely

Where a city has struggled, as Bluffdale has, to get its
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planning house in order and the result has been inordinate delays in
responding to development initiatives, justice and equity may require
that

the

developer

be

permitted

to

pursue

its

goals

in

another

jurisdiction.
Similarly, justice and equity require that the City not commit to
good faith consideration of a multi-use development and then completely
repudiate

that

approach.

The

evidence

in

this

case

is

that

by

encouraging South Farm's participation in the Quality Growth Plan and
passing Resolution 202-05, Bluffdale expressed commitment to mixed-use
development in the disconnection property.
dollars were invested
decision

thereafter

Hundreds of thousands of

in reliance on that: commitment.
to

change

course

may

be

The City's

within

its

legal

prerogatives, but is nevertheless a factor that can be considered in
determining whether justice and equity requires disconnection.
(3)

Bluffdale's

current

political

environment

precludes

an

orderly development process.
The political environment in the City is a factor that in justice
and equity favors disconnection. The proposed South Farm development has
been an emotional and contentious issue since the first public meeting
in October

1997.

The divisions

have

escalated

to the point

that

virtually any decision made by the City in favor of development is
subject to a referendum.

In the current climate, it is simply not

possible to negotiate with the City.

The City's administration has in
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effect become an agent with no authority, who can say no, but can never
say yes, and provide a reliable decision, not likely to be attacked by
referendum.

Leaving the property in the City will only prolong this

dysfunctional and contentious process. The Court is not suggesting that
citizen involvement or the referendum process is anything but salutary.
It is, however, an unwieldily mechanism for making zoning decisions.
That unwieldiness is a factor favoring disconnection in this case.
(c)

Disconnection will not leave Bluffdale with an area within its
borders for which the cost of providing municipal services would
materially increase.
Based

upon

the

findings

above,

the

Court

concludes

that

the

disconnection of this land, when considered as raw ground will not, and
cannot

materially

increase

Bluffdale

City's

historical

costs,

requirements, or other burdens of providing municipal services to any
remaining portion of the city. Accordingly, there is no basis under the
primary analysis to prevent disconnection under Section 502.7(c) (i).
Conflicting evidence was heard on the effects of development on the
existing historical city, most notably the evidence regarding traffic
flow on existing streets.

While both parties' witnesses agreed there

would be an increase of traffic on the streets now located in Bluffdale
city, Steve Goeres, Petitioner's traffic analyst specifically testified
that the increase would only be 2.5%.

When countered only by Shane

Jones' general and unsupported testimony that it would be greater than
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that, there can be no other conclusion than that the increase in traffic
would be minimal, and would not cause a material increase in the current
and historic costs of maintaining those roads.
While the witnesses agreed that development decreases the permeable
surface area of the land, thus increasing the amount of surface runoff,
even the City's witness conceded that development is better in terms of
storm water management because the water is channeled, controlled and
managed more efficiently.

State law would preclude the development from

adding to the volume of storm drainage from the disconnection property.
Sewer services are currently provided to the city by South Valley
Sewer district, and the subject property, when developed would also be
served by the district.
City,

however,

disconnection.

it

Because this is not a service provided by the

is not

considered

for purposes

of

the proposed

At trial, all the credible evidence suggested that there

would be no material increase in the cost to the city to provide law
enforcement, zoning or other municipal services as a result of the
disconnection of the land, after the land is developed.
In short, petitioner
preponderance

of

the

established

evidence,

through

that whether

expert
developed

testimony, by
or not, the

disconnection of the subject property would not materially increase the
cost to the City of providing municipal services to any existing portion
of the City.
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Disconnection would not make it unfeasible for Bluffdale to function
as a municipality.
The

evidence

at

trial

clearly

established

three

reasons

that

disconnection would not make it unfeasible for Bluffdale to function as
a municipality: the loss of tax revenue is insignificant; there would
be no material
City's

impact

proposed

from the proposed

growth

plan

for

the

development; and Bluffdale
subject

property

would

be

impractical.
(1) There is no significant loss of revenue
As

raw land,

the disconnection property generates

$1,750 in tax revenue for Bluffdale City.

Loss of this

approximately
insignificant

amount, when considered against Bluffdale's budget as a whole, would not
be

enough

to

municipality.

make

it

unfeasible

Furthermore,

for

Bluffdale

in the context

of

to

function

as

the consideration

a
of

Bluffdale's ability to function as a municipality, all that Bluffdale is
losing is raw land, with its associated

$1,750 in revenue.

From the

evidence presented at trial, the Court cannot conclude that Bluffdale's
continued existence hinges upon its ability to develop this raw land in
the manner it has proposed.
(2)

There is no material impact from development

The Court's conclusion above that the disconnection would not leave
the City with an area within its boundaries for which the costs, etc.
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previous

years,

also

supports

the

conclusion that such immaterial increases in costs, if any, would not
make Bluffdale's continued existence unfeasible.

This is particularly

true in the case of the costs associated with maintenance and improvement
of existing roadways.

The evidence suggested

that these costs are

necessary infrastructure costs which would be required regardless of
whether the land is disconnected or not.

Similarly, the installation of

the 12" water main was a necessary infrastructure investment; and the
value it provided to Bluffdale city will not be lost as a result of the
disconnection.
(3)

The

City's

plan

for

the

disconnect

property

would

be

impractical
Disconnection would seriously limit Bluffdale's ability to grow, but
it must be noted that growth is not assumed in any event.
preference for one acre lots may make growth impossible.

The City's
Ms. Wikstrom

credibly opined that it would take in excess of 50 years to build out the
disconnection property in one acre lots (as Bluffdale City would prefer),
even assuming that the disconnection property absorbed 100 percent of the
demand for one acre lots in Salt Lake and Utah counties.
(e)

The disconnection would not create a peninsula
The proposed disconnection will not leave or create one or more

islands

or peninsulas

of

unincorporated

territory.

The

statutory

definition of a peninsula requires two separate calculations:

\ui
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''Peninsula," when used to describe an unincorporated area,
means an area surrounded on more than V2 of its boundary
distance, but not completely, by incorporated territory and
situated so that the length of a line drawn across the
unincorporated area from an incorporated area to an
incorporated area on the opposite side shall be less than 25%
of the total aggregate boundaries of the unincorporated area.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-1-104(6).

A disconnection only creates a peninsula

if both tests are met.
(1)

Following disconnect the remaining unincorporated area is not
surrounded

on more

V2 of

than

its

boundary

distance

by

incorporated territory.
The first of the two tests requires a determination of whether the
disconnection creates an area that is surrounded on more than one-half
of its boundary distance, but not completely by incorporated territory.
The unincorporated area that disconnection would "leave or create" would
be bordered in part by Bluffdale and in part by Herriman; however, the
unincorporated area which is left or created is essentially infinite.
The

newly

created

unincorporated

unincorporated

areas

in

Salt

area

Lake

would

County

join

which

other
in

bordering

turn

borders

unincorporated areas in other counties throughout the state.

In the

Court's view, all contiguous unincorporated areas must be considered in
making the calculation.

Tracing the borders of incorporated territory

reveals only islands and peninsulas of incorporated land in a vast ocean
of unincorporated territory. In reality, unless other boundaries are

l\Q\
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utilized, the very definition which was created by the legislature makes
the existence

of a peninsula

impossible, because

of necessity,

every

"peninsula" with measurable boundaries will also be an island.
(2)

The 25% test as interpreted by the City renders the statute
vague

Having concluded that the unincorporated area left or created by
disconnection is not surrounded by more than one-half of its boundary
distance
second

by

incorporated

calculation.

territory,

The

Court

it

is not

further

necessary

concludes

that

to make
if

the

the
term

"unincorporated area" were limited to the newly disconnected areas as the
City proposes, the statute is rendered too vague to apply.

In virtually

any disconnection, it would be possible to draw a line from incorporated
territory to incorporated territory on the opposite side that either does
or does not meet the test.

In this case, this difficulty was illustrated

quite clearly at trial as counsel for both parties were able to draw
lines from one portion of incorporated territory to a point "opposite"
to support their positions.

For instance, it is conceivable that a line

could be drawn across a corner of any possible section of unincorporated
land that will always be less than 25% of the aggregate boundaries of the
unincorporated area if that area were limited to the disconnected area
as Bluffdale proposes.
(3)

The

proposed

disconnection

definition of "peninsula"

does

not

meet

the

historical
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Because of the ambiguity that exists in the statutory definition of
"peninsula,"

it

is

useful

to

examine

historical

word-particularly in the disconnection context.

usage

of

the

It is probable that the

legislature attempted with the definition provided to describe a portion
of land that, were it surrounded by water, would look like a "peninsula"
as that word is commonly used.

By definition a "peninsula" is "a piece

of land that projects into a body of water and is connected with the
mainland by an isthmus." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
Language (3d. Ed. 1992), 1338.

An "isthmus" is "a narrow neck of land

connecting two larger masses of land." Id., at 957.
question

were

"unincorporated

If the land here in

land which projects

into an area of

incorporated land and is connected with the main mass of unincorporated
land by a narrow neck," it would be possible to apply the definition
given by the statute to that land with more confidence.

Here, the

protrusion the disconnection would leave is shaped like a right triangle,
with

the narrowest

portion

unincorporated land.

farthest

removed

from the main body of

The Court cannot conclude that the legislature

intended this land to be within its definition of a peninsula.
Absent a clear statutory definition, the Court turns to the historic
use of the word.

The statutory provisions limiting the creation of

"peninsulas" or "peninsular land masses" were imposed to avoid irregular
boundaries

or

areas

of

unincorporated

territory

which

unreasonably

disrupt either the county's or municipality's provision of services to
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When the land is considered

as interrupting incorporated territory, all of Bluffdale is to the east
of

the

disconnect

disconnect.

property,

and

all of Herriman

lies west

of

the

The ability of these two municipalities to provide services

to their citizens would not in any way be impacted by the presence of
this unincorporated section of land.

Also, while the county would be

required to cross through municipalities in order to provide services to
the land, currently there are virtually no services to be provided to the
land.

Based upon these historic

factors, the Court

finds that no

peninsula here exists.
(f)

Salt Lake County is capable of providing cost-effective municipal
services to the disconnected parcel.
Only minimal services, in the form of an occasional police call and

seven or eight fire calls are currently provided to the property every
year.

The evidence at trial supports a conclusion

that this minimal

involvement would not cause a material increase in Salt Lake
costs of providing these services.

County's

Similarly the evidence supports the

conclusion that the County could provide these services cost effectively.
(g)

Disconnection is not precluded because the petitioners may have had
other remedies
Bluffdale City has argued that this action is improper and should

be dismissed because it is simply the appeal of a zoning decision; and
is an attempt to circumvent the boundary adjustment procedures at Utah
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Code Ann.

§ 10-2-419, which
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the Petitioner's

exclusive

remedy.

Neither of these contentions are well taken.
(1)
As

This action is not an appeal of a zoning decision.
this

Court

has previously

held,

this present

action

is a

procedure which seeks distinct remedies from those available through
appeal of a zoning decision under
Petitioners'

right

to appeal

§ 10-9-1001.

the December

While it was the

9, 2003 decision to the

District Court, they certainly did not waive the right to the distinct
relief which a successful petition under § 10-2-501 would afford, because
quite simply those issues were never raised in South Farm's attempt at
amending the general plan and changing zoning.
concerned

that disconnection will

Cities need not be

result every time a landowner is

unhappy with the planning and zoning decision.

It is a rare circumstance

that a landowner affected by a planning and zoning decision could meet
all the tests required for a successful disconnection case.

This Court

has not and would not order disconnection simply because a landowner was
unhappy with a zoning decision.

Justice and equity require that cities

be allowed reasonable latitude in making such decisions.
(2)

This action is not a boundary adjustment action.

Respondent argues that Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-419 provides the
exclusive mechanism for boundary adjustment.

Section 419, and § 10-2-

510, upon which the Respondent relies for this conclusion, do not support
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this contention.
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Section 510, referring to the disconnection provisions

contained in §§ 10-2-501 et seq. states:
This part shall not be construed to abrogate, modify, or
replace the boundary adjustment procedure provided in Section
10-2-419.
Subsection (1) of § 10-2-419 states:
The legislative bodies of two or more municipalities having
common boundaries may adjust their common boundaries as
provided in this section.
Id. (Emphasis added).
clear

that

boundary

The language selected by the legislature makes
adjustment

is

a

procedure

undertaken

by

two

municipalities who act in concert.

Indeed, under section 419 the only

right

within

of

the

owners

of

property

the

adjustment is that they may object to the action.

portion

because

section

419

describes

a

for

Section 10-2-419 does

not provide a cause of action for a private lamdowner.
context,

proposed

When read in this

procedure

exclusive

to

municipalities, § 10-2-510 may not "abrogate, modify, or replace" the
right of cooperating municipalities to adjust boundary lines.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Petitioner's Petition for Disconnection
is hereby GRANTED.

Petitioners are directed to prepare a Decree of

Disconnection consistent^ith this opinion.
Dated this Z.S

day of February, 2006^00*

UA?
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V. BLUFFDALE CITY

PAGE 35

FINDINGS & MEMORANDUM

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Memorandum Decision, to the following,
this

day of February, 2006:

Bruce R. Baird
Attorney for Petitioners
9537 South 700 East
Sandy, Utah 84 070
Hoilis S. Hunt
Attorney for Petitioner South Farm
392 East 12300 South, Suite A
Draper, Utah 84020
Dale F. Gardiner
Attorney for Respondent
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1270
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James K. Tracy
Attorney for proposed intervenors
136 S. Main Street, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Addendum "E"
(Decree of Disconnection entered by the Third District Court
on March 20, 2006)

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Bruce R. Baird, #0176
HUTCHINGS BAIRD & JONES PLLC
Attorneys for Petitioners
9537 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84070
Telephone: (801)328-1400
Facsimile: (801)328-1444
Hollis S.Hunt, #1587
HUNT & RUDD
Attorneys for Petitioner South Farm, LLC
392 East 12300 South, Suite A
Draper, Utah 84020
Telephone: (801)495-3500
Facsimile: (801)495-1877

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 0 2006
SALT LAKE COUNTY

ByDepilfy Clerk

I tit'
» tkg-^J

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS f

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

BLUFFDALE MOUNTAIN HOMES, LC;
etal.
Petitioners,

DECREE OF DISCONNECTION

Civil No. 040909930

vs.
BLUFFDALE CITY, a Utah Municipal
corporation,
Respondent.

Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Trial in this matter was held from January 30 through February 2, 2006.
The Petitioners were represented by Bruce R. Baird of Hutchings Baird & Jones,
PLLC, and Hollis S. Hunt, of Hunt & Rudd. Respondent was represented by Dale
F. Gardiner, and Craig Klieneman, of Parry Anderson & Gardiner, and James K.
Decree of Disconnection (re: real property) @J

l
JD20090158
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Tracy and Patrick S. Malone, of Mabey Murray, L.C. The Court heard the
testimony of the witnesses for the Petitioners and the Respondent, reviewed the
exhibits submitted and considered the various motions, briefs, and other
procedural matters raised by the parties. The Court having considered the
evidence and testimony in this matter entered its Findings of Fact and
Memorandum Decision on February 27, 2006, and now enters the following
Decree of Disconnection;
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The Disconnected Property, as described in Exhibit "A" attached, is
hereby disconnected and separated from the municipal boundaries of the
City of Bluffdale, and now becomes a part of the unincorporated area of
Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

2.

Pursuant to § 10-2-507(1), U.C.A., a certified copy of this Decree and a
transparent reproducible copy of the map, which is attached as Exhibit
"B", shall be filed by the Clerk of the Court with the Lieutenant
Governor upon the entry of this Decree.

3.

Pursuant to § 67-la-6.5(7), U.C.A., the Lieutenant Governor shall then
complete the statutory requirements to certify the disconnection of the
Disconnected Property.

4.

The City of Bluffdale shall then, pursuant to § 10-1-117, U.C.A., and
within thirty (30) days after the entry of this Decree, file Amended
Articles of Incorporation in the Lieutenant Governor's office and in the

l^kHV

Salt Lake County Recorders office meeting the statutory requirements
of§ 10-2-507(2), U.C.A.
5.

The Court finds that there are no taxes that need to be levied on the
Disconnected Property that are required to pay the Disconnected
Property's proportionate share of the obligations accrued to the City of
Bluffdale while the Disconnected Property was part of the City of
Bluffdale pursuant to § 10-2-506(1), U.C.A.

6.

Any costs reasonably and actually incurred by the City of Bluffdale in
complying with this Decree shall be charged to the Petitioners who shall
pay such costs within a reasonable period of time after receiving a
detailed invoice from the City of Bluffdale.

7.

Other than as provided in Paragraph 6, the parties shall each bear their
own costs of this action.

Dated this ZQ day of March, 2006.
BY THE COU

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Dale F. Gardiner
Attorney for Bluffdale City

W\\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (_

day of March, 2006,1 served the foregoing

DECREE OF DISCONNECTION by hand delivery, addressed to the following:
Dale F. Gardiner
Craig R. Kleinman
PARRY ANDERSON & GARDINER

1200 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
James K. Tracy
MAYBE MURRAY LC
1000 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION
DISCONNECT LAND ASSOCIATION
A parcel of land lying in Sections 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 27 of Township 4
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at the West Quarter corner of said Section 6; thence South 89°36'05" East along
the centerline of said Section 6 for 3763.944 feet to the west line of the Welby Canal; thence
along said canal for the following One Hundred Forty Seven (147) courses; South 32°19'55"
East for 122.651 feet; thence South 23°18'28" East for 49.828 feet; thence South 10°26'48" East
for 48.555 feet; thence South 00°10'56" West for 48.412 feet; thence South 07°16'50" West for
52.937 feet; thence South 14°17'03" West for 106.982 feet; thence South 06°22'06" West for
55.045 feet; thence South 00°43'32" West for 52.928 feet; thence South 01°35'47" East for
214.599 feet; thence South 10°05'19" East for 57.621 feet; thence South 17°45'41" East for
55.569 feet; thence South 25°32'39" East for 55.349 feet; thence South 28°09'27" East for
554.609 feet; thence South 35°11'01" East for 310.277 feet; thence South 37°17'31" East for
165.659 feet; thence South 44°49'05" East for 112.612 feet; thence South 51°23'01" East for
215.838 feet; thence South 42°10'48" East for 52.329 feet; thence South 31°33'56" East for
106.838 feet; thence South 26°17'40" East for 212.555 feet; thence South 29°31'21" East for
106.223 feet; thence South 38°02'18" East for 58.641 feet; thence South 49°41'00" East for
161.798 feet; thence South 53°28'05" East for 229.399 feet; thence South 53°25'35" East for
44.402 feet; thence South 53°24'55" East for 174.082 feet; thence South 55°48'08" East for
160.484 feet; thence South 70°39'18" East for 54.337 feet; thence South 86°58'33" East for
56.348 feet; thence North 84°00'14" East for 161.248 feet; thence South 87°22'44" East for
52.180 feet; thence South 80°15'14" East for 270.231 feet; thence South 77°44'20" East for
52.132 feet; thence South 65°48'00" East for 51.809 feet; thence South 50°22'11" East for
50.211 feet; thence South 40°18'00" East for 51.808 feet; thence South 33°26'33" East for
241.730 feet; thence South 31°29'26" East for 154.228 feet; thence South 20°20'08" East for
106.043 feet; thence South 13°33'51" East for 423.556 feet; thence South 21°37'17" East for
56.533 feet; thence South 27°10'54" East for 412.294 feet; thence South 28°35'34" East for
433.534 feet; thence South 31°31'03" East for 428.536 feet; thence South 19°55'18" East for
50.061 feet; thence South 00°54'12" East for 47.742 feet; thence South 20°48'38" West for
158.104 feet; thence South 13°19'41" West for 59.086 feet; thence South 35°53'23" East for
60.836 feet; thence South 74°29'38" East for 212.583 feet; thence South 67°35'11" East for
100.955 feet; thence South 67°18'50" East for 355.561 feet; thence South 65°10'20" East for
215.080 feet; thence South 59°49'02" East for 372.880 feet; thence South 52°54'59" East for
105.787 feet; thence South 43°55'00" East for 163.875 feet; thence South 42°45'41" East for
277.617 feet; thence South 34°15'21" East for 107.029 feet; thence South 27°00'54" East for
778.589 feet; thence South 22°14'40" East for 54.148 feet; thence South 17°13'01" East for
595.287 feet; thence South 26°14'18" East for 114.291 feet; thence South 50°14'59" East for
60.701 feet; thence South 63°28'01" East for 348.152 feet; thence South 63°28'01" East for
295.997 feet; thence South 55°28'17" East for 52.340 feet; thence South 50°09'01" East for
105.261 feet; thence South 48°19'32" East for 360.507 feet; thence South 48°19'32" East for
380.852 feet; thence South 46°19'24" East for 108.048 feet; thence South 40°28'11" East for
106.848 feet; thence South 30°42'43" East for 473.939 feet; thence South 33°57'21" East for
54.448 feet; thence South 28°53'29" East for 139.550 feet; thence South 36°26'57" East for
106.518 feet; thence South 46°41'07" East for 166.181 feet; thence South 51°13'15" East for
168.834 feet; thence South 6O°10'03" East for 53.216 feet; thence South 72°43'17" East for
53.432 feet; thence South 81°25'55" East for 102.039 feet; thence South 73°24'31" East for

68.206 feet; thence South 64°25'17" East for 89.155 feet; thence South 58°36'14" East for
667.789 feet; thence South 60°35'49" East for 106.336 feet; thence South 70°09'05" East for
107.406 feet; thence South 75°03'21" East for 523.941 feet; thence South 87°19'57" East for
114.951 feet; thence North 84°42'53" East for 102.480 feet; thence South 68°11'04" East for
211.037 feet; thence South 81°41'17" East for 161.218 feet; thence South 71°28'13" East for
50.515 feet; thence South 59°46'29" East for 48.571 feet; thence South 52°13'26" East for
128.083 feet to the south line of the north half of Section 16; thence South 89°19'49" East along
said south line for 1781.243 feet more or less to the West Quarter corner of Section 15; thence
South 89°28'41" East along the south line of the north half of said Section 15 for 422.224 feet
more or less to the west right-of-way line of Redwood Road; thence along said right-of-way line
for the following eight (8) courses; with a non-tangent curve to the left, having a radius of
2770.595 feet, a central angle of 10°56'57" (chord bearing and distance of South 15°29'21" East
- 528.650 feet) and for an arc distance of 529.455 feet; thence South 13°42'56" East for 301.500
feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 1400.000 feet; thence South 25°08'12" East for 301.500
feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 1000.393 feet; thence South 13°42'56" East for 301.500
feet; thence South 19°25'34" East for 7311.125 feet to the intersection of said west right-of-way
and the south line of the north half of Section 27; thence North 89°35'39" West along said south
line for 1401.748 feet more or less to the center of said Section 27; thence North 89°35'39" West
along the centerline of said Section 27 for 1320.000 feet more or less to the Southwest corner of
the east half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 27; thence North 00°42'20" West along the
west line of the east half of said Northwest Quarter for 2627.441 feet more or less to the
Northwest corner of the east half of said Northwest Quarter; thence South 89°36'50" West along
the north line of said Section 27 for 1380.651 feet more or less to the Southwest corner of said
Section 22; thence North 00°03'29" East along the west line of said Section 22 for 2598.603 feet
more or less to the West Quarter corner of said Section 22; thence North 01°06'41" East along
the west line of said Section 22 for 1326.035 feet more or less to the Northeast corner of south
half of the north half of said Section 21; thence South 89°59'33" West along the north line of the
south half of north half of said Section 21 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the northeast corner
of the south half of the Northwest Quarter said Section 21; thence South 00°52'20" East for
1370.072 feet to the center of said Section 21; thence North 88°53' 11" West along the south line
of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21 for 2607.161 feet to the West Quarter corner of said
Section 21; thence South 89°58'02" West along the centerline of said Section 20 for 2640.000
feet more or less to the center of said Section 20; thence North 00°0r58" West along the
centerline of said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the North Quarter corner of said
Section 20; thence South 89°28'28" West along the north line of said Section 20 for 2617.134
feet to the Northwest corner of said Section 20; thence South 00°22'04" East along the west line
of said Section 20 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the West Quarter corner of said Section 20;
thence North 89°16'28" West along the centerline of said Section 19 for 5280.000 feet more or
less to the West Quarter corner of said Section 19; thence North 00°43'32" East along the west
line of said Section 19 for 2640.000 feet more or less to the Northwest corner of said Section 19;
thence North 00° 15' 11" East along the west line of said Section 18 for 2650.924 feet to the West
Quarter Corner of said Section 18; thence North 00°36'54" East along the west line of said
Section 18 for 2623.328 feet to the Northwest corner of said Section 18; thence North 00°09'22"
West along the west line of said Section 7 for 2693.831 feet to the West Quarter corner of said
Section 7; thence North 00°07'48" West along the west line of said Section 7 for 2673.457 feet
to the Northwest corner of said Section 7; thence North 00° 11'30" West along the west line of
said Section 6 for 2677.167 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
Containing 4052.3182 Acres Gross, more or less
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LESS AND EXCEPT PARCEL 138
A parcel of land lying in Northeast Quarter of Section 19 of Township 4 South, Range 1 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more particularly described as follows:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of said Section 19; thence South 45°02'26" West for
1844.418 feet more or less to the southwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast
Quarter of said section; thence North 00°05'40" West for 1319.955 feet more or less to the
Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of said section; thence South
89°16'09" East for 1307.406 feet more or less to the POINT OF BEGINNING.
Containing 19.8064 acres more or less.
ALSO LESS AND EXCEPTING PARCEL 144
A parcel of land being the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 21, Township 4
South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, being more particularly described as
follows:
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the being the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest
Quarter of said Section 21; thence South 00°52'20" East for 1370.072 feet more or less to the
Southeast corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21; thence
South 89°59'33" West for 1320.000 feet more or less to the Southwest corner of the Northeast
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 21; thence North 01°35'55" West for 1344.924
feet more or less to the Northwest corner of the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of
said Section 21; thence North 88°53'56" East for 1336.913 feet more or less to the POINT OF
BEGINNING.
Containing 41.3943 Acres more or less
Net Acreage 3991.1175 Acres more or less
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Addendum "F"
(Exhibit 209, Remote View of Municipalities in Central
Western Utah-Zoomed View)
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Addendum "G"
(Exhibit 216, Colored Map of Disconnection Area)

SIGNED PETIONERS FOR ANNEXATION

QUASI GOVERNMENT (WATER CONSERVANCEY, UT
POWER AND LIGHT, CAMP WILLIAMS, SCHOOL DIST
HERRIMAN CITY

RIVERTON CITY

CAMP WILLIAMS / UTAH STATE ARMORY

UNSIGNED PETITIONERS

UNINCORPORATED AREA OF SALT LAKE COUNTY

I

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

PETITIONERS MAP

